Impact of Interest Group Testimony on Lawmaking in Congress by Kasniunas, Nina Therese
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Dissertations Theses and Dissertations
2009
Impact of Interest Group Testimony on
Lawmaking in Congress
Nina Therese Kasniunas
Loyola University Chicago
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 2009 Nina Therese Kasniunas
Recommended Citation
Kasniunas, Nina Therese, "Impact of Interest Group Testimony on Lawmaking in Congress" (2009). Dissertations. Paper 220.
http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/220
 
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO 
 
 
 
IMPACT OF INTEREST GROUP TESTIMONY ON LAWMAKING IN CONGRESS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO 
 
 THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL 
 
 IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF  
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
PROGRAM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
NINA THERESE KASNIUNAS 
 
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 
 
AUGUST 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by Nina Therese Kasniunas, 2009 
 
All rights reserved 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 This work is the result of much time and effort by several individuals other than 
me.  Raymond Tatalovich was instrumental in guiding me through every step in the 
process of pulling this research together, from choosing an interesting and important 
topic to helping me write grant proposals, selecting a committee and reading and offering 
feedback on multiple drafts of papers and chapters.  I am so grateful to have a mentor 
who was so generous with his time, advice and much needed support.  Richard Matland 
was also invaluable.  His patience was never ending and he too was very giving of his 
time as he read through numerous drafts and iterations of this dissertation.  I have learned 
much from him along the way and he has undoubtedly made me a better scholar.   
 Alan Gitelson and John Frendreis also gave of their time to read drafts and offer 
feedback on my dissertation.  They were particularly helpful in the initial stages of this 
research project, offering critical advice on how to proceed from my proposal to the 
finished product.  It was extremely helpful to have their viewpoints as well.  Other 
members of my department at Loyola also helped along the way – Vincent Mahler was 
helpful with aspects of the statistical modeling and Susan Mezey listened to me and 
offered advice as I was putting together a topic to research. 
 Lastly I would like to thank my parents who supported and loved me all along the 
way.  Their belief in me has no limits and was critical to helping me survive this process.
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS        iii 
LIST OF TABLES         vi 
LIST OF FIGURES         ix 
LIST OF GRAPHS         x 
CHAPTER ONE: INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESSIONAL    1 
HEARINGS 
 Overview of Congressional Committees       7  
 Importance of Studying Interest Group Influence in Committees             12 
 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW                  19 
 Interest Group Influence                   22 
 Interest Group Access to Policy Makers      24 
 Congressional Testimony as Interest Group Influence    30 
 Conclusion          37 
 
CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK     39 
 Subgovernments and Issue Networks       40 
 Committee Power Theories        42 
 Interest Group Influence Theory       50 
 Interest Group Impact Theory       57  
 Conclusion          64 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH DESIGN       66 
 The Access Model         66 
  Research Sample for the Access Model     67 
  Independent Variables for the Access Model     73 
 The Influence Model         89 
  Research Sample for the Influence Model     89 
  Independent Variables in the Influence Model    96 
 Summary          99 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: INTEREST GROUP ACCESS TO CONGRESSIONAL 101  
HEARINGS 
 The Access Model        101
v 
 
  Descriptive Statistics       102 
  Hypotheses for the Access Model     112 
 Results         120 
Logistic Regression with only Chair and Committee Variables 121 
Logistic Regression with only Interest Group Variables             126                               
Logistic Regression with Interest Group and Committee   129
 Variables       
 Logistic Regression Comparison by Session of Congress  136 
 Discussion         140 
 Conclusion         148 
 
CHAPTER SIX: THE INFLUENCE OF INTEREST GROUP TESTIMONY  150 
ON LEGISLATIVE MARK UPS 
 The Influence Model        151 
  Descriptive Statistics       151 
  Hypotheses for the Influence Model     161 
 Results         168 
  Logistic Regression with only Committee Variables   168 
  Logistic Regression with only Interest Group Variables  170 
Logistic Regression with Interest Group and Committee  175  
Variables 
Logistic Regression Comparison by Session of Congress  188   
 Discussion         194 
 Conclusion         198 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION      201 
 Interest Group Impact Theory      201 
  Summary of Results       202 
  The Access Model       202 
  The Influence Model       204 
  Contributions to the Interest Group Literature   206 
  Contributions to the Congressional Committee Literature  208 
 Pluralism and Plural Elitism       209 
 Limitations and Future Research      218 
 Conclusion         221 
 
APPENDIX A: LEGISLATION IN WHICH INTEREST GROUPS  222 
SUCCESSFULLY IMPACTED THE BILL MARKUPS     
 
APPENDIX B: LISTING OF SUCCESSFUL INTEREST GROUPS  227 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY         234 
 
VITA           247 
vi 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 
 
 1.  Interest Group Impact Hypotheses      62 
 
2. Number of Organizations Registered in the Lobbying     70 
Disclosure Database  
 
3. Variable Descriptions for the Access Model     87 
 
4. Committees Used in the Influence Model Along with Their    92 
Legislative Activity 
 
5. Breakdown of Outcomes for all Recommendations Made    95 
by Interest Groups 
 
6. Variable Descriptions for the Influence Model     98 
 
7. Classification of Interest Groups      103 
 
8. Access to Hearings by Type of Interest Group    108 
 
9. Groups Making PAC Contributions by Type of Interest    112 
Group 
 
10. Congressional Quarterly’s Party Unity Scores for Each    113 
Party within the House of Representatives for 1998 – 2004 
 
11. Probability of an Interest Group Being Invited to Testify with   122 
Committee Variables Only 
 
12. Probability of an Interest Group Being Invited to Testify with   123 
Committee Variables Only (corrected model) 
 
13. Probability of an Interest Group Being Invited to Testify with   124 
Committee Variables Only (second corrected model 
vii 
14. Probability of an Interest Group Being Invited to Testify with   127 
Interest Group Variables Only 
 
15. Probability of an Interest Group Being Invited to Testify with  128  
Interest Group Variables Only (dropping budget) 
 
16. Probability of an Interest Group Being Invited to Testify with   130 
Interest Group Variables and Committee Variables 
 
17. Comparison of Odds Coefficients for Each Session of Congress 137 
 
18. Were the Access Hypotheses Supported?    139 
 
19. Types of Interest Groups Comprising the Influence Data Set  153 
 
20. Types of Groups Testifying Orally as Compared to those   155 
Submitting Written Testimony   
 
21. Percentage of Each Type of Interest Group Making PAC   157  
Contributions in the Influence Sample 
 
22. Groups that Successfully Made Recommendations by Type  158 
 
23. Congressional Quarterly’s Party Unity Scores for Each Party   161 
within the House of Representatives for the 103rd, 106th and  
108th Sessions 
  
24. Probability an Interest Group’s Recommended Change is   169 
Included in the Bill Markup with Committee Variables  
Only 
 
25. Probability an Interest Group’s Recommended Change is   170 
Included in the Bill Markup with Interest Group Variables Only 
 
26. Probability an Interest Group’s Recommended Change is   172 
Included in the Bill Markup with Interest Group Variables Only  
(dropping budget) 
 
27. Probability an Interest Group’s Recommended Change is   173 
Included in the Bill Markup with Interest Group Variables Only  
(dropping budget and members) 
 
28. Probability an Interest Group’s Recommended Change is   174 
Included in the Bill Markup with Interest Group Variables Only  
(dropping budget and members, corrected) 
viii 
 
29. Probability an Interest Group’s Recommended Change is Included  176 
in the Bill Markup 
 
30. Probability an Interest Group’s Recommended Change is Included  186 
      in the Bill Markup (narrower definition of impact) 
 
             31. Probability an Interest Group’s Recommended Change is Included  189 
                   in the Bill Markup by Session of Congress (w/submitted, y1) 
 
32. Percentage of Recommended Changes Accepted by the 103rd, 106th  192 
       and 108th Congresses 
 
 33. Were the Influence Hypotheses Supported?    193
ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 
  
1. Levels of Partisanship in the Committees and Subcommittees   76 
 
 2.   Percentage of Groups Maintaining a Lobbying Presence   107 
      Over a Seven Year Period (1998-2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF GRAPHS 
 
Graph 
 
1. Predicted Probability of Testifying by Number of   132 
Lobbyists on Staff 
 
2. Predicted Probability of Testifying by Members in   133 
Group 
 
3. Predicted Probability of Testifying by Level of    134 
Lobbying Activity 
 
4. Predicted Probability of Testifying by Active Media   135 
Mentions 
 
5. Predicted Probability of Testifying by Passive Media   136 
Mentions 
 
6. Predicted Probability of Interest Group Impact by   177 
Partisanship 
 
6a. Predicted Probability of Interest Group Impact by  178  
Partisanship 
 
7. Predicted Probability of Interest Group Impact by Ratio  179 
of Majority to Minority Party Seats on Committee 
 
7a. Predicted Probability of Interest Group Impact by Ratio  180  
of Majority to Minority Party Seats on Committee 
 
8. Predicted Probability of Interest Group Impact by Ideology 181 
 
8a. Predicted Probability of Interest Group Impact by Ideology 182
xi 
9. Predicted Probability of Interest Group Impact by Group  183 
Age 
 
9a. Predicted Probability of Interest Group Impact by Group 184  
      Age 
       
  1 
CHAPTER ONE 
 INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS 
Interest groups actively seek to influence governmental policy.  On its face this 
suggests a certain level of self interest among groups.  They exist to pursue policy 
objectives that will further their interests.  This is true of each and every group.  Even 
groups that exist to combat poverty are serving their own interests in that members and 
organizers of the interest group are receiving some payoff for pursuing laws to alleviate 
poverty.  The realized benefits as theorized initially by Mancur Olson can be material 
(1965).  The group may receive government tax subsidies that might reduce its overhead 
costs or encourage more individuals to contribute to its cause.  But the benefits might 
move beyond the material.  Members, staff and organizers might be advantaged by the 
sense of solidarity they receive from working among others with similar goals or they 
may simply feel fulfilled in some way by having done their part to help combat this 
problem (Clark and Wilson 1961).  The latter type of incentive is often referred to as an 
expressive or purposive benefit, while the former is labeled as being a solidary benefit 
(Salisbury 1969). 
 Whether seeking expressive, solidary or material benefits, interest groups lobby 
government to provide them.  While some may value certain types of benefits over 
others, or view some as a more appropriate target for government action, understanding 
what types of groups do gain access and have influence is important.  Does providing 
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campaign contributions to committee members guarantee access?  Is there something else 
that better explains the success of some groups over others?   
Almost every interest that exists among our citizenry is represented in 
government either through an existing organization or a latent group that could form 
given the right situation (Truman 1951).  The population of interest groups, as such, is a 
reflection of all the interests that exist in our complex society (Truman 1951).  The 
cardinal principle of pluralist theory was expressed by James Madison in Federalist #10.  
By increasing the size of the republic, the number and diversity of interests will be 
increased and, as a result, it is less likely that any one interest will be able to dominate the 
political process.  It is the varied perspectives, ideas and input on policy from such a wide 
range of interests that ensures the policy output will be optimal for the public good.  
Pluralism works only if all interests have equal access and an equal opportunity to 
influence the policymaking process. 
 This research focuses on the role of interest groups in policymaking and the 
function of congressional hearings.  There have been a variety of ways to specify interest 
groups, but this research uses the broadest definition.  An interest group is any organized 
interest that seeks to shape public policy.  Using such a broad definition enables 
comparison of a number of organized interests that together comprise the interest group 
populations: membership groups, trade association, governmental entities, business 
corporations, etc.  While groups serve to represent individual interests in government, 
linking citizens and policy makers, they also serve perhaps a more important role.  Once 
organized and working toward their policy goals, interest groups have found a way to 
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make themselves indispensable to policy makers.  They serve as purveyors of 
information (Wright 1996).  The reason why pluralism values inclusion of the widest 
range of interests possible is that they bring different perspectives to the table.  Those 
varied perspectives provide information to policy makers who are weighing a number of 
legislative alternatives.  Understanding this role, interest groups over time have worked to 
provide information to policy makers that would lead to those legislators adopting the 
positions being advocated by the interest groups.  Interest groups have hired onto their 
staffs, scientists, analysts and researchers whose work gets compiled into reports that 
serve to influence not only legislators but also other actors that indirectly influence 
policymaking such as the media and public opinion.  Interest groups are now an integral 
part of the policy process.   
This role being sustained by interest groups has become increasingly important as 
our society has become more complex and hence also our public policy (Rich & Weaver 
1998; Smith 1984; Schlozman & Tierney 1986).  Our economy is no longer dominated 
by a handful of industries and interests.  It has evolved rapidly into an intricate web of a 
large number of different industries whose own developments occur so quickly that it is 
difficult to remain informed about those interests.  The complexities and intricacies of our 
economy and society require similarly complex and involved policy which in turn 
requires a high level of understanding by legislators (Smith, Roberts, Wielen 2007).  Our 
legislators, through their backgrounds, however rarely represent the full range of interests 
present in our economies and our society at large.  Even when it comes to long standing 
American interests like agriculture, many members of Congress who work with 
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agriculture policy lack any relevant background experience.  It becomes even more 
difficult when Congress legislates over newer industries like biofuel technologies.  
Making policy requires understanding the intricacies involved.  When members of 
Congress lack this expertise, interest groups bridge the gap.  They step in and share their 
information with policy makers so that Congress can effectively consider and pass 
necessary legislation. 
Interest groups provide more information than just regarding the specialized or 
intricate nature of the issue being considered.  They also inform legislators on the 
political and electoral consequences of acting on different policy alternatives (Kingdon 
1973).  This type of information is equally attractive, if not more so, to legislators as they 
work in an environment where they are always keeping an eye on the next election 
(Mayhew 1974).  They only have a job as long as they keep winning the next election.  
With all of the demands placed on members of Congress, they welcome interest group 
help in gathering intelligence relating to policy, politics or elections. 
Interest groups certainly do more than just represent individual interests and 
provide information.  For example some of them are very active in elections, working in 
support of a party or candidate.  It is in these pursuits that at times they begin to generate 
negative attention and raise questions about the propriety of their role.  Interest groups, 
especially the newly emergent 527 committees, are often behind the negative issue 
advertising that some Americans abhor so much (Borick 2005; Dwyre 2007; Kaid & 
Dimitrova 2005)1.  Their ability to raise millions of dollars for elections also raises 
 
1 In a study conducted by Kaid, McKinney, and Tedesco (2000) following the 1996 presidential campaign, 
43 percent of their sample indicated that “negative ads are unethical.” 
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suspicion among Americans, for an interest group that contributes upwards of $10 
million in any single election cycle must be reaping some material return.  
This overview of interest groups and the role they play in American politics 
suggests they are necessary players in the governmental system.  But is their presence 
good for democracy?  Do they serve to help or hinder the legislative process?  Interest 
groups theoretically should enhance the representation of citizens in government while at 
the same time providing information to policy makers, but does this occur?  What would 
the implications of limiting interest group activity be?  Without information made 
available to interest groups Congress possibly would have to increase their budgets for 
staff and services like the Congressional Research Service, the Congressional Budgeting 
Office and the Government Accountability Office.  Perhaps without interest groups 
providing information we would see different types of policy outcomes that are not 
reflective of a wide range of interests.   
There is substantial evidence to suggest pluralism in practice does not always 
meet the lofty standards just articulated.  From a theoretical standpoint, pluralism was 
largely discredited by scholars beginning in the 1960s on a number of grounds.  Theodore 
Lowi (1969) indicted interest group pluralism as the root of a stagnant political system in 
which every vested interest served to protect the status quo thus disabling government 
from ruling in a manner best suited for the public as a whole.  Others charged interest 
group pluralism as being tilted toward moneyed and better resourced interests, creating a 
system which prevents newly emerging groups or disadvantaged interests from gaining 
access (Olson 1965; Schattschneider 1960, Wolff 1970).  Some go even further to 
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suggest the moneyed and better resourced groups have gained power within government 
and either construct policies to their advantage or prevent a legislative agenda which 
might threaten their hold on government (Bachrach & Morton 1962; McConnell 1967). 
Moving beyond the theoretical debate over pluralism, the term “special interests” 
has evolved to describe those interests that enjoy an advantaged position of influence in 
Washington.  They have used campaign contributions and personal connections to extract 
special consideration (Coughlin 1985; Crawford 1939; Fleisher 1993; Frendries & 
Waterman 1985; Jones & Keiser 1987; Knappen 1950; Mason 1950; Odegard 1928; 
Schattschneider 1935; Shott 1950; Zeller 1937).  Congressional reformers during the 
1970s attempted to eliminate the revolving door phenomenon in which congressional 
staffers, members and aids leave public life to accept high paid lobbying positions 
because of the perceived impropriety of these relationships (Roberts and Doss 1997)2.  
One also cannot forget the numerous scandals involving lobbyists ranging from Samuel 
Colt using gifts of guns and money to garner patent protection from Congress for the Colt 
revolver in the 1850s to Union Pacific Railroad creating the front company of Credit 
Mobilier to win no-bid contracts for stretches of railroad.  In most recent memory is Jack 
Abramoff who pocketed $85 million from lobbying contracts with Native American 
tribes – when he had paid Ralph Reed and Grover Norquist to lobby against the tribes so 
they would require Abramoff’s services.   
 Certainly corruption will never be completely eliminated, but at the same time 
interest groups serve a public good they fulfill their own needs, sometimes at the expense 
 
2 Cited in Suzanne J. Piotrowski and David H. Rosenbloom.  “The Legal-Institutional Framework” in The 
Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying and Policymaking in Washington eds. Paul S. 
Herrnson, Ronald G. Shaiko and Clyde Wilcox.  Washington DC: CQ Press, 2005. 
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of that same public good.  Within the vast interest group universe, perhaps there can 
never be a uniform role and/or function for interest groups, but this research will aid in 
understanding their place in policymaking. 
   
Overview of Congressional Committees 
 Woodrow Wilson (1885) wrote, “… it is not far from the truth to say that 
Congress in session is Congress on public exhibition, whilst Congress in its committee 
room is Congress at work.”  The heart of all legislative activity occurs within 
congressional committees.   
 The First Session of Congress in the House of Representatives saw the 
implementation of the first committee as well as the formation of the prestigious Ways 
and Means Committee.  The initial Ways and Means Committee was only a temporary 
committee which was re-established as a standing committee in 1795 during the Fourth 
Congress (Kennon & Rogers, 1989).  While initially most work was addressed by the full 
House sitting as a Committee of the Whole, the creation of committees to handle 
legislative tasks tied to specific issue areas quickly followed.  Nine standing committees 
had been created by 1809 and committee reforms in 1822 established that bills in the 
jurisdiction of the standing committees would be referred directly to them and also 
enabled committees to propose bills on their own accord (Schickler 2005).  According to 
Eric Schickler (2005), in part these reforms came about because of the rising workload of 
the House.  The reforms in 1822 marked the institutionalization of the committee system 
that still persists today. 
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 Reflecting the evolving complexity of American society, the House continued to 
initiate new standing committees to meet its legislative demands until they numbered 
forty-eight in the early 1940s.  The sprawling committee system led to the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946 which streamlined committees into the current system of 
nineteen standing committees and nearly a hundred subcommittees.  In addition, the Act 
charged each committee with oversight of the federal agencies in its jurisdiction 
(Schickler 2005).  This enhances the power of the committees but also the workload.  
Although legislative reform occurs once again in the 1970s, this round deals with 
leadership issues and does not reshape the structure of the committee system established 
in 1946.  The Republican takeover of the House of Representatives in 1995 also resulted 
in rules changes.  Term limits were placed on committee and subcommittee chairs, 
multiple referrals of bills was limited and the jurisdiction of the committees was slightly 
altered.  Yet the same committee structure established in 1946 remains in place. 
 Committees occupy a central position in the legislative process.  When a bill is 
introduced into the House, the Speaker assigns it to one or more committees that have 
jurisdiction.  Once assigned to the committee, the chair decides whether the bill shall 
proceed along the legislative path, or whether it will be tabled.  This is the power of gate 
keeping, a significant power in Congress.  If the chair agrees to proceed, he or she then 
assigns it to the appropriate subcommittee.  The subcommittee chair, with similar gate 
keeping power can either continue to proceed or leave the bill aside.  Choosing to 
continue, the chair then schedules a hearing and invites testimony from interested parties, 
including interest groups.  In their testimony, interest groups communicate information 
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about the policy under consideration as well as recommend changes they would like to 
see made to the bill.  The subcommittee may hold one hearing or a series of hearings 
depending on the nature and complexity of the issue.  In other words hearings are held 
until the committee or subcommittee feels sufficiently informed.  Once hearings are 
concluded the chair may then table the issue or move to begin markups on the bill.  
During the markup session, members of the subcommittee may offer amendments to the 
bill which must receive majority support before being added.  At the conclusion of the 
bill markup session, the subcommittee reports the bill back to its parent committee. 
 The parent committee may then either hold hearings again or immediately 
schedule a markup session for the bill attended by the whole committee.  Again, the chair 
has the power to move the legislation along or he or she may decide to table the bill.  
Once the final committee markups are completed, the committee reports the bill to the 
full House. 
 During the 109th Congress (2005-2006), in total 6,438 bills were introduced into 
the House of Representatives.  The House was in session for 241 days which means for 
each day the House was in session, 26 bills were introduced.  Over 2,744 hearings were 
conducted and 570 markups3.  After markup 409 bills were reported.  All of this activity 
occurs in committee.  While many bills get stalled in the policy making process (605 bills 
were passed by the House during the 109th Congress) “bills reported from committee 
 
3 Not every markup is directly preceded by a committee or subcommittee hearing.  Most bills will 
encounter two markups, one at the subcommittee level and one with the full committee.  Some bills will 
face a hearing before both markups, while others will simply hold one hearing at the subcommittee level 
and then follow with the two markups.  While unusual, some bills go straight to markup without a hearing 
especially if the bill had already been passed by the Senate and is deemed a partisan issue for the majority 
party. 
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have passed a critical stage in the lawmaking process” (Davidson & Oleszek 2006, pg. 
244)4.  Bills reported are then placed on a calendar where they await floor consideration, 
including a stop before the Rules Committee for all important bills.  What occurs in the 
hearings and markups determines if and how a bill will be reported, making them 
important stages in the process.  In any case, this is a significant amount of work 
requiring much research and learning on the part of the legislators.   
 As a way to make the policymaking process more efficient, many House members 
rely on their colleagues within the committee that originated a bill for information on 
how to vote on that bill (Kingdon 1973; Krehbiel 1991; McFarland 1984; Walker 1991).  
They are able to trust their colleagues, in part, because specialization has given 
committee members significant expertise in their issue area (Asher 1974; Matthews & 
Stimson 1975; Morrow 1969).  While most members of Congress do not arrive to the 
House with that expertise in hand, they learn much from legislative staff and from 
interest groups (Matthews & Stimson 1975).  The committee hearings are instrumental in 
the transfer of information from interested groups to committee members (Wright 1996). 
 The bulk of legislative activity goes unnoticed even when the legislation is 
successfully enacted.  This is true not just of casual observers; academic studies have 
largely relied upon major pieces of legislation for case studies.  E.E. Schattschneider 
(1935) examined the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930.  The Employment Act of 1946 was 
the focus of Stephen Bailey’s Congress Makes a Law: The Story Behind the 
 
4 When the House is operating under suspended rules, committee reports are not required.  Recent Houses 
have passed more than half of their bills under suspended rules (Davidson & Oleszek 2006). 
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Unemployment Act of 1946 (1950).  Theodore Marmor’s (1973) classic centered on 
Medicare while Birnbaum and Murray (1988) wrote about the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
By focusing on legislation of great consequence rather than ordinary or mundane bills, 
we might not have a complete understanding of the daily workings within the policy 
process. 
 Perhaps the only study to look at ordinary legislating is T.R. Reid’s (1980) 
Congressional Odyssey: The Sage of a Senate Bill.  Reid, a journalist with the 
Washington Post decided to trace from its inception, a bill sponsored by newly elected 
Senator Pete Domenici to implement a waterways user charge on the barge industry.  
This case study of legislating details the “not so glamorous” work which accompanies 
most policymaking.  While the study makes inroads into ordinary legislating, it is a 
journalistic account and fails to make any theoretical contributions to the literature.        
This skewed depiction of policymaking is also found in the media.  Only 
legislation that is divisive enough to generate the conflict that the media always reports or 
legislation that is sweeping in nature or scale tends to gain our attention.  Considering, 
creating and passing legislation is a tedious job and often times a thankless job.  
Nonetheless, year after year, hundreds of bills are considered, deliberated and marked up 
in the House.  For example, during the 109th Session of Congress (2005-2006) 6,438 bills 
were introduced and 2,744 hearings held.  The public policy outputs provide the safety, 
support and regulation we have come to require in our society.  We must not overlook 
how ordinary policy is made. 
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Importance of Studying Interest Group Influence in Committees 
 Over 20,000 groups are active in the American governmental system.  Ninety 
eight percent of interest groups lobby Congress.5  Interest groups are irrevocably an 
important component of policymaking.  Fully understanding their role, the amount of 
access given to them and their ability to influence policy is important.  By studying their 
activity in congressional hearings, we can better understand where power lies in Congress 
and how the leadership utilizes interest groups to its advantage or limits their influence to 
protect its own interests, if Congress is able to control interest groups at all.  
 Once the source of power in this process is detected, we can be clearer on the 
exact function of interest groups in this venue.  David Truman identified three possible 
functions for interest group testimony: 1) transmitting information; 2) propagandizing; 
and 3) a means of adjusting group conflict.  Testing Truman’s hypotheses, several earlier 
works on committees concluded no such informational role of interest groups; rather they 
were strategically selected by chairs to showcase and help gather support for a committee 
bill (Del Sesto 1980; Huitt 1954; Farnsworth 1961; Lutzker 1969).  Other research 
confirmed the informational role (Bauer, Pool & Dexter 1963; Milbrath 1963; Scott and 
Hunt 1965).  However, none of these studies directly tested the impact of interest group 
testimony on legislation.  Not only were the studies unable to test the true function of 
interest groups, but recent congressional scholarship on information exchange and 
 
5 This percentage comes from a large scale survey of interest groups in Washington D.C. conducted by 
Schlozman and Tierney in 1986.  Nownes and Freeman’s (1998) survey of interest groups at the state level 
reported 97% of groups lobby legislators.  Walker’s (1991) examination found 78% and Berry’s (1977) 
revealed 84% engaged in this activity. 
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member preferences raises the important question again, of what is the role of interest 
groups in committee hearings (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989, 1990). 
 Interest group scholarship has brought us to a similar question on the role of 
interest groups in congressional hearings.  While within the literature the manner in 
which power is to be conceptualized still remains largely unspecified, scholars 
acknowledge the importance of information as a means of influence for interest groups 
(Ainsworth 1993; Berry 1989; Lowery & Brasher 2004; Wolpe & Levine 1996; Wright 
1996).  At the same time, the literature on interest group influence has turned its focus to 
congressional committees (Esterling 2007; Hall & Wayman 1990; Schroedel 1986; 
Wright 1990).  It is also known through survey research that testifying before 
congressional committees ranks high on the list of preferred interest group lobbying 
activities (Berry 1997; Nownes & Freeman 1998; Schlozman & Tierney 1986; Walker 
1991).  Having the necessary resources to test the influence of this testimony on markups, 
this research is the next contribution to our understanding of the relationships between 
interest groups and congressional committees.  Not only is this the next logical step, but it 
is a needed step.   
 The work presented here takes that next step and in doing so fills an empirical 
void that currently exists in the literature.  The overriding normative questions that should 
guide research on interest groups were formulated by E. E. Schattschneider nearly sixty 
years ago.  At that time pluralists assumed that interest groups were a universal 
phenomenon, and they “attempt[ed] to explain everything in terms of the group theory” 
(p. 22).  But Schattschneider dissented from that orthodoxy and drew our attention to two 
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dimensions of the pluralist system.  First he drew a distinction between “public” or 
“private” interests.  Public interests, such as national survival, are common to all 
Americans whereas private or special interests are “shared by only a few people or a 
fraction of the community” because “they exclude others and may be adverse to them” 
(p. 24).  For this reason Schattschneider did not believe that all pluralist politics involved 
“special” interests all the time.  Second, he drew the important distinction between 
organized and unorganized interests, and he took note that “the most likely field of study 
is that of the organized, special-interest groups (p. 29).  This piece of the pluralist puzzle 
Schattschneider termed the “pressure system.” (p. 29). 
The pressure system promotes political bias because, in words Schattschneider 
made famous, “organization is itself a mobilization of bias in preparation for action” (p. 
30).  Bias exists because the pressure system is very small.  “The range of organized, 
identifiable, known groups is amazingly narrow; there is nothing remotely universal 
about it”(p. 30).  More specifically, the pressure system has a “business or upper-class 
bias” because, he explained, “businessmen are four or five times as likely to write their 
congressmen as manual laborers are.”  Also statistics show the multitude of trade 
associations in the United States.  Upper-class bias is proven by the “overwhelming 
evidence that participation in voluntary organizations is related to upper social and 
economic status; the rate of participation is much higher in the upper strata than it is 
elsewhere” (p. 31-32).  In sum, this bias is so pervasive that “even non-business 
organizations reflect an upper-class tendency” (p. 33).  Substantial research supports the 
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validity of this claim, but participation does not guarantee, let alone prove, that any group 
has access to the centers of power nor influence over legislation.  
 Schattschneider’s analysis was highly theoretical, for its day, but not grounded in 
any empirical analysis of the pressure system.  It is precisely because the pressure system 
is selective and biased that those interest groups are effective:  “if everybody got into the 
act the unique advantages of this form of organization would be destroyed, for it is 
possible that if all interests could be mobilized the result would be a stalemate” (p. 35).   
Of course the population of the United States has vastly increased since Schattschneider 
wrote, and he did not see the rise of new social movements—women’s rights, 
consumerism, and environmentalism—and the proliferation of new interests and 
membership groups.  We need to revisit Schattschneider’s dire analysis of the pressure 
system to determine if its “class” bias operates today as then. 
The effectiveness of upper-class and pro-business interests in the pressure system 
depends upon the “scope of conflict,” another seminal concept by Schattschneider.  
Given that the contestants in private conflicts are likely to be unequal in strength, “the 
most powerful special interests want private settlements because they are able to dictate 
the outcome as long as the conflict remains private.”  On the other hand, “[i]t is the weak 
who want to socialize conflict, i.e., to involve more and more people in the conflict until 
the balance of forces is changed” (p. 40).  Schattschneider believed that big interests do 
not always prevail through lobbying and, in fact, the “biggest corporations in the country 
tend to avoid the arena in which pressure groups and lobbyists fight it out before 
congressional committees” (p. 41). 
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Business prevails not from direct lobbying and, indeed, its political strategy to 
“mobilize a united front of the whole business community does not resemble the classical 
concept of pressure politics” (p. 42).  Here Schattschneider makes explicit the political 
alignment between business and the GOP.  “The Republican party has played a major 
role in the political organization of the business community, a far greater role than many 
students of politics seem to have realized” (p. 42).  In sum, business does not win in 
Congress through the pressure system.  “The success of special interests in Congress is 
due less to the ‘pressure’ exerted by these groups than it is due to the fact that Republican 
members of Congress are committed in advance to a general probusiness attitude” (p. 
43).   
Scholars in the pluralist tradition continue to cite Schattschneider’s indictment of 
the pluralist system as biased toward upper-class and especially business interests.  Yet 
there has been virtually no concerted effort among scholars to addresses the political 
issues that he raised.  My data base will permit me to address (if not entirely answer) 
some aspects of Schattschneider’s indictment of pluralism. 
 1) Is the pluralist system today as “small” and “exclusive” as Schattschneider 
once characterized it?  If not, then is there greater competition among organized interests 
seeking to influence public policy? 
 2) Are business groups and trade associations still the dominant actors in the 
pluralist system? 
 3) Do business groups and trade associations enjoy more “access” to Congress 
and “influence” over legislation than other types of interest groups? 
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 4) Is access by business groups and trade associations and their influence over 
legislation facilitated by Republican control and frustrated by Democratic control of 
Congress? 
 5) Since “weaker” interests want to socialize conflict in the public domain, are 
they advantaged in congressional committee deliberations (being a public venue) relative 
to business groups or trade associations?  
I build an interest group impact theory of access to and influence in congressional 
hearings and test it with two statistical models.  The access model tests what factors drive 
the decision of which groups to invite to testify in hearing for the 105th-108th sessions of 
Congress.  Testing whether or not interest group testimony has any influence on the 
subsequent markups is accomplished with the influence model.  The influence model 
incorporates data from the 103rd, 106th and 108th sessions of Congress. 
 The next two chapters elaborate on the literature regarding interest group 
influence and committee power and build a theory that describes the influence of interest 
groups in congressional hearings.  Chapter four then lays out the research design detailing 
how the research was conducted and how data was compiled.  Chapter five tests and 
discusses the Access Model and the chapter six does the same for the Influence Model.  
The conclusions of this research are found in the last chapter.  
 Committee hearings play an important role in policymaking yet they are rarely a 
topic of study.  They are crucial to the needs of legislators and operate in a way that is 
desirable to interest groups as well.  We need to fully understand this process as well as 
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how interest group influence operates here if it exists at all.  This research will fill the gap 
that currently exists in the literature. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Serious scholarly attention to interest groups in American politics followed the 
seminal work of David Truman, The Governmental Process (1951).  Truman postulated a 
theory of American government based on the multitude of interests that exist in society.  
These interests, when they attempt to exert influence upon one another or on government, 
become political interest groups.  Truman believed that interest groups are established to 
reflect the increasingly specialized society and to maintain “equilibrium” in a society that 
is prone to many external shocks, such as war, industrialization or technological 
advancement.  One of the main contributions of Truman’s work is that it is not just 
organized interests that get representation but also latent interests that could at any point 
in the future come together to become an organized interest. 
 From Truman’s work, pluralism became the paradigm for democracy.  Pluralism 
holds that the multitude of interests working in the political system serve to check one 
another so that no one interest is able to dominate the policy making process.  There are 
no barriers to groups participating in the policy making process.  Different groups will 
enter the process when they have policy considerations and will just as easily exit the 
system when they have no active interest.  In their attempt to gain influence, the varied 
interests will compete with one another and within this competition engage in a debate 
about what is best for the public good.  The policy that ensues would in fact be the result 
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of a series of bargains and compromises negotiated by these interests and our policy 
makers and would be the best policy for the public good.   
Shortly after the publication of Truman’s work, researchers sought to test the 
pluralist theory, and some of their research lent support for the theory.  For example, 
Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954) concluded that political participation was 
mediated through groups, which served the system well, because the groups supported 
stability and continuity in the American political system.  Robert Dahl (1959), in his 
study of New Haven politics, concluded that all the interests that wanted to participate in 
the policy making process were given access and that no one interest group dominated 
the process. 
 Just as pluralism was gaining in popularity, however a number of scholars began 
to attack this theory.  The most frequent critique was that not all groups were represented 
in the policy making process, and among those groups that did participate there was an 
“upper class bias” if not a “pro-business” agenda to their activism.  Such was the 
argument found in Schattschneider’s The Semi-Sovereign People (1961).  The same 
business elites were found to be controlling the political, social and cultural institutions in 
C. Wright Mills’ The Power Elite (1959), using their position to enhance their goals.  
Theodore Lowi provided another critique of pluralism in his The End of Liberalism 
(1969).  Lowi maintains that interest group liberalism has rendered the political system 
impotent and because of the participation of groups, formal procedure has been replaced 
with informal bargaining.  Because of these attacks on pluralism, as a descriptive theory, 
it lost credibility, yet it still retains much support as a prescriptive theory. Truman’s 
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work also led to a burgeoning literature concerned with the formation and maintenance of 
interest groups.  This work shifted the level of analysis away from the group and toward 
the members who support these groups.  Most notable was the work of Mancur Olson and 
Robert Salisbury.  They were concerned that Truman’s theory gave no explanation for 
how groups came into being.  Mancur Olson (1965), using a rational choice framework, 
pointed out the problems of collective action.  He noted that larger public interests would 
have difficulties in forming organizations that would not be shared by smaller, narrower 
interests such as business and corporations.  The only way for larger organizations to 
overcome the barriers to collective action would be to require mandatory membership or 
to offer members some type of particularized benefits in return for their membership.  
Salisbury (1969) took Olson to task for an excessively economic view.  Building on the 
work of Clark and Wilson (1961), he suggested that the exchange of selective goods for 
membership need not solely be material but that selective goods could be solidary or 
purposive in nature.  Salisbury also introduced the notion that many groups get started by 
entrepreneurs who take it upon themselves to start the interest group in return for a job 
with a nice salary; entrepreneurs are not unlike business entrepreneurs who underwrite 
the costs of starting up a business. 
 From this point, the scholarship on interest groups splits into two streams.  The 
first draws on the work of Olson and Salisbury and focuses on the existence and 
maintenance of interest groups, examining the environment of the interest group system.  
The second focuses on the impact of interest groups on public policy and how they exert 
their influence.  The first stream of research has been productive and has significantly 
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advanced our understanding of what Allan Cigler calls the “demand aggregation” aspect 
of interest groups (1991).  Research within the second stream, “group impact” while 
prolific, has not led to a better understanding about the conditions of influence 
(Baumgartner & Leech 1998).  Over reliance on PAC studies, conflicting results, the 
inability to specify power, and lack of an overarching theoretical framework has 
prevented growth within the group impact literature (Baumgartner & Leech 1998).     
 
Interest Group Influence 
 Within the impact literature, largely because of data made available with the 
creation of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) in the 1970s, most research has 
examined the link between interest group contributions and congressional roll call votes.  
Data on PAC contributions and congressional roll calls are both easily accessible.  
Moreover, public cynicism concerning the purported buying of votes by special interests 
has made this a popular area of research for scholars.  The theoretical underpinnings of 
this work rests on the idea that members of Congress are continually focused on the next 
election (Fenno 1973; Fiorina 1977; Mayhew 1974) and concerned about raising enough 
money to fend off any qualified challengers (Herrnson 2004).  Most of the research here 
is quantitative.  Different models employed by different scholars yield results that are 
mixed, confusing and contradictory.  Some research reports that interest group campaign 
contributions are largely unrelated to the voting decision of members of Congress 
(Chappell 1981, 1982; Grenzke 1989; Kabashima and Sato 1986; Rothenberg 1992; 
Owens 1986; Vesenka 1989; Wright 1985).  Contradicting results are reported by others 
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who find statistically significant relationships between interest group contributions and 
the voting behavior of members of Congress (Ashford 1986; Coughlin 1985; Durden, 
Shogren & Silberman 1991; Ginsberg & Green 1986; Feldstein and Melnich 1984; 
Fleisher 1993; Jones and Kaiser 1987; Langbein & Lotwis 1990; Masters & Zardhoohi 
1986; McArthur and Marks 1988; Peltzman 1984; Silberman & Durden 1976; Stratmann 
1991; Wilhite & Thielman 1987).  Welch (1982) finds some support for the theory that 
PAC contributions influence members of Congress although he emphasizes that other 
variables such as party, ideology and constituency have a much stronger influence. 
 Finding no clear evidence that money buys votes, scholars began to examine the 
theory that the influence of money will not appear on floor votes in Congress, but rather 
in the committees (Hall & Wayman 1990; Schroedel 1986; Wright 1990).  Whereas 
Wright and Schroedel examine the influence of money on committee votes, Hall and 
Wayman suggest that contributions will have a more indirect effect, mobilizing some 
legislators on behalf of issues that groups support.  Studying two bills in the Ways and 
Means and Agriculture Committees, Wright finds no direct influence of money on votes 
at the committee level.  Schroedel, however, does find that contributions from banks, 
insurance companies and brokerage firms were strongly related to the decisions of 
members of the House Banking and Energy and Commerce Committees.  Hall and 
Wayman interview staff committees and examine markup records and conclude that PAC 
contributions serve to mobilize legislators to fight for the policy interests of the groups 
that made the contributions. 
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 Taking yet another tack in the approach to studying the links between interest 
group contributions and legislator behavior is Kevin Esterling (2007).  Esterling theorizes 
that interest groups make campaign contributions to “work horse” members, members he 
depicts as having a higher capacity to engage in the technical and analytical debate.  The 
contributions made then are an incentive for the “work horse” members to engage in such 
specialized discourse that the interest groups deem necessary for creating effective public 
policy.  The idea is to steer those members with the mental acumen toward a technical 
debate and away from the political debate.  Looking at the hearings held on the Medicare 
program from 2000- 2003, he finds support for his theory.     
 
Interest Group Access to Policy Makers 
 In part due to the confusing results of those studies, other scholars have modified 
the hypothesis about the impact of money.  They posit that the purpose of campaign 
contributions is not to buy votes but rather to buy access to members of Congress (Berry 
1984; Gopoian, Smith & Smith 1984; Magleby and Nelson 1990; Sabato 1985, 1989; 
Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Souraf 1992; Wittenberg and Wittenberg 1989; Wolpe 
1990).  With the shift of focus now moving toward access, the question becomes what is 
access and can we measure it empirically?  Very few empirical studies have looked at 
access. 
 The first attempt to empirically measure the access given to interest groups was 
conducted by Laura Langbein (1986).  She operationalized access as the number of 
minutes members of Congress spend face-to-face with interest groups.  She relied on a 
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unique study conducted by the Obey Commission in Congress that included data on the 
time members of Congress reported spending with interest groups in a sample week.  
Langbein’s study found that PAC contributions did appear to significantly influence 
access, but there are problems with her approach.  First, she was working with aggregate 
data so there is no evidence that specific contributions made by a single group led to 
access to certain legislators.  Second, the sample only included 92 members of the House 
from the 95th Congress.  Although the sample is large enough, it is only considering one 
point in time.  Longitudinal data would be necessary before any inferences can be made 
more generally about the behavior of members of Congress because the political 
conditions and environment within Congress change and certainly affect access.  
Longitudinal studies would be better equipped to understand the conditions of access.  
Yet, it was an important first step towards gathering empirical evidence on the link 
between contributions and access.  
 Both Chin, Bond and Geva (2000) and Hojnacki and Kimball (2001) defined 
access as face-to-face meetings with members of Congress.   Chin, Bond and Geva 
conducted an experiment involving congressional schedulers.  Schedulers were asked to 
create a mock four day schedule for their member of Congress.  Given a folder with 24 
scheduling requests (more requests than slots available) the scheduler had to decide 
which requests would be granted and in what order.  The results of the experiment 
revealed no influence of PAC contributions on access.  The strongest influence on 
whether interests gained access was constituency.  Those interests that resided within the 
congressional district of the member were given priority access over other requests for 
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appointments.  Hojnacki and Kimball also found minimal support for the hypothesis that 
PAC contributions buy access.   They found that contributions only engender access to 
lawmakers when the contributions are given to a member of Congress who is typically on 
the other side of the issue stance of the interest group.  In other words, when money is 
given to legislative allies it has no influence on how much access is granted to an interest 
group.  However when the “unlikely” contribution is made to a more hostile lawmaker, it 
tends to open doors.   
 Another attempt to measure interest group access was provided by Hansen’s 
(1991) study of the farm lobby.  He theorizes that interest groups gain access when two 
conditions exist: (1) when lobbying organizations enjoy a competitive advantage over 
other intermediaries and (2) when member of Congress expect groups, issues and 
circumstances to recur. This is a well-developed theory of access to the policy-making 
process.  However Hansen never explicitly defines access; he describes access as a close 
working relationship with members of Congress.  Another difficulty is the theory is not 
as easily transferred to other policy areas. 
 In sum, there are very few studies that attempt to empirically assess the link 
between interest groups and access when defined as face-to-face contact with members of 
Congress.  The constraints of available data have forced researchers to assume that PAC 
contributions facilitate interest group access.  Perhaps there are more direct ways to 
measure access. 
 Kevin Leyden (1995) is the only published researcher to define access as 
invitations to testify at congressional hearings.  His model tested the influence of several 
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variables on whether or not interest groups were invited to testify.  Incorporating data 
from congressional hearings held in 1985 he found that the number of lobbyists 
employed by a group, the size of the group’s membership and whether the group has a 
PAC influenced which groups received invitations to testify.  This supports the 
suggestions that groups which have more resources wield more influence. 
 Thomas Holyoke (2003) also recognizes congressional testimony as an avenue of 
access to Congress.  Recognizing the appeal of testifying in committee for interest 
groups, Holyoke examines whether interest groups attempt to alter their positions on a 
policy in order to secure an invitation to testify.  Theorizing a difference in the function 
of interest groups for ideological outlier committees from non-outliers, he suggests 
interest groups will be strategic in their attempts to testify before those ideological outlier 
committees.  Holyoke argues that while non-outlier committees will rely on a range of 
groups to testify so they can gather appropriate information to pass good legislation, 
ideological outlier committees will only invite interest groups that are already supportive 
of the policy under consideration.  The outliers will use that testimony to garner support 
as they push the bill through the policy process.  Building a database from interviews he 
conducted with 82 interest groups and the testimony from those groups that were invited 
to testify, Holyoke tests his theory.  He finds that the ideology of the interest group is a 
concern behind which groups are invited for both ideological outlier and non-outlier 
committees although it is a stronger consideration for the outliers.  Constraints of interest 
group member preferences and the competition from other lobbying groups prevent an 
interest group from tailoring its position to appear more supportive of the outlier 
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committees; without these constraints interest groups do alter their positions in order to 
find favor with a committee and hence access to the hearings as a testifier. 
 Approaching the same problem form the subgovernment model of policymaking 
is the work of Ken Kollman (1997).  The question he asks is whether interest groups only 
testify before friendly committees, because the subgovernment model assumes that a 
“cozy” or friendly relationship exists among interest groups, congressional committees 
and bureaucrats.  Therefore Kollman seeks to determine whether this assumption is valid 
insofar as groups deemed unfriendly will be excluded.  He uses measures of interest 
group ideologies along with the ideologies of committee chairs in a bivariate correlation 
test.  The interest group ideologies are determined by looking at questions Jack Walker 
asked of groups in his 1985 survey.  The first question asked which committees the 
interest group frequently communicated, consulted and interacted with.  A second 
question asked the group how the 1976 switchover from a Republican presidency to a 
Democratic presidency affected their cooperation with federal agencies.  A couple of 
other questions asked generally about the policy positions of the group, for example 
whether they favored more or less government regulation.  Congressional committee 
ideologies were measured by a scale he created from scores such as the ADA and ACU 
rankings.  While Kollman does find that interest groups testify before “friendly 
committees” he shows that what appears to be invitations made based on close 
friendships is actually due to general homogeneity of ideological biases.  The interest 
groups end up testifying before many committees with which they do not report frequent 
contact and thus are not considered “friendly” committees.  Although those committees 
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are not “friendly” they still share similar ideologies.  “What looks like friendly lobbying 
of committees is actually bias in representation by interest groups and committees” (539).  
While this study is revealing and important, it doesn’t directly address the question of 
what factors determine how interest group invitations are made. 
 A study on corporate political activity by Hansen and Mitchell (2000) also 
examined interest group access to congressional hearings.  Looking at Fortune 500 
companies in 1988 they attempted to gain a better understanding of the political activity 
of American owned corporations as compared to that of foreign owned corporations.  
While the focus of their study looked to the determinants of lobbying, PAC contributions 
and charitable contributions, as a means of substantiating those results they also ran a 
regression on their model to indicate the determinants of participation in congressional 
hearings.  In other words, they viewed testifying in congressional hearings as a good 
indicator of corporate political activity.  Their dependent variable was the number of 
times a corporation testified in Congress.  They found the size (dollar sales) of the 
corporation, its level of government procurement, firm and industry measures of 
regulation, countervailing power, and foreign ownership (negative relationship) to be 
indicators of whether a corporation testified.  Countervailing power refers to the lobbying 
efforts mobilized to counter the corporate lobbying activity measured as the level of 
lobbying activity and PAC spending of labor unions.  They also had included measures 
for the number of Wall Street Journal citations and the concentration of the industry 
which were not found to be statistically significant.  This study, while advancing the 
literature on corporate political activity, fails to look at the conditions of access, modeling 
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this as a group driven decision.  It does not discuss the congressional side to this process 
at all. 
 Thus there are only three known studies that directly test the question of which 
groups will gain access to testify before a congressional committee.  A fourth tests the 
access to committee hearings, but only as a subsidiary interest.  The studies have begun 
to build our understanding of interest group access to congressional hearings but are still 
limited.  They are limited in their breadth as well as in their modeling of committee 
characteristics beyond the ideology of the committee.  The research presented in this 
work does incorporate committee characteristics beyond ideology and will help build 
theory on interest group access and help us to begin to understand the conditions under 
which access is granted. 
 
Congressional Testimony as Interest Group Influence 
Ninety eight percent of interest groups lobby Congress.6 As reported by interest 
groups active in Washington, the most popular lobbying activity is providing testimony at 
legislative hearings.7  This is a preferred form of lobbying activity because it is a low-
cost activity (Schlozman & Tierney 1986; Wright 1996).  Despite the popularity of this 
form of lobbying and the access scholars have to transcripts of that testimony, this forum 
remains a virtually unstudied aspect of interest group influence on the policy making 
 
6 This percentage comes from a large scale survey of interest groups in Washington DC conducted by 
Schlozman and Tierney in 1986.  Nownes and Freeman’s (1998) survey of interest groups at the state level 
reported 97% of groups engage in lobbying legislators.  Walker’s (1991) examination found 78% and 
Berry’s (1977) revealed 84% engaged in this activity. 
7 Both the Schlozman and Tierney (1986) and the Nownes and Freeman (1988) surveys report that 99% of 
interest groups testify at legislative hearings.  Heinz, et al. (1993) report 95% and Berry (1977) shows 88%. 
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process.  To date, neither interest group nor congressional scholars have examined the 
impact of interest group testimony on the markup of bills in committee. 
 In his literature review on interest group influence in the United States Congress, 
Richard Smith (1995) found only three studies that examine interest group activity in 
congressional committees.  His bibliography included over 250 articles and books written 
about interest group influence.  Thus, Smith concludes “it’s readily apparent that what we 
know is more speculative than definitive” (Smith 1995, 122).  A more comprehensive 
literature review by Baumgartner and Leech (1998) reveals that of all the studies 
conducted on lobbying only one used hearing testimony as a measure of lobbying (Segal 
et al. 1992). 
 The one study using hearing testimony as a measure of lobbying examined the 
effect of a senator’s personal ideology on his or her Supreme Court nomination votes 
(Segal et al. 1992).  These researchers built a spatial model of roll call voting on Supreme 
Court nominations from 1955 through 1988.  Two of the independent variables in their 
model measured the number of interest groups testifying in support of the nominee and 
another tapped the number of interest groups testifying in opposition.  The results of the 
statistical analysis reveal a slight, positive impact by the number of groups testifying in 
support of the nominee and a modestly stronger, negative influence exerted by the 
number of groups testifying against the nominee.  This is a thoughtful look at 
confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominees.  However, as the authors note, this 
type of voting is a special form of voting in the Senate.  The roll call votes cast here are 
largely influenced by the ideology of the individual senator.  Also, the study looked at the 
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Clarence Thomas confirmation hearing which was unusual in several respects and 
perhaps may have led to the identified relationship being spurious.  This speaks little 
about the influence of interest group testimony on other types of policy considerations. 
 Most studies that considered the influence of interest group testimony in Congress 
came from scholars writing shortly after the publication of David Truman’s seminal 
work.  Through a variety of case studies, these scholars found committee hearings to be 
carefully planned events in which witnesses are chosen strategically to bolster and 
promote the already formulated position of the committee or committee chair (Del Sesto 
1980; Farnsworth 1961; Huitt 1954; Jones, Baumgartner and Talbert 1993; Lutzker 1969; 
Morrow 1969; Redman 1973).   
 The earliest study in this regard was conducted by Ralph Huitt (1954).  He looks 
at the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency in 1946 to test David Truman’s 
hypotheses regarding the purposes of congressional hearings.  Truman suggested that 
committees use hearings to collect information from interest groups, to disseminate 
propaganda in support of committee legislation or to provide a catharsis for frustrations 
and grievances.  Huitt specifically looks at questions that were being asked by the 
committee members to see if they were properly answered.  He concludes that committee 
hearings were clearly being used as a public platform for opposition groups the senators 
identified.  He also states that a great deal of information was presented by interest 
groups but senators accepted or rejected it in accordance with their preconceived notions 
of the facts. 
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 The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations from 1947-1956 is the subject of 
study for David Farnsworth (1961).  Farnsworth observes hearings are seldom directed 
primarily at the acquisition of information.  If an issue becomes the subject of public 
hearings, the committee has already selected a course of action.  The testimony primarily 
serves as an instrument through which the committee builds support for its position.  
Farnsworth discerns that the committee allows opponents to use the hearings to “blow off 
steam,” committee members then are able to gauge the intensity of opposition to a given 
proposal. 
   Lutzker (1969) applies a group interaction analysis to the House and Senate 
subcommittees that held hearings on the Higher Education Act of 1965.  This analytical 
technique was borrowed from sociologists who developed it to profile the types of 
interactions amongst individuals.  There are 12 profiles that include categorizations such 
as: shows solidarity; shows tension release; agrees; gives suggestion; etc.  Lutzker applies 
this analysis to profile the testifiers in these congressional hearings and finds witnesses 
gave more opinion than information in these hearings. 
 Taking a similar approach, Del Sesto (1980) develops a typology of roles taken on 
by committee members during hearings.  The cooperative roles consist of the 
investigator, instrumentalist and organizer/administrator.  On the other hand are 
antagonistic roles including the debunker of facts, the procedural antagonist and the 
debunker of qualifications.  He applies this classification to members of the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy.  As he anticipated, his analysis reveals that when 
questioning and cross-examining witnesses representing the nuclear establishment, 
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committee members assumed cooperative role behaviors more frequently.  Conversely, 
when questioning and cross-examining witnesses representing environmentalists, 
concerned citizens and public groups, committee members more frequently took on 
antagonistic role behaviors. 
 All of these earlier studies on the influence of interest group testimony in 
congressional committee came to the same conclusion: it did not serve to transmit 
information.  The result is that for decades the prevailing conventional wisdom dismissed 
any real influence of interest groups.  If anything, interest groups were being used by 
committees (or perhaps complicit with them) as a tool to build support for the 
preconceived policy positions. 
 However, during the 1970s, there was a paradigm shift in congressional studies.  
The seminal works of Anthony Downs (1957), Kenneth Arrow (1951) and Mancur Olson 
(1965) in this field influenced congressional scholars.  Embracing rational choice and 
game theory, scholars began to question the conventional wisdom that congressional 
hearings were little more than pre-planned policy showcases.  Over 3,000 hearings are 
held each year (Wright 1996).  These hearings are expensive in terms of resources and 
opportunity costs.  Why would Congress expend so many resources for these hearings if 
there was no informational value to them?  This is the central question that led formal 
theorists to re-evaluate the role of congressional hearings.   
 Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1989, 1990) were perhaps the lead scholars that 
questioned the function of hearings.  In their modeling of Congress, a key component is 
the information gathered by committee members through hearings.  The underlying 
  35  
    
rational choice theory is that members of Congress are interested in learning any political 
information about policy as they are consistently looking forward to the next election 
(Mayhew 1974).  Committee members turn in part to congressional hearings to gather 
this political information as well as technical information regarding the policy being 
considered.  The technical information, testimony that suggests which policy alternatives 
are best suited to address the problem at hand, is also useful in members’ pursuit of 
advancing what they consider to be good public policy.   
 Gilligan and Krehbiel’s work is centered on the informational role of committees, 
but they never consider the specific agents who transmit that knowledge.  This is done by 
David Austen-Smith (1993) who builds on their model by introducing a lobbyist into the 
game.  He recognizes not only the importance of information, but that it is interest groups 
who possess the relevant information.  Taking Gilligan and Krehbiel’s modeling in a 
different direction, Diermeier and Feddersen (2000) reassess who actually benefits from 
the information gained by committees.  Recognizing the costliness of holding hearings, 
they suggest members of Congress outside of the committee benefit from the committee 
actions.  They believe that even when committees who are ideologically extreme hold 
hearings other members, understanding the costliness involved in holding a hearing, will 
take the action as a signal that the committee is seeking to transmit information to the 
House floor.  They also suggest members outside of the committee are more likely to 
trust the testifiers in the hearing than they are to trust the members of an ideologically 
extreme committee, which is why these committees would take on the costs of holding a 
hearing. 
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 Certainly the formal modeling of congressional activity is based on the 
assumption that information is useful and necessary for members of Congress.  Scholars 
employing more empirically based research also have reassessed the belief that 
committee hearings do not serve an information gathering function.  Recognizing that the 
types of policy being considered in the post-reform Congresses require much more 
specialized information, some have suggested that interest groups have become 
increasingly important as purveyors of knowledge.  Also, the changes in the structure of 
Congress itself in the post-reform era require much more of interest groups.  Looking at 
labor and environmental groups during the post-reform 86th through 102nd sessions of 
Congress, Heitshusen (2000) does in fact find evidence that suggests an increased 
demand for information from interest groups. 
 In an earlier study, Browne and Paik (1993) come to a similar conclusion. They 
were primarily interested in the effects of modern information needs of Congress on the 
iron triangle networks in Washington.  Relying on personal interview they conducted 
with 120 members of Congress and their staffs in the agricultural domain, they find 
interest groups were the overwhelming choice as the second most important information 
source.  The only source of information more important than the interest groups was 
members’ own constituents.   
 Within congressional studies, there has been a paradigm shift toward rational 
choice theory that began during the 1970s.  The popularity of formal modeling of 
congressional behavior gave rise to the importance of information.  As noted the critical 
role of information has also been resurrected among more empirical work.  Despite 
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information being recognized as important and committees being seen as the heart of 
congressional activity, no study yet has tested directly the conventional wisdom 
suggesting that congressional testimony yields no information of relevance to committee 
members. 
 
Conclusion 
 Since the seminal work of David Truman in 1951, research on interest groups has 
shown noticeable theoretical and empirical advances in explaining group membership, 
organizational maintenance, and the political environment.  Less decisive are the findings 
in the literature testing for the connection between PAC contributions and roll call votes.  
Since they have not discerned any solid relationships, other scholars have looked 
elsewhere for group influence.  Some began to theorize and test models on the influence 
of interest groups at the committee level.  This seemingly is an important avenue of 
access since most congressional activity occurs within the committees.  To date only a 
couple of studies have looked at the access given to interest groups to congressional 
hearings.  With so many interest groups reporting that providing testimony in hearings is 
a favored activity this should be an access point that is given more attention. 
 This access point is worth studying because presumably the interest group 
testimony is a lobbying attempt.  This is one way in which groups try to shape public 
policy.  However, many earlier studies looking at the influence of interest groups within 
congressional hearings found little evidence to confirm the importance of this 
information to members in the development of policy.  For the most part, policy had 
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already been formulated and only members who were predisposed to an interest group 
would find the testimony of that group to be beneficial.  These findings likely are the 
reason that scholars have not paid significant attention to hearings as an access point for 
interest groups. 
 Within the congressional field of study, however the rise in popularity of formal 
methods has brought attention to the centrality of information in congressional activities.  
Several empirical studies have revealed the degree to which members of Congress have 
turned to interest groups to provide the information they need.  Congressional scholars 
have at the same time taken note of the amount of time and resources committees spend 
holding hearings.   Rational choice theorists now suggest Congress would not be willing 
to expend such resources unless there was something to be gained through hearings: 
information.   
 This renewed emphasis on hearings and the importance of information along with 
the strong desire of interest groups to testify suggest this arena needs to be researched.  
This is potentially a critical avenue for interest group influence.  Most of the studies 
dismissing the importance of hearings were conducted before the congressional reform in 
the early 1970s and in a time when policy was much less specialized than it is today.  As 
circumstances have changed so might have the importance of interest group testimony.  
Research needs to look at not only who gains access to congressional hearings, but 
whether the information conveyed influenced policy.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 This research develops the interest group impact theory describing under what 
conditions an interest group receives an invitation to testify before a committee or 
subcommittee and, furthermore, under what circumstances that testimony will affect the 
legislative markup.  No such theory currently exists.  Building one requires a foundation 
that intersects both interest group theory and congressional committee theory.   
 Organized interests have a large arsenal of strategies they employ to influence 
policy makers.  They have an opportunity to lobby at least two levels of government 
because of the federalist structure and three branches of government.  Within both levels 
and within each branch there are multiple ways to exercise influence.  Of all the arenas 
where one could examine group access and influence, this research focuses on 
congressional hearings in part because it is reported as the favored lobbying venue of all 
interest groups.  Interest group participation in congressional hearings has also been 
found to be closely related to the group’s overall level of involvement in Washington 
(Hays 1991). 
 Another reason to study committee hearings is that research on campaign 
contributions and congressional voting behavior have suggested that money does not 
influence floor votes in Congress directly but rather committee decision making (Hall and 
Wayman 1990; Schroedel 1986; Wright 1990).  If lobbying is effective at the committee 
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level, then which groups gain access might indicate what types of groups are likely to be 
advantaged by the existing system? 
 
Subgovernments and Issue Networks 
 Much of the attention devoted to the nexus between interest groups and 
congressional committees has come from studies of the subgovernment model of policy 
making.  In the subgovernment model, a limited number of interest groups, legislators, 
and executive agency leaders who frequently interact with one another on policy 
dominate policymaking in that particular area (McCool 1998).  Usually it is only groups 
with friendly interests or that are aligned with the committee that participate in hearings 
(Baumgartner & Jones 1993; Berry 1989; Hansen 1991; Lowi 1969; Shepsle and 
Weingast 1987; Wilson 1981).  Since the relationship between friendly groups and the 
committee chairs is strong and well established, there is never any surprise as to what the 
groups will say when they testify formally in hearings.  As such, chairs select groups that 
will buttress the committee position and act as “window dressing” (Berry 1989; Davidson 
& Oleszek 2004; DeGregorio 1992; Hinckley 1971).  Somewhat similar models (and 
often times confused) such as the iron triangle and subsystem models maintain similar 
views when it comes to interest groups and committee chairs (Freeman 1965; Thurber 
1991).  They are friendly, have similar policy views and work together to the exclusion of 
others.  When applied to committee hearing invitations, it is expected that only these 
“friendly” groups get to participate.   However the iron triangle model no longer is the 
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best description of all policy making in Congress and perhaps never was8.  For one, this 
model was intended to describe distributive policy, not regulatory policy (McCool 1998).  
Also, although on certain issues there may appear to be an iron triangle of influence, for 
the most part policy networks are more fluid and open.  A number of scholars who have 
studied the issue suggest that in the post-reform Congress the ambitious and highly 
specialized agenda enables more competition and participation in the policy making 
process (Browne & Paik 1993; Heclo 1978; Heinz, et al. 1993).  It is anticipated that 
although most invited groups are interests friendly to the committee or subcommittee 
chair, some opposition groups will also be invited.  In fact, current committee rules 
require the minority party be able to invite witnesses to testify.   
 The subgovernment model of policy making and the closely related iron triangle 
and subsystem theories are useful because they examine relationships that extend across 
branches and actors involved in policymaking.  They are most instructive in suggesting 
that a similar approach should be used in studying interest group testimony access and 
influence.  When it comes to access, the interest group impact theory maintains that 
committees and subcommittees will be much more inclusive with their witness lists than 
the subgovernment and related models would have us believe.  As the issue network 
literature has shown, there are many more groups competing with one another for access 
to House committees since the 1960s and early 1970s that combined with more rules 
requiring greater transparency in Congress results in a wider range of groups being 
included in hearings.   
 
8 Daniel McCool (1998) provides an excellent overview and assessment of the literature pertaining to iron 
triangles, subgovernment models and policy networks.  
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Committee Power Theories 
Congressional scholars caution not to neglect the committee or subcommittee 
itself.  Committees are the primary arenas of lawmaking, especially in the House.  There 
are several theories on committee power.  First, the [party as] cartel model stresses the 
subordination of the committee to the party and depicts chairs as agents of the party 
leadership (Kiewiet & McCubbins 1991; Cox & McCubbins 1993; Cox & McCubbins 
2002).  Gary Cox and Matthew McCubbins first developed this model in The Legislative 
Leviathan (1993) and have continued to elaborate on it (2002).  The majority party, 
including the committee and subcommittee chairs will in certain circumstances abdicate 
their power and give it to the party in order to shape a favorable party agenda.  The 
favorable party agenda is one in which there is strong party unity and includes few, if any 
issues, that divide the party.  In order to ensure such an agenda is pursued, the party will 
use House procedures to obstruct any divisive issues from reaching a floor vote, while, at 
the same time pushing through those with whole party support.  The committee and 
subcommittee chairs having given their power to the party, submit to the party’s wishes 
and act accordingly.  Those who do not comply risk losing their chairs.   
Thus, power within the chamber is centralized through the party leadership.  
Under this model, one would expect to see little influence exerted by the individual 
chairs.  It is expected that only organized interests supportive of the majority party will be 
allowed to testify.  The party leadership would not condone inviting “outside” interests to 
testify for fear they might influence party members to vote independent from the party 
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line.  The only dissenting testimony would come from the minority party’s invited 
interest.  Furthermore, it is expected those interests which are aligned with the majority 
party will have an opportunity to influence the bill during markup. 
Take for instance the issue of medical liability reform.  The two parties are 
divided on issues of tort reform with Republicans supporting caps on the amount of 
damages courts can award and Democrats generally believing there should be no limit, 
particularly when it comes to medical liability.  During the 108th Session of Congress 
(2003-2004), the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing on the HEALTH Act of 
2003.  This bill contained reforms modeled after California’s Medical Injury 
Compensation Reform Act including a $250,000 cap on non-economic damages.  The 
opening statements of the Republican chair indicated his strong support of the legislation.  
The ranking minority member, Representative John Conyers on the other hand, in his 
opening statement clearly states his opposition to the bill, citing a Center for Justice and 
Democracy study that reveals no correlation between insurance premiums and tort 
reform.  The witnesses that followed represented the Coalition for Affordable and 
Reliable Health Care, the American Medical Association, and the Physician Insurers 
Association of America, all ardent supporters of the proposed HEALTH Act.  The one 
exception was a woman who presumably was invited by the minority party as her 
testimony told of her tragic tale of medical neglect that led to paralysis.  The Center for 
Justice and Democracy was not invited to testify nor was Public Citizen, a group that 
submitted written testimony including over 75 pages of research and studies indicating 
that medical liability reform would not be wise policy.  The Republican Party supports 
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tort reform, and under its leadership, the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing on 
the issue inviting those groups they knew would support reform.  The chair of the 
committee controlled access to the hearing such that most of the testimony would voice 
support for the Republican position on the policy. 
Contrast what occurred in the House Judiciary Committee hearing in the 108th 
Congress (2003-2004) with the House Judiciary subcommittee on Economic and 
Commercial Law during the 103rd Congress (1993-1994) when the Democrats were the 
majority party.  The subcommittee held a hearing to examine the same issue of medical 
malpractice reform.  Rather than invite groups with positions that advocate reform, the 
interest groups invited to testify included the American Bar Association, the American 
Board of Trial Advocates and the National Center for Patients’ Rights.  All of which 
agree with the Democrats that there should be no limit on the amount of damages 
awarded by the courts.  Notably absent in the hearing are the perspectives of the medical 
community which along with the Republican Party, view the issue as a cause of 
increasing insurance costs.  The majority party in both instances limited access to those 
groups that were supportive of their position. 
According to cartel theory, all majority party members have a vested interest in 
giving power to the party leadership to ensure that only those bills that have majority 
party support (without out any defectors) receive attention in committee or subcommittee 
and make it to the floor where they will be passed.  Any legislation that might have 
members of the majority party breaking party lines is to be blocked by House procedure 
so that the perception of a strong, unified majority party is not tarnished.  Under the cartel 
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model, “outside” interests would never be allowed to testify; the party does not want to 
risk fracturing majority party support.   
Extrapolating from the cartel model, when it comes to deciding which interest 
groups to include in committee and subcommittee hearings, only those groups known to 
support the party position on the proposal would be given access and influence.  However 
this presupposes a party position on a known policy alternative.  Those policy alternatives 
do need to be developed at some stage.  While it is true that some legislation is crafted by 
interest groups and presented to policy makers in private meetings, other legislation is 
still developed by members of Congress working through their committees and 
subcommittees.  When the bill is conceived within the committee or subcommittee there 
is often no party line - there is no intelligence on what positions would best be supported 
by partisan beliefs.  As long as there is not a developed party position on an issue, a wide 
net is cast in choosing which groups will be given access to congressional hearings.  
Members are motivated to make good public policy and will choose those groups that can 
bring the most reliable and valuable information to the table. 
A second committee power model is conditional party government.  This model 
was developed by John Aldrich and David Rohde (1995, 1997, 2000).  Conditional party 
government is similar to cartel theory in that members are motivated by electoral 
concerns to cede power to their party.  Members recognize that there are advantages built 
into the structure of Congress for the majority party such as being able to establish the 
agenda and chair the committees that if utilized properly can not only further their 
electoral prospects but also aid them in making good policy.  The “conditions” that 
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present the best opportunity for members to empower their leadership are two.  The first 
condition is sharp differences between the two parties, differences that ultimately stem 
from polarization within the electorate.  The second condition is party cohesion on these 
issues.  Party unity and consensus exist on most of these issues.  The strength of this 
model, like that of cartel theory, is its recognition strong party leadership is not always 
present (it has varied over time) but when it is present, it is ultimately driven by shifts 
within the party electorate.  The primary difference in the cartel theory and conditional 
party government model is what aspect of party government is the focus.  The 
development of conditional party government centered on roll call behavior whereas 
cartel theory looked more at agenda control, both positive and negative.   
The two models are highly compatible and when it comes to extending the 
theories to the access and influence given to interest groups, the predictors are largely the 
same.  Perhaps the only difference is the amount of emphasis cartel theory places on 
negative agenda control.  Cartel theory suggests the majority party will only act 
positively on issues with majority party consensus.  While conditional party government 
does not, the condition of having distinct differences between homogenous parties 
implies more issues would have majority party consensus than there would be when the 
two conditions were not met.  Therefore, conditional party government applied to interest 
group access and influence would be limited to those interests that are aligned with the 
majority party unless the party position has yet to be developed.   With no party position 
to be developed, committees seek out the interest groups that will enable them to best 
make policy suited to the party interests. 
  47  
    
A third distinct model is the informational model.  Here the chamber is dominated 
by the majority interests of its members; that majority is not necessarily partisan and 
changes according to the policy under consideration (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990; 
Krehbiel 1991; Maass 1983).  While the preferences (on any given policy) of members 
can be partisan in nature they may also be shaped by ideology, district needs, by 
committee loyalty, by bargains entered into with other members or by information made 
available by interest groups.  Just as member preferences vary, so do their derivatives.  
Since party is not the only driving force, it alone is not the organizational backbone of the 
House.  Rather the chamber devises and maintains the committee and subcommittee 
structure to divvy up the workload.  The incentives are for each committee or 
subcommittee to maximize the information on the subject under its jurisdiction so as to 
make sound policy.  This theory assumes that committees and subcommittees have more 
information available to them and hence are more knowledgeable about the consequences 
of a particular policy than the full membership of the House.  The committee or 
subcommittee uses this informational advantage when necessary to sway the House 
membership to the committee’s preferred position.  The committee leadership recognizes 
they need to induce this informational advantage any time the median floor member’s 
position diverges from the median committee member’s position.   
The members of Congress who lie at the median of their committees and 
subcommittees and the chamber are pivotal points in legislative negotiations and as such 
have significant influence (Krehbiel 1998).  According to this model, power is 
decentralized and rests with the committees and their chairs (Arnold 1989; Baron and 
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Ferejohn 1989; Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974; Shepsle and Weingast 1995; Weingast and 
Marshall 1988).  Applying the informational model to interest group access and 
influence, it is the individual committee or subcommittee chairs that influence the 
likelihood of a group receiving an invitation to testify and of being able to affect policy.  
The chair will make these decisions based on which groups have the ability to provide the 
best information.  Because the decision rests with the chair, there will be some variance 
by chair since each one has a different utility function for the interest group information.  
Chairs who are ideologues and as such are resistant to a wider range of ideas and 
viewpoints will not allow as much access or influence as chairs who are more moderate 
and therefore more open to input from a variety of interest groups. 
  The informational model fits nicely with the perspective of one interest group 
scholar whose model is termed the communications theory of lobbying.  John R. Wright 
(1996) emphasizes the critical role of interest groups as purveyors of information.  
Interest groups aid in the policymaking process by giving relevant information to 
members of Congress.  The information most useful is political, electoral or policy 
information.  Political information relates to the status of the policy in terms of who is 
supporting and who is opposing in Congress, giving the legislator an idea of whether or 
not the policy has enough support to be passed.  Electoral information provides the 
legislator a sense of what will happen within his or her constituency if the legislator 
supports or opposes a policy.  The technical or policy specific knowledge about the 
legislation itself and any alternative approaches is considered policy information.    
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Wright bases the relevance of all three types of information based on Mayhew’s 
(1974) earlier work that identified three goals of members of Congress: 1) reelection, 2) 
influence within the chamber and 3) good public policy.  Wright sees interest group 
testimony, therefore, not as window dressing for the committee or subcommittee’s 
position or as veiled support for the majority party but as a repository of knowledge.  The 
communications theory of lobbying applied to the access and influence of interest group 
testimony suggests the chair would look to interest group resources.  Since interest group 
resources can signal what type of knowledge the group has, how well received and 
connected the group is, these will determine which groups are successful.  
The literature makes it clear that both party and ideology are central considerations in 
understanding the dispersion of power in congressional committees.   
Theodore Lowi (1964) developed a typology of policies which he argues 
determine the politics surrounding passage and implementation of those policies.  Three 
policy arenas were originally developed by Lowi (1964): distributive, regulatory and 
redistributive.  Since the research sample here is almost entirely distributive and 
regulatory policy, only these two policy arenas are considered. 
The distributive policy arena is one that is characterized by policy which can be 
made without regard to limited resources.  Since limited resources are not constraining 
the decision making involved in crafting this policy, distributions are widespread.  In 
addition there is little conflict and competition.  Distributive policies are made in a policy 
subgovernment dominated by congressional committee or subcommittee decision making 
(McCool 1988). 
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On the other hand, the regulatory policy arena is marked by competition and 
conflict.  This is due to regulatory policy being specific and individual in its impact.  
There is a clear beneficiary as well as there are clear losers.  Whereas distributive policies 
are theorized to be made within the confines of subgovernments, regulatory policy 
networks are much more open.  Open access to a wide range of policy actors heightens 
the level of competition and conflict.  Decision-making in this policy arena occurs in 
Congress as a whole, not in the committees or subcommittees (1964). 
In addition to the preceding committee variables, I will be including dummy 
variables representing the type of policy under consideration.  It is expected that interest 
groups will have greater access to regulatory policymaking than distributive since 
distributive decisions are made within the exclusive cozy subgovernments.   
 
Interest Group Influence Theory 
The preceding discussion included a congressional committee model labeled the 
informational model.  It is the only theory outside of subgovernment models of 
policymaking whose focus includes interest groups.  In this context, Wright’s 
communications theory of lobbying was also introduced.  Wright’s theory was the 
capstone to many earlier studies that recognized that groups testify not to showcase 
committee or subcommittee preferences but rather to communicate information which 
will aid legislative deliberation.  While clearly some testimony is for building political 
support, it is also true testimony provides useful technical and political information that 
serves the interests of the chamber or party leadership (Bradley 1980; Huitt 1954; 
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Heitshusen 2000).  Such a perspective underscores what interest groups bring to the table.  
All interest groups lobby; they have information to provide.  For many in the field of 
interest group politics, the theory of interest groups as purveyors of information has been 
embraced so fully that it is now axiomatic.  Interest group scholars, therefore, have turned 
their attention to what makes some groups more powerful and influential than others.  
These studies look to interest group resources to find answers. 
Lobbyists are an interest group’s representatives in Washington.  Lobbyists are 
the individuals who meet with policy makers so they can provide them with information.  
They are the links between the policy makers and the interest group itself.  Since 
lobbyists are the conduits of information, groups with more lobbyists will be able to 
transmit more information and hence be more influential.  There are two types of 
lobbyists: those who work full time as a staff member of an interest group and those who 
work for a public relations or lobbying firm and contract their services out to multiple 
interest groups.  While both types of lobbyists are instrumental in communicating an 
interest group’s message, in house lobbyists tend to have more policy expertise geared 
toward the interest group’s niche, whereas contract lobbyists often times get hired for the 
connections they have in Washington or for their knowledge of how politics works 
(Lowery & Brasher 2004).  Whether you are counting in house lobbyists or contract 
lobbyists, the more a group has, the more influential the interest group is thought to be 
(Lowery & Brasher 2004; Schattschneider 1933; Schlozman & Tierney 1986). 
All studies of lobbying assert the importance of an interest group’s reputation.  
Even manuals on how to lobby underscore the importance of reputation.  Reputation is 
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everything (Ainsworth 1993; Berry 1997; Lowery & Brasher 2004; Wolpe & Levine 
1996).  The credibility of a lobbyist and the group dictates whether their information will 
be considered reliable by members of Congress, because members don’t have the time or 
resources to verify every bit of information offered to them (Ainsworth 1993; Berry 
1977).  In other words, members of Congress use reputation as a cue or signal indicating 
to them which groups provide reliable information.  There is plenty of anecdotal and 
experiential evidence that suggests reputation is the primary currency of lobbyists and 
interest groups in Washington (Berry 1997; Ornstein & Elder 1978; Rosenthal 1993; 
Wolpe 1990).  However, it is difficult to measure the reputation of a lobbyist.   
Although it is difficult to measure reputation directly, it is possible to measure 
indirectly.  It seems reasonable the credibility that assists groups in gaining access and 
potentially influencing legislators is the same group credibility that assists in gaining 
media coverage.   Journalists like policy makers rely on cues such as reputation when 
deciding whose information to trust.  Therefore one could look to see how frequently a 
group is mentioned in the major media as a measure of their credibility.  Groups who are 
mentioned in the media more frequently are more likely to be seen as legitimate political 
actors with reliable information and as a result win access and influence in congressional 
subcommittees and committees. 
It’s not just reputation that determines the influence of a group.  There are other 
factors that go into the political calculus of determining which organized interests are 
considered “major players.”   Influential groups purportedly are able to gain access by 
making campaign contributions (Berry 1989; Gopoian, Smith and Smith 1984; Magleby 
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& Nelson 1990; Sabato 1985, 1989; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Souraf 1992; West & 
Loomis 1999; Wittenberg & Wittenberg 1989; Wolpe 1990).  Conventional wisdom 
suggests that no group would make any significant financial contribution unless it had 
something to gain.  Furthermore, groups that give once will continue to give money, 
which points to some type of payoff for the interest group.  Although the aforementioned 
studies on interest group contributions do not operationalize access, it is assumed that 
such a theory would apply to congressional hearings, in which case groups that make 
campaign contributions are more likely to have access to congressional hearings and have 
an impact on bill markups.   
It is not just that money buys access.  It strikes awe to see the amounts of money 
raised by interest groups.  The top PACs in 2003-04 were:  the National Association of 
Realtors which gave a total of $3,787,083; the Laborers Union which gave a total of 
$2,684,250 and the National Auto Dealers Association which gave $2,603,6009.  Again 
one can point to the conventional wisdom that says this money must be doing something 
for these groups, but there is another way to look at these inordinate contributions.  These 
groups are capable of raising money.  These PACs are not self-funded.  They need to 
make appeals to their membership in order to collect the money they give to candidates 
for public office.  It is an incredible feat to raise that quantity of money and it speaks to 
the influence these organizations have over their membership.  So while PAC 
contributions are included as variables, in the sense money is buying something, this 
 
9 These figures were obtained from the website maintained by the Center for Responsive Politics located at 
www.opensecrets.org. 
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should not overshadow the fact this variable is an indirect measure of the power and 
appeal of the groups over their own membership. 
In considering what constitutes a powerful interest, West and Loomis (1999) 
theorize the breadth of lobbying activity and the financial resources of the group indicate 
power.  Those groups which engage in more lobbying activities through a variety of 
means are more likely to exert an impact on policy compared to those which do not.  One 
lobbyist cannot be nearly as effective as a team of twenty.  There is only so much one 
individual can do.  Groups, which employ a staff or contract for lobbyists are able to 
lobby more and therefore exert more influence than those that do not.  In addition to 
lobbying, the financial resources of a group point to the power of a group.  Lobbyists, 
staff, communication with membership, and office space all cost money.  Moreover, a lot 
of what an interest group is able to accomplish is dependent on the team of researchers 
who are conducting analyses and developing policy proposals.  These individuals almost 
anonymously blend in with other staff members in interest group studies.  Since all of 
these resources cost money, the budget of an interest group is an effective indicator of its 
strength and power (Ornstein & Elder 1978).  The greater the resources of the group the 
stronger the group’s potential to gain access and influence. 
Lastly, one must not forget the membership that supports a group.  For some 
interest groups this is a more important resource than for others.  The importance of the 
group membership is not just the financial support contributed by the membership but 
rather the “reach” of influence of the group.  Recall that one type of information groups 
provide to members of Congress is electoral information.  Members of Congress value 
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any intelligence about what is happening with the voters in their constituency.  Interest 
groups and membership organizations, in particular, bridge a gap that sometimes exists 
between voters and their legislators.  Interest groups often have more contact with certain 
constituents than the member of Congress does herself.  So when an interest group, such 
as Americans for Tax Reform, indicates that it represents 600,000 members, it is 
indicating the reach it has within the electorate.  The group is signaling to members of 
Congress that it is in communication with 600,000 members and has some influence over 
those individual voters.   
Trade associations, like membership organizations, have a membership, but the 
difference is the membership of trade associations is comprised of businesses or in the 
case of professional associations, individual professionals.  Just as membership groups 
reach out to their membership so do trade associations.  Trade associations are as 
effective as membership groups in mobilizing their constituencies.   
Jeffrey Berry gives an example of the mobilizing capabilities of trade associations 
in The Interest Group Society (1997).  A bill was coming up for vote that would have 
implemented tax withholding on interest and dividend income earned by individuals.  
Two banking associations that opposed this legislation, the American Bankers 
Association and the U.S. League of Savings Institutions effectively mobilized not only 
their membership, but also the customers of their members by putting inserts in monthly 
bank statements encouraging the customers to take action against the bill.  Because of 
these efforts, 22 million letters were written to Congress prompting them to vote down 
the law (Berry 1997).  The trade association is also in communication with its members 
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on other business matters, perhaps even more so than membership groups are with their 
supporters. 
Many observers have suggested individuals who join membership groups are 
nothing more than check donors.  Once a year they write a check to the group but outside 
of that contribution, there is little interaction between members and the group.  Trade 
associations have much more extensive contact with their membership since they do 
more than just represent those businesses.  The same can be said of labor unions and their 
membership.  In fact, because of the constant communication between labor leaders and 
the rank-and-file, they are able to train, mobilize and encourage them to participate in 
elections in unprecedented numbers.  The level of membership is symbolic of how 
powerful the group is. 
The difficulty in talking about the membership of interest groups is that not all 
interests have “members.”  Businesses stand out in this regard.   While businesses might 
not have dues paying members, they do have employees.  The importance of the 
membership is not size or monetary contributions but rather their electoral reach.  A 
membership group or trade association can communicate a political message or mobilize 
its membership.  Similarly, businesses can communicate political messages or at times, 
mobilize their employees.  An example of this type of communication was recently 
displayed by Wal-Mart.  According to a story broken by the Wall Street Journal on 
August 1, 2008, Wal-Mart warned store managers and department heads a vote for 
Obama would lead to fewer jobs due to increasing labor costs.  This would be the result 
of an Obama presidency they foresee supporting legislation making it easier to unionize. 
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Therefore, just as one associates membership size with the political reach of an 
interest group (trade association, membership or union) one can similarly conceptualize 
employees of businesses.  Given the electoral needs of legislators, the membership (or 
number of employees) of an organized interest can be a strong indicator of the power of 
that interest (Ornstein & Elder 1978; Schlozman & Tierney 1986). 
Interest group resource theories collectively indicate resources of an interest 
group are mobilized strategically to influence policy.  The more influential groups tend to 
have more resources at their disposal.  One common denominator is interest groups use 
resources to communicate information and through that information attempt to influence 
policy.  Applying interest group resource theories to the access and influence given to 
interest groups in congressional hearings, those that have more tools will win more access 
and influence. 
The literature on interest group influence identifies several important factors.  
These include interest group resources, interest group reputation and PAC contributions.  
Several variables will specify these interest group factors, the empirical testing of which 
follows in the next chapters. 
 
Interest Group Impact Theory 
Using committee power and interest group resource theories to guide the way, I 
have developed an interest group impact theory based on two dimensions, “access” and 
“influence”.  The interest group impact theory attempts to pull together the most relevant 
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aspects of the other theories and apply them directly to interest group testimony and 
access.    
The theoretical power of earlier subgovernment models of policymaking is that 
they considered the intersection between interest groups and congressional committees.  
Although this research is not entrenched in the subgovernmental policymaking model, it 
does recognize that interest groups cannot be studied in isolation especially when an 
important question asks which actor is more important in this equation.  As such, 
consideration is given to aspects of Congress that affect how decisions are made. 
Since committee members have an interest in making good policy they will seek 
out those interest groups that have a strong reputation for providing reliable information.  
A committee or subcommittee chair will look to the resources and reputation of the 
interest group in choosing which groups to invite.  Those groups that have more 
resources at their disposal will gain more access and have a better chance at influencing 
policy.  In some situations, there will be a reluctance to cede power to interest groups, 
particularly those that are not aligned with the majority party.  The important 
considerations are who or what has control in the committee.  What the committee power 
theories have shown is that it is either party or member preferences.   
Party and ideology are the essential considerations.  Party and ideology will 
impact the influence stage more so than access for a couple of reasons.  First, granting 
access to an interest group does not necessarily mean they will also be allowed influence.  
Committees can maintain an appearance of being equitable and inclusive in their dealings 
by granting access to a wide range of groups.  However, once the positions of the groups 
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are known, in the influence stage only groups whose interests are aligned with the 
majority party will be successful.  Because the partisan leanings and ideologies of most 
interest groups are difficult to quantify without some survey of those interests, testing this 
part of the theory must be modified.  Rather than testing specific interests, it will suffice 
to generalize the interests.  Businesses are expected to have a close relationship with the 
Republican Party and be allowed more influence when the Republicans control the House 
whereas labor unions are more closely aligned with the Democrats and will find success 
when the Democrats are in the majority. 
Ideology will impact access and influence as well.  The impact will reveal itself in 
the extreme ideologues who serve as committee or subcommittee chairs as well as within 
the committees or subcommittees whose ideologies (mean of all individual members’ 
measured ideologies) depart significantly from the chamber mean.  Ideologue chairs are 
expected to be exclusive in the access they grant to groups making it much more difficult 
for all groups to testify in front of them.  Exclusivity also reigns within ideologically 
divergent committees or subcommittees when it comes to allowing interest group 
influence on bill markups.  These committees or subcommittees are loath to allow interest 
groups influence as they use hearings less as fact finding missions and more as a rally for 
supporting the committee or subcommittee position.  Doing this gives them a greater 
chance at mobilizing support for the bill further along the policy process.  Interest groups 
therefore will fare better in terms of access with committees and subcommittees chaired 
by moderates as they will have a greater chance at influencing a bill when testifying 
before more moderate committees and subcommittees. 
  60  
    
Member preferences might be shaped in ways other than by partisanship or 
ideology.  It is anticipated that preferences will reflect the amount of legislative 
experience a committee or subcommittee chair has.  Relative newcomers in the House 
will have less policy expertise and therefore be more dependent on outside interests for 
their informational needs.  Not having expertise, they will not have a predisposition to 
inviting certain interest groups to participate over others.  Conversely, more experienced 
House members serving as chairs, will through their experience have come to rely on a 
smaller number of groups they deem as trustworthy.  They will have little need to reach 
out to as wide of a range of groups and the less tenured House chairs.  The impact of 
experience plays out similarly when it comes to allowing interest group testimony to 
influence bill markups: less tenured chairs will be more willing to allow influence than 
more tenured members. 
While the party models of congressional control depict less autonomy of 
committee chairs than the informational models, the interest group testimony theory I 
develop acknowledges some room for leadership on the part of the committee chairs, 
even during conditions of strong party government.  While the ability of chairs to make 
decisions may be hampered significantly when parties are strong, they still have the 
ability to make some decisions independently.  They still get to choose which groups will 
testify and they can try to guide how their committee members vote on bill markups.  
Understanding this it is expected that some committees and subcommittees and chairs 
will be more accessible than others as some will be more accommodating in the bill 
markups. 
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 Interest groups fill an informational role.  They provide knowledge to policy 
makers, not just about policy but also about electoral prospects.  While one measure of 
interest group resources is information, its reputation as a good source of information is 
also relevant.  Therefore, the number of lobbyists employed, its budget, membership and 
campaign contributions are all measures of group strength.  Group strength cannot be 
ignored when devising a theory about interest group access to and influence on 
congressional committee and subcommittee hearings. 
 Lastly it is expected the politics of making policy within the regulatory and 
distributive policy arenas will extend to both interest group access and influence.  Since 
the regulatory arena is characterized as being more open to political actors, it is expected 
interest groups will have greater access to congressional hearing within the regulatory 
arena.  However, because the regulatory arena is also marked by greater competition and 
conflict among policy actors, influence on bill markups will not be as easy for groups to 
attain.  Rather, interest groups are more likely to have influence within the distributive 
policy arena since the very fact that they were invited to testify is an indication they 
belong to the policy subgovernment considering the legislation.  From the privileged 
position of being part of the iron triangle, interest groups testifying on distributive policy 
will have a greater likelihood of influence on the bill mark ups.     
 The hypotheses that were developed to test the interest group impact theory are 
listed in Table 1. 
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______________________________________________________________________ 
Table 1: Interest Group Impact Hypotheses 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Access 
H1: Partisan affinity, as measured by businesses during Republican controlled Houses, 
will be positively related to the likelihood that an interest group receives an invitation to 
testify. 
 
H2: Partisan affinity, as measured by the interaction of being a business and 
contributions given to House Republicans seated on the committee being lobbied, will be 
positively related to the likelihood an interest group receives an invitation to testify.  
 
H3: Ideological extremism, as measured by the ideology of the committee or 
subcommittee chair, will be negatively related to the likelihood that an interest group 
receives an invitation to testify. 
 
H4: Chair influence, as measured by the number of years a chair has been a House 
member, will be negatively related to the likelihood that an interest group receives an 
invitation to testify.  
 
H5:  Interest group resources, as measured by the number of contract lobbyists and 
lobbyists on staff, will be positively related to the likelihood that an interest group 
receives an invitation to testify. 
 
H6:  Interest group resources, as measured by the membership and budget of the group, 
will be positively related to the likelihood that an interest receives an invitation to testify. 
 
H7: Interest group resources, as measured by the amount of lobbying activity of a group, 
will be positively related to an interest’s likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify. 
 
H8:  Interest group visibility, as measured by the number of active and passive media 
mentions of an interest group, will be positively related to an interest’s likelihood of 
receiving an invitation to testify. 
 
H9: Interest group visibility, as measured by the age of a group, will be positively related 
to an interest’s likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify.  
 
H10: Political influence, as measured by the amount of PAC contributions an interest 
group gives to all members of Congress, will be positively related to an interest’s 
likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify. 
 
H11: Political influence, as measured by the amount of PAC contributions an interest 
group gives to committee members, will be positively related to an interest group’s 
likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify. 
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H12: Political influence, as measured by PAC contributions made to the committee and 
subcommittee chair, will be positively related to an interest group’s likelihood of 
receiving an invitation to testify. 
 
H13: Regulatory policy arena, as measured by policy committees, will be positively 
related to an interest group’s likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify. 
 
 
 
Influence 
 
H1: Partisan affinity, as measured by businesses during Republican controlled Houses, 
will be positively related to the likelihood that an interest group’s recommended change 
will be included in the bill markup. 
 
H2: Partisan affinity, as measured by labor unions during a Democrat controlled House, 
will be positively related to the likelihood that an interest group’s recommended change 
will be included in the bill markup.  
 
H3: Partisan affinity, as measured by the level of partisanship within a committee or 
subcommittee, will be negatively related to the likelihood an interest group’s 
recommended change is included in the bill markup. 
 
H4: Ideological extremism, as measured by the ideology of the committee or 
subcommittee, will be negatively related to the likelihood that an interest group’s 
recommended change will be included in the bill markup. 
 
H5: Chair influence, as measured by the number of years a chair has been a House 
member, will be negatively related to the likelihood that an interest group’s 
recommended change will be included in the bill markup. 
 
H6: Interest group resources, as measured by the number of lobbyists, will be positively 
related to the likelihood that an interest group’s requested change will be included in the 
bill markup.   
 
H7: Interest group resources, as measured by the membership size and budget of an 
interest group, will be positively related to an interest’s likelihood of having its requested 
change included in the bill markup.   
 
H8: Interest group visibility, as measured by the number of media mentions an interest 
group receives, will be positively related to the likelihood its requested change will be 
included in the bill markup.   
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H9: Interest group visibility, as measured by the age of an interest group, will be 
positively related to the likelihood an interest’s requested change is included in the bill 
markup.   
  
H10: Political influence, as measured by an interest group’s PAC contributions to House 
members, will be positively related to the likelihood its requested change will be included 
in the bill markup. 
 
H11: Political influence, as measured by an interest group’s PAC contributions to 
members sitting on the committee holding the markup, will be positively related to the 
likelihood its requested change will be included in the bill markup. 
 
H12: Political influence, as measured by an interest group’s PAC contributions to the 
chair of the committee holding the markup, will be positively related to the likelihood its 
requested change will be included in the bill markup. 
 
H13: Regulatory policy arena, as measured by regulatory policy, will be negatively to the 
likelihood an interest group’s requested change is included in the bill markup. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Studying committee hearings to understand interest group influence also enables a 
deeper understanding of power distribution in Congress.  While there are many well 
developed theories regarding both interest group influence and committee power, none 
focus their attention on committee hearings.  Interest groups rank testifying as a preferred 
lobbying activity indicating the opportunity they see to influence policy.  On the other 
side committees and subcommittees spend much of their time and resources holding 
hearings signaling the importance they place on these events.  Because all parties 
involved in committee hearings deem them important, this is a critical venue to study. 
 An interest group impact theory is developed here to understand the conditions 
and circumstances under which interest groups are given access and have the ability to 
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influence bill markups.  Pulling together theories regarding interest group resources and 
committee power, the interest group impact theory continues to build on that research.  
The models developed to test this theory are discussed in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 In examining interest group influence within House committee and subcommittee 
hearings, there are two dimensions to my research.  The first seeks to identify what 
factors affect which interest groups are invited to testify in hearings.  The second is to 
look at whether interest group testimony impacts the subsequent bill markups coming out 
of that committee or subcommittee.  While it would appear that this would be a two-
staged analysis, by necessity two separate research models are designed, using two 
separate data sets.  As the research design is fundamental to this examination, this chapter 
provides the detail of that design and explains how the data were collected. 
 
The Access Model 
 What factors influence whether an interest group receives an invitation to testify 
before a House congressional hearing?  Theory suggests there could be two potential 
sources of influence.  First, since it is the chair of the committee or subcommittee who 
extends the invitation, it is likely that characteristics of the chair and features of the 
committee or subcommittee also influence this decision.  Second, characteristics of the 
interest group itself may affect whether a group receives an invitation.  Thus a data set 
needs to be compiled that would enable testing of both sets of factors.  
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This question has previously been examined, primarily by Kevin Leyden (1995).  
For his data, he chose a random sample of 250 groups from The Encyclopedia of 
Associations.  He then used the Congressional Information Service to look up how many 
times each group testified in 1985.  His dependent variable measured the number of times 
each group testified.  This method worked well with Leyden’s theory that interest group 
resources influenced which groups were invited to testify.   However that methodology 
does not work with the theoretical framework I am developing, because it does not 
include the collection of any information about the committees and subcommittees and 
their leadership.  Approaching the study of this process from the perspective of interest 
group resources is looking at only half the equation.  There is an established literature 
about congressional committees and their leadership; since committees spend much of 
their time holding hearings their role in this process should not be overlooked.  Political 
institutions, players and organizations do not function in isolation of one another, they 
interact daily.  For theory to best describe reality, we must study the interactions.  Leyden 
only needed to collect data on the interest groups and how many times they testified; in 
the interest group testimony theory presented here information about the committee and 
its leadership also is included.  I therefore need to develop a data sample that enables 
collection of both interest group and chair committee and subcommittee features. 
 
Research Sample for the Access Model 
 The starting point of this research was selecting a sample of groups.  Since 
Leyden conducted his research, a new source of lobbying information has been created.  
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In 1995 Congress successfully passed and enacted into law the Lobbying Disclosure Act.  
One of the requirements of this legislation is for any lobbyist to file bi-annual lobbying 
reports with Congress.  The legislation specifies a lobbyist as:  “Any individual who (1) 
is either employed or retained by a client for financial or other compensation (2) for 
services that include more than one lobbying contact; and (3) whose "lobbying activities" 
constitute 20 percent or more of his or her services on behalf of that client during any six-
month period” (2 U.S.C. § 1605).  The report requires disclosure of lobbying contacts, 
issues that are lobbied and amount of money expended on lobbying.  The database 
maintains all reports filed since 1998.  This is a much more comprehensive listing of 
groups than any of the encyclopedias of organized interests that exist and as such is the 
sampling source chosen for this study.  For example, in 2004 the number of registrants 
filing reports under the Lobbying Disclosure Act numbered 17,138.  That same year, the 
Washington Information Directory notes in the preface that the 2004-05 edition, listed 
more than 13,000 organizations.  This directory has been a popular source for those 
seeking a comprehensive listing of organizations active in federal government, but it does 
not identify the numerous state and local governments, coalitions, colleges and 
universities, and state and local trade and membership groups that actively lobby 
Washington policy makers. 
 Since one set of variables of interest are those measuring characteristics of the 
committee and subcommittee chairs, some variance in this set of variables is desirable.  
The data should span more than one session of Congress.  Fortunately for purposes of this 
research design, the Republican majority implemented rules when they won control of 
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the House in 1994 that implemented term limits on committee and subcommittee chairs.  
No member of Congress can hold any one chair for more than six years.  Since the 
Republicans first maintained a majority and appointed chairs in the 104th session of 
Congress (1995-1996), in the 107th session of Congress (2001-2002) most of the chairs 
were re-appointed to other members of the Republican caucus.  My dataset includes 
hearings from the 105th through the 108th Congress; a time span that includes years prior 
to the switchover of chairs as well as years after.  A random sampling of groups was 
employed to select 100 groups for each of the following years: 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 
2003 and 2004.  Since collecting data for all of these groups is time consuming, in the 
interest of conserving time one year was excluded – 2002.  One concern in omitting the 
year 2002 is different term effects for whether it is the first or second year in a 
congressional session.  A dichotomous variable measuring for the term effect will be 
included in the analysis to ensure there is no differential effect. 
 The random sampling of groups was conducted as follows.  First, for each year of 
Congress, the Lobbying Disclosure Database (which can be accessed through both the 
US House and Senate’s websites) was consulted to indicate the comprehensive number of 
organizations that registered for that year.  Table 2 indicates the number of registrants in 
the database for each year.  Then, 100 numbers were randomly selected for each year, 
using a range indicated by the number of organizations registered.  So if in 2004, 17,138 
groups were registered, 100 numbers between 1 and 17,138 were selected.  The random 
numbers drawn were then matched to the number of the group and that group was 
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selected.  If a group was selected more than once (within a year or across years), it was 
discarded and a replacement was randomly selected.10   
 
 
Table 2: Number of Organizations Registered in the Lobbying Disclosure Database 
  
Session Year   Organizations Registered 
 
105th  1998    13,068 
106th  1999    14,020 
106th  2000    13,618 
107th  2001    14,845 
108th  2003    16,951 
108th  2004    17,138 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Once the initial sample of 600 groups was collected, each group’s year-end 
Lobbying Disclosure report was consulted to determine which issues were lobbied for the 
year in which they were selected.  On the reports most groups identify the issues lobbied 
in two ways.  They describe the issue and identify the bill number.  For example a group 
might record that they lobbied:  The Medicare Reform bill, H.R. 1.  However some 
groups only identify the bill number and others only describe the bill.  If only a 
description of the issue was given, keyword searches in LexisNexis Congressional were 
used to identify which committees and subcommittees held hearings on that issue during 
that session of Congress (both years).  So if I selected the US Chamber of Commerce for 
                                                 
10 This occurred fewer than ten times for each year in the sample so I am confident that the sample is not 
skewed toward groups with more than one registration.  Some organizations are listed multiple times since 
each separate lobbying firm must file a report.  Therefore if an interest group has in house lobbyists as well 
as contract lobbyists from a specific lobbying firm, then that group would have two separate registrations: 
one from the group itself and one from the lobbying firm. 
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1999, I would check to see whether the issues they report lobbying were the subject of 
hearings for the 106th Congress which spans 1999-2000.11  Some groups disclose only 
lobbying one or two issues and others report lobbying twenty issues.  Every single issue 
mentioned was researched using LexisNexis Congressional to determine which 
committees and subcommittees held hearings on that issue.  Following the example of the 
Medicare Reform bill, using LexisNexis Congressional, it is found that in the 108th 
Congress, seven hearings were held on Medicare reform in the House.  Therefore there 
were seven opportunities for an interest group to receive an invitation to testify.  Each 
opportunity to be invited to testify (each issue for which there was also a hearing held) 
becomes an observation in the data set.  The dichotomous dependent variable is 1=yes the 
group testified in that hearing, or 0 = no the group did not testify.   If in a group’s 
lobbying report it has more than one issue lobbied, each issue is searched through 
LexisNexis Congressional to determine how many hearings were held.  Thus the initial 
pool of 600 groups was transformed into a data set with 2488 observations.  Each 
observation represents an opportunity to testify on an issue in which the group is 
interested.  Some groups have only one observation in the data set and others have as 
many as twenty-five observations.  
 There are possible limitations to creating a database in this way.  First, some 
interest groups that do end up testifying never have to file lobbying reports with 
Congress.  The Lobbying Disclosure law which mandates the registration of lobbying 
activity specifies that only organizations whose total expenses for lobbying activities 
 
11 Searching for hearings by session of Congress rather than by year potentially overcomes the changes in 
scheduling and time available for committee work seen in election versus non-election years. 
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exceed $24,500 during a semi-annual period need to file a report.  This applies to a 
number of groups.  For example, for one of the hearings held on Medicare reform, the 
House Government Reform Committee invited the Washington Business Group on 
Health to testify, now called the National Business Group on Health.  This organization 
represents large employers’ interests when it comes to health policy issues.  It is a well 
established group being in existence since 1974.  However it does not spend enough 
money lobbying to require lobbying disclosure and therefore is not found in the lobbying 
database.   
Second, the lobbying law only applies to federal political activity.  A number of 
groups who are invited to testify focus their activity solely on the state and local levels of 
government and thus are not registered in the database.  In 2004, a representative for 
Citizens for Florida’s Waterways testified before the House Committee on Resources 
hearing on the Endangered Species Act.  This group advocates the responsible use of 
Florida waterways and is active particularly at the local level.  However, they have never 
registered (or been required to) under the Lobbying Disclosure Act since they do not 
expend enough resources lobbying at the federal level.  For both reasons, a number of 
groups are excluded from the registration and thus have no chance of being selected in 
the sample.  But this is only a fraction of the whole universe of groups and should not 
have a significant bearing on the results of this study.   
Another constant is the assumption that if a group lobbies an issue then this is an 
indication it wants to testify on that issue.  For the most part this assumption is not 
problematic.  We do know through survey research that groups want to testify and that 
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testifying is actually a preferred lobbying activity (Schlozman & Tierney, 1986).  The 
only other activity that is more popular is meeting with policy makers in person.  Even 
when an interest group has been able to meet with legislators one-on-one they do not 
cease to use other lobbying techniques especially testifying in hearings.  As Schlozman 
and Tierney (1986) learned through their interviews, testifying at hearings actually puts 
organizations in contact with key legislators with whom they have been unable to reach 
otherwise.  This is one of the main reasons this avenue of lobbying is so desirable.  Still 
there might be times when a group declines an invitation to testify or times when a group 
does not wish to testify.  Although this possibility exists, it appears to occur infrequently.  
In compiling the database for the second part of the research, groups who were unable to 
accept an invitation to testify still submitted written testimony along with an apology for 
not being able to participate in person.  Having examined that public record, the instances 
of declined invitations were fewer than five, suggesting that this limitation is minimal. 
 
Independent Variables for the Access Model 
The data compiled will comprise the dependent variable in the access model: 
whether or not the opportunity to testify was granted.  There are 2488 observations in the 
data set.  Next, data were collected for the independent variables.  Because the interest 
group testimony theory is derived from both, congressional committee power theories 
and interest group resource theories, two types of independent variables are being tested: 
those measuring features of the committee and subcommittee, or chair and those relating 
to the interest group. 
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The congressional committee power theories shape the first group of independent 
variables: partisan affinity, ideological extremism and chair influence.  Barbara Sinclair 
succinctly describes the competing beliefs about whether parties and leaders have an 
impact on how members make decisions in the House in a footnote in Party Wars (2006, 
pg.377).  She says congressional scholars are divided over whether it is partisanship and 
influence of party leadership (Cooper & Brady 1981; Cox & McCubbins 1993; Rohde 
1991; Sinclair 2006) that motivates behavior or whether it is individual member 
preferences (Krehbiel 1991).  These competing views are evaluated in the conditional 
party government model (Aldrich and Rohde 1995, 1997, 2000), the [party as] cartel 
theory (Kiewiet & McCubbins 1991; Cox & McCubbins 1993; Cox & McCubbins 2002), 
and the informational model (Krehbiel 1991; Maass 1983; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990).   
The former two arguing the influence of partisanship and party leadership, the latter 
arguing individual member preferences.  Various measures of partisanship and individual 
preferences of the chairs are developed.  Preferences of the chair are used rather than 
committee and subcommittee members since the decision of who to invite to testify in 
hearing ultimately lies with chair.  He or she makes this decision without taking any type 
of committee or subcommittee vote; in other words there is no step in the process for 
input from committee and subcommittee members, unless minority members are 
exercising their right to call their own witness. 
The measures of partisan affinity then are ratioRD and partisanship.  RatioRD is 
the ratio of Republicans on the committee or subcommittee to the number of Democrats.  
There are no Democratic controlled Houses used in the access sample and so keeping the 
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ratio in terms of Republicans to Democrats works.  The distribution of seats on a 
committee or subcommittee is an indication of those that the party leadership deems 
important to control.  The House Rules adopted at the beginning of each session of 
Congress determine the distribution of seats among parties.  The ratio of majority party 
seats to minority party seats varies.  Some committees, the Rules Committee are so 
important to the leadership that the majority party maintains an overwhelming majority of 
seats on that committee.  Therefore ratioRD is an indirect measure of partisan influence. 
Partisanship measures the level of partisanship that exists within a committee or 
subcommittee.  This variable was developed by calculating the ratio of all bills 
introduced by Republicans to those introduced by Democrats that received action beyond 
being introduced within that committee or subcommittee12.  Information regarding such 
committee action on bills was obtained through the Library of Congress’s Thomas 
website.  The way the ratio was calculated, the closer the value was to one, the more 
bipartisan the committee.  However, there are a number of committees and 
subcommittees with values between one and zero, therefore partisanship uses the 
absolute value of the difference of the ratio and one.13  The larger the value, the more 
partisan the committee or subcommittee is.  Figure 1 lays out the percentage of 
committees and subcommittees holding each value of partisanship.  This histogram was 
created from the access sample.  The percentages represent quite a few committees and 
 
12 Some bills carry more than one sponsor and a number of co-sponsors.  For the purposes of this measure, 
only the original co-sponsor is counted. 
13 With the measure devised, some (sub)committees had a blank value since they had taken no action on 
bills beyond them being introduced.  Rather than have STATA treat this as missing data and dropping the 
observations, the mean partisanship score for the parent committee for that session of Congress is used 
instead. 
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subcommittees scored zero, which is the value given to the completely bipartisan 
committees or subcommittees.  These include the Government Reform subcommittees, 
some of the oversight subcommittees along with a few others.  The most partisan 
committee is the Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts with a value of 24 for the 106th 
Congress, a value of 22 for the 108th Congress and a value of 15 for the 105th Congress.  
The Education and Workforce Subcommittee on Workforce Protections of the 105th 
Congress also has a value of 16. 
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While both ratioRD and partisanship measure partisan affinity, they are tapping 
different dimensions and are not correlated.  The correlation between the two variables is 
.082.  This is a weak correlation.  Partisanship is more indicative of the level of 
partisanship within the committee or subcommittee under the leadership of the committee 
or subcommittee chair.  The committee leadership, not the House leadership is directly 
responsible for how many majority or minority sponsored bills receive action.  RatioRD 
on the other hand is a dimension of partisanship that is set by the House leadership.  Not 
only does this variable give an indication of which committees and subcommittees are 
considered important for the majority to control, it also affects voting within the 
committee or subcommittee as most decisions require majority votes.     
Other variables are designed to measure ideological extremism.  DWchair 
measures the ideology of the committee or subcommittee chair using Rosenthal and 
Poole’s DW Nominate scores.14  Believing that liberal ideologues will behave no 
different than conservative ideologues in terms of granting access to groups, DWchair is 
the absolute value of the difference in between a chair’s DW Nominate score and the 
mean House DW Nominate scores.  The closer the score is to one, the more extreme the 
individual is in his or her ideology.  The closer the score is to zero, the more moderate the 
ideology.  It is believed that ideologues will rely on a small, reliable set of interest groups 
for testimony rather than including wide ranging groups.  This behavior is expected to be 
displayed by both liberal and conservative ideologues.  With exclusivity dominating the 
invitation lists of these committees and subcommittees, interest groups in general will 
 
14 These data are available through their website www.voteview.com. 
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have a more difficult time gaining access to them.  If individual preferences are driving 
behavior, we would expect behavior to vary by level of ideology.   
Understanding individual preferences also might partially be a function of how 
long a member has been in the House, tenure is included as a measure of Chair Influence.  
More seasoned members have spent time building expertise in their issue niches and are 
less dependent on interest groups for information than are newer members of the House.  
The length of the chair’s service in the House is measured in tenure.  More tenured chairs 
will not find it necessary to invite a large and diverse number of interest groups but newer 
members who are chairs motivated by their desire for information will.  
Dummy variables are created to represent the individual chairs, committees and 
subcommittees, and committee type.  The dummy variables serve two purposes.  The first 
is to measure the independent effect, both chairs and committees may exert on the 
process.  Outside of partisanship, ideology, and tenure, chairs are individuals who have 
personalities.  Some may be very accommodating when it comes to including interest 
groups in hearings whereas others might grudgingly allow them to participate.  
Anticipating personalities will impact the decision the chair dummy variables are 
included.  Committees themselves have distinct cultures.  Fenno (1966) first 
demonstrated this with his detailed study of the Appropriations Committee.  
Understanding committees have behaviors and norms distinct to themselves, it is possible 
for committee type to influence what types of groups are given access and ultimately 
influence. 
  79  
    
The second reason for including the chair and particularly the committee dummy 
variables is to take into account the effects these variables may have in this pooled time-
series analysis.  Since the committees and chairs cross time periods included, they can be 
creating statistical noise which is being picked up by other variables, unless they are 
included as control variables.  Thus they will also serve as controls. 
Committees are classified as constituency, policy or prestige depending on what 
type of policy is typically under the jurisdiction of that committee or subcommittee.  
Constituency committees are those committees where members are able to use the 
distributive legislation they pass to help them in their re-election goals (Deering & Smith 
1990).  The idea is the more benefits secured for your constituency, the better off you will 
be come election time.  As was discussed in Chapter 3, the politics of making regulatory 
policy is marked by little conflict or competition among political actors as most decisions 
are made within the confines of policy subgovernments.  There is little dissent as the 
benefits of distributive policy are widespread.  Policy committees deal with regulatory 
legislation and prestige committees are the much sought after Appropriations, Ways & 
Means, and House Rules Committees.  Theoretically, regulatory policy involves more 
actors and more conflict and competition since there is some constituency that will 
benefit from the policy at the same time there are other constituencies that will be 
deprived in some way.  Committee types are not unrelated to member motivations.  It has 
been theorized that constituency committees are more likely to run by consensus and 
exhibit low levels of partisanship whereas policy committees are highly partisan and 
contentious in nature (Carson, Finocchiaro & Rohde, 2001).   
  80  
    
                                                
Looking at the descriptive statistics, it becomes clear that lobbying with money is 
a technique more frequently employed by certain types of interest groups, particularly 
businesses.  It is also commonly thought that businesses are more likely to associate 
themselves with or support the Republican Party, this too is the assertion leveled by E.E. 
Schattschneider (1965).  Similarly, labor unions are often the largest financial 
contributors in elections and they rarely support any candidates outside of the Democratic 
Party.  Research also indicates that labor PACs are more likely to support representatives 
of similar ideologies just as corporate and oil PACs are more likely to support 
Republicans (Gopoian 1983, Grier 1989, Neustadtl, Scott & Clawson 1991).  Coupled 
with other studies finding evidence that campaign contributions buy access to legislators 
(Langbein 1986, Wright 1989), it would be reasonable to expect that when businesses 
make campaign contributions to Republican chairs, they gain better access than other 
interest groups.  An interactive variable is created to reflect this:  businessmoney.  This 
variable is an interaction between being a business and the amount of PAC contributions 
given to the Republican members seated on the committee being lobbied.15  This is 
another measure of partisan affinity. 
A last committee related variable measures whether or not the district 
representative of an interest group has a seat on the committee or subcommittee being 
lobbied.  This is a variable to be included since at least one study has demonstrated how 
district constituents have an advantage to gaining access to members of Congress than do 
other political actors (Chin, Bond, Geva, 2000).   
 
15 A similar interactive variable to measure labor groups that support Democrats is not used since all 
sessions of Congress in the access sample are controlled by a Republican majority. 
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In line with the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3, I am interested in measuring 
interest group resources, visibility, and political influence.  Interest group resources are 
measured by lobbyists, membership size, organizational budget, and lobbying activity.  
Visibility is measured by age and active and passive media mentions.   Political influence 
is measured by PAC contributions to House committee and subcommittee members and 
contributions made to the committee or subcommittee chair.  Schattschneider, widely 
known for his indictment that the heavenly chorus sings with an upper class accent, in his 
earlier Politics, Pressures and the Tariff (1935) claims that those groups who made 
campaign contributions and were able to maintain experienced lobbyists in Washington 
had the advantage in influencing Congress (Ornstein & Elder 1978).  Lobbyists can be of 
two varieties: in-house lobbyists or contract lobbyists.  In-house lobbyists are effective in 
communicating information to legislators since they are highly knowledgeable about the 
policy around which their group is organized.  Since they work solely for one group, over 
time they build significant policy expertise if they were not hired for having such 
expertise in the first place.  Contract lobbyists, on the other hand, are hired because of the 
contacts they have in government (Lowery & Brasher 2004).  Many contract lobbyists 
previously worked in government and are intimate not just with policy makers but are 
knowledgeable about policy processes.   
Own lobbyist and hired guns are two of the interest group resources variables.  
Own lobbyist measures the number of internal lobbyists an interest group has on staff, 
whereas hired guns indicates the number of contract lobbyists.  Both lobbyist variables 
  82  
    
                                                
are interval.  The information for both was retrieved from the group’s year end lobbying 
disclosure report.   
 “The primary political resource that organizations command is, of course, money.  
What makes money important in politics is its convertibility – the fact that it can easily be 
transformed into other valued political resources.  In short, money buys things 
(Schlozman & Tierney 1986, pg. 89).”  While PAC contributions are always the focus of 
studies on lobbying, the money interest groups have available for day-to-day operations 
must not be overlooked.  Since money pays rent and salaries and is used in many ways 
not easily identifiable, the organizational budget is important. 
Another measure of political resources is budget.  Budget is a direct translation of 
a group’s budget or their net income.16  Information for this interval level variable was 
obtained from websites maintained by the interest groups or from Hoover’s Company 
Reports.17   
The size and stability of a group comprise another political resource.  As indicated 
by Ornstein & Elder (1978), membership size is an important physical resource because 
members translate into votes and because membership gains legitimacy.  Jeffrey Berry 
states, “There is no one measure of the organizational capacity of interest groups, but key 
variables include size, membership, stability, and… effective allocation of available 
funds” (1999, pg.120). 
 
16 This variable ends up getting dropped.  In the initial logistic regression analysis it was insignificant (P > 
z at 0.103) and because this variable has 686 missing observations it would have lowered the sample size to 
1548.  Because of its insignificance it was dropped in order to preserve a larger sample. 
17 Hoover’s Company Reports is a subscription service that offers proprietary business information for 
more than 25 million corporations and organizations.  This service was accessed through Lexis-Nexis. 
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Members is an interval variable measuring the size of the membership for those 
groups that have members, and for the others it measures the number of employees.  
Most trade associations count their membership by the number of companies or 
organizations that belong to them.  However, including that number as the measurement 
of their members would not be accurate, because the reach of the trade association goes 
beyond the member companies and organizations; it extends further to the employees and 
organizational membership.  Thus for trade associations, membership is measured by the 
number of individuals belonging to or employed by the trade association’s institutional 
members.   This data was retrieved from websites maintained by the interest group, from 
testimony they submitted to Congress and from Hoover’s Company Reports.18   
Visibility in part is measured by the age of a group.  Age was an interest group 
variable Kevin Leyden (1995) identified as being important to include in his analysis.  
Although he provides no justification for this resource, likely it stems from the work done 
by scholars studying organizational maintenance, particularly those involved in niche 
theory and population ecology (Gray & Lowery 1996; Browne 1990; Walker 1983).  The 
ability of a group to survive is important because, “[they] must survive if they are to 
influence public policy” (Lowery & Brasher 2004).  Groups that have been in existence 
over a period of time are legitimate actors; they have maintained their reputations as 
informants on the policy in which they specialize.  How long the group has been in 
existence is measured by age.  The age of the group is logged since this is not a linear 
variable.  Data again was collected from interest group websites, congressional testimony 
and Hoover’s Company Reports. 
 
18 Hoover’s Company Reports was accessed via LexisNexis. 
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An interest group’s reputation is everything (Ornstein & Elder 1976; Schlozman 
& Tierney 1986; Levine & Wolpe 1996).  The function of interest groups is to provide 
information.  Because interest groups deal with facts and figures and members of 
Congress rely on those facts and figures to make policy, there is no room for error.  The 
intelligence provided by interest groups must be legitimate and should groups tarnish 
their reputation for providing reliable information, they will be out of business.  Interest 
groups provide information not only to legislators but to the media as well.  Just as they 
cannot pass on false or exaggerated information to policy makers, they cannot provide 
bad information to the media.  The media will just as quickly demonize those groups that 
cross the line of legitimacy.  Thus the reputation that an interest group so carefully 
cultivates in Congress is analogous to its image in the mass media.  Not only is the 
reputation the same, but any attention given to a group by a media, helps perpetuate the 
legitimacy of the interest group within government.  For this reason, two variables that 
measure the amount of media attention a group receives are included.  The number of 
times the group is mentioned in the New York Times and Washington Post for the issue 
on which they are lobbying is represented in active media, while the number of mentions 
they receive for other issues is found in passive media.19 Active media and passive media 
are also measures of visibility. 
Schattschneider was not the only one to contend that campaign contributions are 
an indication of interest group influence.  David Lowery and Holly Brasher (2004) 
proclaim that as a means of influencing the legislature, the resources interest groups 
 
19 The entire two year period leading up to and including the year of lobbying activity was used in this 
measure.  This is to capture the effects of prior lobbying since in most cases it takes years of lobbying 
before an issue is even considered by the congressional leadership. 
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possess are information, votes and money.  While the empirical studies on the link 
between voting behavior and money may be unclear, one thing is not: the widespread 
suspicion that if interest groups are raising and spending millions of dollars, then they 
must be purchasing something.  Whether PAC contributions buy votes or simply gain 
access for groups, money will always be a consideration when studying lobbying.   
Several interest group variables are designed to measure political influence: 
House PAC, Chair PAC and Committee PAC20.  Campaign contributions made by the 
organized interest to members of the House (both parties combined) are accounted for by 
House PAC, another interval level of measurement.  These data were collected from 
www.opensecrets.org, a website maintained by the Center for Responsive Politics that 
retrieves and compiles data from the Federal Election Commission as well as from data 
files obtained through the Federal Election Commission’s website.  Chair PAC measures 
PAC contributions made to the chair of the committee or subcommittee being lobbied.  
Lastly, committee PAC measure money given to both Republican and Democratic 
members seated on the committee.  For all the political influence variables, contributions 
in the election cycle preceding the term of Congress under observation are used. 
The last interest group resource to be included in this model is the level of 
lobbying activity of a group.  While this is not a variable identified in other studies it is 
one deemed important nonetheless.  If a group has enough resources and breadth to reach 
out to more legislators and lobby more issues, it is hypothesized that the group would 
                                                 
20 Variables measuring PAC contributions made to Republican House members, Democratic House 
members, Republican committee members and Democratic committee members were tested but failed to 
carry a statistical influence and did not contribute in any significant way to the statistical model, so they 
ultimately are not used in the analysis. 
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become more influential.  The more issues a group lobbies, the more legislators they will 
come into contact with and the more contacts they have, the more influential they will be.  
A strong reputation and influence within only one committee or subcommittee will do 
nothing to increase the overall legislative influence of a group.  To become more 
influential, a group needs to branch out and become a trusted resource common to many 
legislators.  The number of issues for which a group lobbies is found in lob act as 
reported in the group’s year-end Lobbying Disclosure report. 
Some of the interest group variables appear that they may be related to one 
another.  For example, if it is theorized the legitimacy of a groups is measured by both 
media mentions and the age of a group, there is a possibility that the two measures are 
correlated. To guard against any intercorrelation, and to see if any of these variables 
collectively are measuring some underlying dimension of interest groups, a factor 
analysis of the interest group resources variables was conducted.  Specifically, I factor 
analyzed own lobbyists, hired guns, members (log), and budget (log).  The eigenvalues of 
the factors showed Factor 1 carrying a value of 0.727 and the following Factor 2 with a 
0.308.  According to the Kaiser criterion (1960) only factors with eigenvalues greater 
than 1 are retained.  Therefore the factor analysis confirms these variables are measuring 
different, uncorrelated aspects of interest group resources. 
Collectively, then, the independent variables that account for features of the 
interest group are: hired guns, House PAC, comm PAC, chair PAC, members, budget, 
age, active media, and lob act.  Table 3 below contains descriptive statistics for all of the 
access variables.   
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Table 3: Variable Descriptions for the Access Model 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Median  Std.Deviation Min.  Max 
Testifies  2488  .246  0  .431  0 1 
 
Committee  
Partisanship 2346  3.389  1.832  4.290  0 24 
Ratio R:D 2346  1.311  1.25  .243  .75 6 
Tenure  2346  7.889  8  3.314  1 18 
DWchair 2346  .385  .372  .166  .029 .757 
Business $ 2488  $2044.59 0  $7615.18 0       $102,500 
Reponcommittee 2488  .020  0  .142  0 1 
 
Interest Group 
Hired Guns 2488  6.838  3  11.719  0 79 
Own Lobbyists 2488  6.026  3  7.894  0 42 
Members 2276  4,572,758 23,483  8.23e+07 0 1.61e+09 
Budget  1697  2.27e+09 2.29+e08 6.38e+09        -1.04e-10 8.22e+10 
Lob Act  2488  9.731  7  7.757  1 34 
Active Media 2488  .701  0  4.021  0 142 
Passive Media 2488  35.088  7  70.909  0 506 
Age  2399  76.747  74  54.294  2 466 
House PAC 2488  $175,827.30 $1250  $402,393.60 0 $2,424,300 
Comm. PAC 2488  $7545.31 0  $30,076.54 0 $646,725 
Chair PAC 2488   $374.64  0  $1742.49 0 $55,000 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Some of the variable descriptions deserve explanation. To begin, although the 
descriptions for business money, House contributions, committee contributions and chair 
contributions are listed in whole numbers, in the analysis the logs are used since these are 
not linear relationships.  The maximum value listed for age is 466 years.  This is the 
correct value; the oldest interest group in the access sample is the Jena Band of Choctaw 
Indians.  Another puzzling value is the .75 minimum value of ratio of Republicans to 
Democrats seated on a committee or subcommittee.  Even though all sessions of 
Congress under consideration are controlled by a Republican majority, during the 106th 
Congress, due to Republican vacancies, there were more Democrats seated on the Small 
Business subcommittee on Empowerment.  The other perhaps troubling value is the 
maximum and minimum values for the budget variable.  The minimum value is negative 
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because some of the groups in the sample were reporting negative revenues.  Both Sun 
Microsystems and Cable & Wireless did so.  The maximum value is $82.2 billion, which 
is the reported revenue for Daimler Chrysler in 1998.  
Lastly, because this is a pooled time-series analysis it is possible that the sessions 
of Congress create error patterns that will affect the results of the statistical analysis.   
Namely they can potentially over-inflate the results or produce non-reliable results.  In 
order to correct for this, a dummy variable for each session of Congress is included in the 
model.  In this way, time is “taken seriously” and the inclusion of the dummy variables 
corrects for temporally dependent observations (Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998).  Similarly, 
a series of dummy variables are introduced to indicate the type of interest group and 
committee.  These measures are meant to control for the pattern of errors produced by the 
nature of the interest groups, committees and subcommittees, and types of policies. 
As stated previously, the dichotomous dependent variable indicates whether or 
not the organized interest testifies before the committee or subcommittee hearing on the 
issue it lobbied.   The model will be tested using logistic regression in order to determine 
the impact of the independent variables on the likelihood an interest group testifies at a 
committee or subcommittee hearing.  The hypotheses for the access model are presented 
in the following chapter as are the results of the logistic regression analysis.  
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The Influence Model 
 The second part of this research studies what occurs when interest groups do 
testify.  Testifying before congressional committee is reportedly a favored lobbying 
activity by groups; they compete with one another to be able to participate formally in the 
hearing process.  Is this the case because of the platform it creates for groups to advance 
their position or is it more?  Do they seek participation as witnesses because this is an 
avenue of influence?   The influence model tests what factors increase the likelihood that 
interest group testimony influences the subsequent bill markups at the committee and 
subcommittee level. 
 
Research Sample for the Influence Model 
 Had it been possible, the questions presented in the access and influence model 
seemingly would have enabled a two-staged analysis of some data.  The reality is this 
does not work for a couple of reasons.  First, by beginning with a selection of interest 
groups who may or may not have successfully been able to testify, the number of groups 
who do so would be small.  Taking it one step further, for those few groups that were 
successfully able to testify you would need for the committee or subcommittee, before 
which the group testified, to have followed the measure beyond hearing and into markup.  
This would significantly limit the number of possible observations.  Second, the question 
of whether interest groups have influence in committees and subcommittees is rather 
critical.  To offer the best modeling of this process and how it works, there really needs to 
be variation in which party has majority control.  Relying on the Lobbying Disclosure 
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database as a starting point for data collection would have prohibited including a 
Democrat majority in the House.  Thus by necessity the ideal of a two-staged analysis 
was discarded and instead two separate models are developed using two different data 
sets. 
The process of gathering data for the influence model began with taking a random 
sampling of hearings from a number of specified House committees and subcommittees 
from the 103rd, 106th and 108th Congresses.  These sessions are used to ensure variation in 
the majority party and the committee and subcommittee chairs.  The 103rd Congress 
(1993-1994) was the last session of Congress in which Democrats maintained majority 
control before the Republican revolution that kept them in the minority through the 109th 
Congress.  When the Republicans did gain control in 1994, they implemented six year 
term limits on their leadership and committee and subcommittee chairs.  Thus the first 
group of Republicans appointed as committee and subcommittee chairs in 1994 were 
replaced by the 108th Congress (2003-2004).  Therefore the chairs in the 106th Congress 
(1999-2000) are largely different from those in the 108th Congress and both are different 
from their Democrat counterparts in the 103rd Congress. 
 Recognizing that there are special committees in the House such as Ways and 
Means, Appropriations, and Rules, not all committees were used as a sampling source for 
committee and subcommittee hearings.  The preceding three committees are considered 
“prestige” committees.  They are highly sought after committees with very few newer 
members of Congress holding seats.  In addition, within these committees special norms 
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have been developed which guide members’ behavior.21  Many fewer hearings are held 
by these committees than the others and only a select number of interest groups ever 
receive an opportunity to participate in them.  It is for this reason that the three 
committees were excluded from consideration. 
 Conducting a content analysis of all the hearings held in these three sessions of 
Congress would also be too large of an undertaking.  There are many ways of 
differentiating among committees: level of partisanship within, level of legislative 
activity, and types of policy pursued.  The level of partisanship or legislative activity 
undertaken is fluid, capable of changing significantly from session to session.  The types 
of policy pursued moreover, do not frequently change as the jurisdiction of the 
committees and subcommittees is set by House rules and in general only gets revisited 
when control of the House shifts from one party to the other.  Because of the stability of 
this differentiation among committees, a variation in this classification is pursued. 
 Categorizing the committees along these lines has been conducted by Fenno 
(1973) and later by Deering and Smith (1990).  Fenno suggests three types of committees 
exist: policy, constituency and prestige.  Policy committees tend to work with regulatory 
(or redistributive) policy whereas distributive legislation is the focus of constituency 
committees.  Prestige committees are committees that have special duties and roles 
assigned to them, mostly dealing with money issues.  For this research sample, three 
policy committees and three constituency committees were purposefully selected.  The 
 
21 See for example Richard F. Fenno, Jr.  1962.  “The House Appropriations Committee as a Political 
System: The Problem of Integration.”  The American Political Science Review 56: 310-24 and John F. 
Manley.  1965.  “The House Committee on Ways and Means: Conflict Management in a Congressional 
Committee.”  American Political Science Review 59: 927-39. 
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policy committees are: 1) Financial Services; 2) Education and Workforce; and 3) 
Energy and Commerce.  The constituency committees are: 1) Agriculture; 2) Resources; 
and 3) Transportation and Infrastructure.  These committees were selected over their 
counterparts as a quick assessment confirmed the level of activity within these six 
committees would render enough hearings with subsequent markups.  The subcommittees 
of these six committees, each with about 5-6 subcommittees, are also included in the 
sample. 
 
Table 4: Committees used in the Influence Model Along with their Legislative 
Activity 
108th         Hearings       Markups 
Agriculture            34        8 
Education & Workforce          45       24  
Energy & Commerce          114       51    
Financial Services           95       22  
Resources            85       45 
Transportation & Infrastructure         69       14  
 
106th
Agriculture            56       21 
Banking & Financial Services         41       38 
Commerce           108       80 
Education & Workforce          69       18 
Resources            71       10 
Transportation & Infrastructure         89       24 
  
103rd  
Agriculture            55       53 
Banking, Finance & Urban Affairs        120       49  
Education & Labor           39       41 
Energy & Commerce           98       79 
Natural Resources          169      106 
Public Works & Transportation        100       63 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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 Once the committees were selected, all hearings held by the committees and their 
subcommittees that also had subsequent markups were identified.  Many hearings never 
progress further.  Table 4 lists the number of hearings held by each committee and its 
subcommittees, and how many markups were held.  Every hearing that had a subsequent 
markup made it into the initial research sample with one exception: the Committee on 
Resources.  There were so many markups for the Natural Resources Committee in the 
103rd Congress that only 20 (randomly selected) made it into the initial research sample.   
All testimony from these hearings was read and coded.  The coding sheet 
identifies the interest group and then lists every recommendation made.  Some groups 
make only one recommendation and others many more.  The most recommendations 
made by any one group are 45.  The next step was to determine which recommendations, 
if any, were included in the markup.  The markup transcripts were accessed, (some are 
online others are only available for perusal at the committee in Washington DC) read, 
and compared to the interest group recommendations.  Each recommendation was coded 
as either: no; yes – changed; yes-broad support; or yes-no change.  Any recommendation 
(positive or negative) not included in the markup is coded “no.”  So if a group 
recommends increasing appropriations by $5 million dollars and they remain unchanged, 
it is coded as “no.”  If a group adamantly opposes the bill and wants it to die, it gets 
coded as “no” since the bill did not die – it made it the markup stage.  When it comes to 
the yeses, they vary.  “Yes-changed” is used to indicate when a group makes a 
recommendation to add an amendment or modify the legislation (including deletions) and 
they are successful.  When these recommendations are successful, they change the 
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content of the legislation.  Then there is testimony that recommends a change that is 
already included in the legislation before markup.  For example, a group may testify that 
it recommends a citizen suit provision in the legislation to find that it is already included 
in the base legislation being considered.  In these instances, the organization is really only 
indicating support for the legislation as introduced by the committee or subcommittee.  
When this occurs, it is coded as “yes-no change.”  The last code, “yes-broad” identifies 
testimony that says, “We support HR 10 and encourage it be passed as quickly as 
possible.”  No specific recommendation is made; the interest group is simply voicing 
support for the entire bill as it exists.  This content analysis was conducted on both 
testimony submitted in person (by invitation) and that submitted in writing.22    
Next, since some groups had lengthy testimony that included a multitude of 
recommendations and others very few, only three of each group’s recommendations were 
included.  From the coding sheet of each interest group hearing consideration, three 
recommendations were randomly selected.  Each of the three recommendations (or less) 
of each group that submitted testimony becomes a separate observation in the database.  
The dichotomous dependent variable is coded 1=yes or 0=no.  The only observations that 
received a 1=yes were those that were originally coded as “yes-changed.”  The other 
“yeses” were coded separately and were included in a separate analysis.  Table 5 shows 
the outcome breakdown for all of the recommendations.  Note this is a summary of all 
13,177 recommendations prior to randomly selecting only three for each interest group. 
                                                 
22 By House rule, all testimony submitted in writing must be included in the official record of the 
congressional hearing.  Typically the record is left open for a number of days to allow for inclusion of all 
written testimony sent into the (sub)committee.  No invitation is required to submit written testimony. 
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Table 5: Breakdown of Outcomes for all Recommendations Made by Interest 
Groups 
________________________________________________________________________ 
     Frequency  Percentage 
No          9193       69.8% 
Yes – No Change        2998       22.8% 
Yes – Broad Support         564        4.3% 
Yes – Changed         422        3.2% 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 This table is included because it provides some revealing descriptive information 
about the types of recommendations interest groups and their success.  The mean number 
of recommendations made by each interest group in this sample is 4.6 and the maximum 
number of recommendations of any one group was 45.  But of all the recommendations 
rendered by the interest groups, only 4.3% were the type that affirmed the group’s broad 
support for the legislation introduced into the committee.  If the more specific 
affirmations are included (yes-no change) this combined category still only accounts for 
slightly more than 25 percent of the recommendations.  Almost ¾ of the 
recommendations were real attempts to change the bill as it was introduced.  This is 
strong evidence that interest groups are not simply taking an invitation to testify as an 
opportunity to provide “window dressing” support for the committee or subcommittee 
legislation.  The success in changing the legislation was much less as interest groups only 
were successful in getting their recommendations into the bill markups less than 5% of 
the time. 
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Independent Variables in the Influence Model 
 As in the access model, the independent variables were chosen to test both 
committee power theories and interest group resource theory which are the foundation for 
the interest group impact theory being developed here.  Partisan affinity, ideological 
extremism, and chair influence comprise the first set of variables measuring 
characteristics related to the committee or subcommittee and its chair.  Party influence is 
measured by partisan and maj:min.  Ideology is found in ideology, and tenure measures 
chair influence.  Partisan is a measure of the level of partisanship of a committee or 
subcommittee.  This was calculated first by taking the ratio of majority party bills to 
minority party bills that received consideration in the committee or subcommittee with 
either a hearing or bill markup.  Next the absolute value of the difference between the 
ratio and one was calculated to get the value of partisan.  This is done because otherwise 
a value of one represents complete bipartisanship with several committees and 
subcommittees carrying values lower than 1.  The higher value of this variable, the more 
partisan the committee or subcommittee.23  Maj:min is the ratio of majority party 
members to minority party members sitting on the committee or subcommittee24.  
Ideology is a measure of the absolute value of the difference between the first dimension 
of a chair’s DW Nominate scores and the mean House DW Nominate score.  Lastly 
tenure measures how long the chair has been a member of Congress.   
 Interest group resources, interest group visibility and political influence are 
theorized to increase the success of a group.  Interest group resources are measured by 
 
23 Partisanship in the influence model is measured in the same way as it was for the access model. 
24 As was done for the Access model, the correlation between partisan and maj:min was calculated.  At 
0.0985, there is little correlation between these two Party Influence variables. 
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members, budget, own lobbyists, and hired guns.  Interest group visibility is measured by 
media and age.  Political influence is measured by several PAC variables.   Members 
indicates the number of members of the group or the number of employees of the 
business.  The budget of the group, or in the case of businesses, governments, churches, 
and colleges/universities the revenue of the group is represented by budget.  Own 
lobbyists measures the number of in-house lobbyists and the number of contracted 
lobbyists representing an organization is hired guns.  Media measures the number of 
mentions in the New York Times and Washington Post the organization received for the 
two year period prior to the hearing at which the group testified.  Age measures the age of 
an interest group.  The dollar amount of PAC contributions made to House candidates is 
found in House PACs.  Chair PAC measures the amount of PAC money given to 
committee and subcommittee chairs, whereas comm PAC account for money contributed 
to committee and subcommittee members.  Majority PAC measures PAC money given 
only to majority committee members.  All of the PAC variables used contributions given 
in the two year election cycle immediately preceding the session of Congress under 
observation. 
 In the access model, the interest group variables were factor analyzed to 
determine any underlying dimensions created by any combination of variables.  Doing so 
failed to identify any notable factors.  Factor analysis was applied to the interest group 
variables in the influence model as well.  As with the first model, here the eigenvalues 
reveal no significant factor.  
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 A group of dummy variables representing the type of interest group submitting 
the testimony follows.  Groups are classified as membership, trade association, business, 
church, federal government, government (local, state, county), college/university, union 
or think tank.  These variables will give an indication if any type of interest group holds 
an advantage in gaining influence.  Business and labor are often cited in popular 
discourse as being unfairly disadvantaged.  Including these variables will enable testing 
of this claim.  A dummy variable also is included to indicate whether the policy in 
consideration was regulatory in nature.  Table 6 gives the descriptions of the variables 
used in this model.   
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Table 6: Variable Descriptions for the Influence Model 
Variable Obs. Mean  Median  Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
Partisan  4257 3.523  2.6  2.713  0 12 
Maj:min  4257 1.432  1.267  0.272  1.1 2 
Ideology 4257 0.344  0.353  0.169  .003 .626 
Tenure  4257 8.936  9.0  2.963  3 16 
 
Members 2841 3,079,339 6500  3.63e+07 2 6.35+e08   
Budget  1828 6.42e+10 3.98e+07 7.28e+11 6000 9.40e+12 
Own Lobbyists 4257 1.749  0  4.807  0 41 
Hired Guns 4257 1.736  0  6.341  0 89 
Media  4257 182.4  6  431.7  0 2678 
Age  2994 67.2  54  49.007  4 368 
House PAC 4257 $40,209.92 0  $206,859.40 0 $3,353,926 
Comm. PAC 4257 $4992.46 0  $22,609.02 0 $338.050 
Chair PAC 4257 $330.78  0  $1370.95 0 $10,500 
Maj.Com. PAC 4257 $3241.54 0  $13,717.80 0 $188,850 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 Looking at Table 6, the most tenured chair in this impact model is Charlie 
Gonzalez (D).  The most extreme ideologue is Cliff Stearns (R).  Aerospace Industries 
Association of America has the largest membership, but recall for trade associations 
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membership is calculated by total number of individuals employed by all member firms 
and businesses.  The largest budget is found with the US Department of Commerce.  
Verizon has the most contracted lobbyists employed, whereas the US Chamber of 
Commerce has the most staff lobbyists.  The city of New Castle, Delaware is the oldest 
organized interest followed closely by Richmond, Virginia and the University of 
Pennsylvania.  The National Association of Realtors contributed the most money to 
House members and the Credit Union National Association (CUNA) contributed the 
most to majority party members seated on a committee before which they testified. 
 As is the case with the access model, since this is a time series, pooled analysis, a 
number of precautions were taken to ensure that the regression analysis was not detecting 
any error patterns created by each session of Congress and each committee or 
subcommittee.  Following the advice of Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998), dummy variables 
were created for two of the three sessions of Congress as well as for most committees and 
subcommittees.  Including these dummy variables tests for autocorrelation; if 
autocorrelation were present these variables would be highly correlated to the dependent 
variable.  Also, separate regressions were run in which only the observations for each 
separate session of Congress were included.  Both precautions indicated no problem with 
autocorrelation. 
 
Summary 
 This research into the workings of House congressional hearings, specifically the 
role of testifiers necessitates two separate statistical analyses.  The first analysis models 
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the factors involved in the decision making process of which groups get asked to 
participate in hearings.  The data used in this analysis cover four sessions of Congress 
(105th-108th) and include 2459 observations which in this model is an attempt to testify 
on behalf of an issue being lobbied by a group.  The dependent variable is measures 
whether or not a group received an invitation to testify and the independent variables 
measure a range of interest group, committee and subcommittee, and chair 
characteristics.  Logistic regression is applied to determine the likelihood of each 
independent variable on the group being asked to testify. 
 The influence model is the second model designed to test what influences whether 
or not an interest group’s recommendation is heeded.  The testimony and markups of six 
committees and their subcommittees were read and coded to determine whether the 
recommendation made was incorporated in the bill markup.  This data was then used to 
test a statistical model in which the dependent variable is whether or not the 
recommendation was followed and the independent variables again measure a number of 
interest group, committee and subcommittee, and chair features.  This is a pooled, time 
series analysis covering the 103rd, 106th and 108th sessions of Congress.  The hypotheses 
developed to be tested by both models and the results of the analyses are found in the 
following two chapters.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
INTEREST GROUP ACCESS TO CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS 
 
 While the normative concern driving this research is pluralist democracy, two 
specific questions are explored.  In the legislative process, which groups are able to gain 
access to congressional hearings held by committees and subcommittees in the U.S. 
House of Representatives and, once there, whose testimony is able to influence the 
subsequent markups, if any?  Two different data sets are compiled to test each question 
separately.  Two statistical models are developed to test empirically each problem: an 
access model and an influence model.  The access model is discussed in this chapter. 
 
Access Model 
 Since theory suggests either factors relating to the interest group itself or those 
relating to the chair or committee may influence whether an interest group receives an 
invitation to testify, the data set developed here contains both.  This is an original data set 
consisting of 600 groups and 2488 opportunities to testify before a House committee or 
subcommittee.  The details of how these data were collected are found in the previous 
chapter.  
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Descriptive Statistics   
 Examining the pool of 600 groups reveals information about the composition of 
the interest group population.  Table 7 displays the classification of these 600 groups.  
Groups are classified as either: business, trade association, membership, government, 
college/university, coalition, think tank or union.   
Businesses are any interest groups that are for- profit entities.  A business’ 
primary function is not to lobby government but since much policy either regulates or 
taxes its operations, many businesses maintain a lobbying presence in Washington.   
Interest groups that are either trade associations or professional associations are classified 
here as the former.  Both trade and professional associations represent practitioners in a 
particular field or industry and are founded and funded by member corporations, firms or 
individuals.  Their function is to represent the interests of their membership through 
public relations campaigns, education and lobbying.  The only difference is that trade 
associations represent institutions and professional associations represent individuals.  
Since institutions are ultimately comprised of individuals I think it is safe to collapse the 
two into one category especially since when looking at membership numbers I am 
counting individuals, not institutions.   
Any group that seeks out citizen support in the form of donations or membership 
is classified as a membership group.  This broad definition encompasses citizen groups, 
public interest groups, ideological groups and charities, to name just a few varieties of 
groups that fall under this classification.  There is no prerequisite for belonging to 
membership groups; all that is needed is a willingness to contribute.   
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Governmental groups are any governmental entity whether local, state or 
foreign.25  In this sample, that includes entities such as the city of Miami Beach, the 
Illinois Housing Development Authority and the Comanche Nation.   
 
 
Table 7: Classification of Interest Groups 
Type    Frequency  Percentage  Located in DC 
Business        276        46.5%       25.1%  
Trade Association       145        24.5%       67.1%  
Membership         67        11.3%       66.7% 
Government         57          9.6%         0.0% 
College/University        23          3.9%         4.4% 
Coalition         13          2.2%        57.1% 
Union          10          1.7%       70.0% 
 
Think Tank          1           0.2%       100% 
 
Unknown          8          1.3%        37.5% 
Total         600                               100                              38.6% 
 
Colleges and universities include all institutions of higher learning.  Also included 
in this category are any university centers of research such as the North South Center of 
the University of Miami and support centers like the Texas A&M University Research 
Foundation.   
                                                 
25 In this data set, federal governmental entities are not included as they are not required by law to submit 
lobbying disclosure reports. 
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Organized labor unions are classified as union, and coalitions are any combination 
of the preceding types of groups who come together in order to influence a specific issue 
on which they have a similar interest.  The coalitions included in this sample appear to be 
ad hoc in nature, formed solely to lobby for a specified issue.  Examples from the sample 
include the Coalbed Methane Ad Hoc Committee, the Stormwater Reform Coalition and 
the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports.  These are short lived organizations that dismantle 
once the issue is no longer on the congressional agenda.  The transient nature of these 
coalitions makes it difficult to gather information about them; they form and then just as 
quickly dissolve with little trace left behind.  Ideally in any type of research it would be 
nice to classify them and identify them by the organizations that comprise the coalition.  
But the very nature of coalitions precludes me from doing this.  As they represent only 
2.2% of the research sample, I am not overly concerned with not being able to identify 
them in such a way. 
Of the organizations included in the sample 46.5% are businesses, while trade 
associations comprise 24.5% and membership groups 11.3%.  This is in line with the 
sampling of groups conducted by Schlozman and Tierney (1986) who found 47.5% of the 
groups to be businesses, while trade associations accounted for 24.8%.26  Similarly, the 
Baumgartner, Leech, Kimball, Berry, and Hojnacki advocacy and public policy making 
project that examined all of the 1996 federal lobbying disclosure reports showed that 
businesses accounted for 40 percent of the registrants, followed by trade association and 
 
26 Schlozman and Tierney actually had two separate classifications: trade associations (17.9%) and 
professional associations (6.9%).  As this research classifies both as trade associations, they were 
combined.  Also no direct comparison can be made of membership groups as they used a much more 
restrictive definition of membership than is used here.  
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citizen groups with about 14 percent of the registrants.27  This confirms the reliability of 
the sampling.  Table 7 also indicates what percentage of each type of group is located in 
Washington D.C.  Overall, 38.6% of the groups are located in Washington D.C.28   
The predominance of businesses in the organized interest population raises the 
elitist critique of pluralism that moneyed interests, those with more resources, have an 
advantage over other interests.  Allegations such as these are in part why the research I 
am conducting is important.  I raise the issue in Chapter 1 that no one since E.E. 
Schattschneider has systematically, nor empirically, tested his claims of prevailing 
“private” interests in government.  The concern is not just whether his observations of 
government in 1960 are substantiated, but also whether the political climate in 
Washington and the interest group population has been altered since then in a way such 
that the “private” interests are muted by the inclusion of more and greater variation in 
interest groups.    
The stability of the interest group population is also of interest.  There is a whole 
stream of interest group research focused on the interest group population (Browne 1990; 
Gray & Lowery 1997, 2000; Haider-Markel, 1997; Lowery & Gray 1998, 1999; Nownes 
2004; Nownes & Lipinski 2005).  There are not only substantial barriers to the formation 
of interest groups, but numerous difficulties in keeping an organization afloat.  Those 
groups which are no longer able to appeal to a membership or board of directors, will 
 
27 The website of the Advocacy and Policy Making project is: http://lobby.la.psu.edu/.  This specific 
information was obtained from a paper they presented at the Midwest Political Science Association 
meeting in 2007 entitled, “Does Money Buy Power? Interest Group Resources and Policy Outcomes.” 
28 Included in the count of D.C. groups are those groups located in the suburban Virginia districts of 
Congressmen Davis and Moran.  Many of the budget minded interest groups have found it more cost 
effective to keep offices in the suburbs rather than in the high rent districts of Washington D.C. 
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quickly find themselves out of business.  Without appeal they will not be able to raise the 
financial and other resources necessary to maintain a lobbying presence in Washington 
D.C.  Although many observers measure an interest group’s success by how many of its 
policy goals it achieves, a more fundamental measure of success is whether it is able to 
maintain its existence.  A group can only pursue policy if it subsists.   
Figure 2 depicts how many groups maintained a lobbying presence over the seven 
year period examined in this study.  To determine the stability of groups I examined 
whether the groups had filed lobbying disclosure reports for all seven years included in 
the study.  The population is fairly stable with 70% of the groups being represented in 
Washington for all seven years examined.   The most stable type of group is labor unions.  
Eighty nine percent of the unions are represented in all seven years and the other 11% are 
represented in six of the seven years.  Membership groups and trade associations are also 
fairly stable with 80% of those groups being present in all seven years.  The least stable 
are coalitions which have only 46% lobbying across all years.  Coalitions seemingly 
would be the least stable as they come together on an ad hoc basis, typically, to affect 
some specific policy change.  Once they succeed (or fail to succeed) the coalition 
disbands.  Overall the interest group population is fairly stable, but it’s not so stagnant 
that it disallows the entrance of new groups and the exit of others.  While having 70% 
stability means 30% disruption, you need to keep in mind that we are looking at the 
stability of representation in Washington, not the mere existence of the group.  This is a 
fairly healthy picture of the interest group ecology. 
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Figure 2: Percentage of Groups Maintaining a 
Lobbying Presence over a Seven Year Period (1998-
2004)
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 Given the universe of groups with an interest in legislation before committees and 
subcommittees of Congress, Table 8 shows how many groups were invited to testify and 
how many were not.  Of the 2488 lobbying opportunities, access to testify was granted 
612 times, 24.6% of the attempts.29   Think tanks and colleges and universities were the 
most successful at gaining access.  Although they testify less frequently than other types 
of groups, as a percentage of the lobbying attempts, they do better.  Think tanks are a 
special type of interest group in that they exist solely to engage in research geared toward 
policy development.  It is not uncommon for think tanks to generate the policy 
alternatives that comprise bills which are then introduced into Congress.  When this 
occurs, certainly the originator of the policy alternative would be an appropriate witness 
                                                 
29 This is access to submit oral testimony.  If a group is unable to participate in a hearing they may still 
submit written testimony to the committee or subcommittee.  The committees and subcommittees are then 
legally obliged to include the written submissions in the records of the hearing.   
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to invite to a hearing.  When it comes to colleges and universities they are successful in 
part because there is such a narrow range of issues they lobby.  On that range of issues 
(funding of research, student aid, and higher education legislation) colleges and 
universities are the primary interests.  Colleges and universities also house research 
centers whose work, similar to think tanks, generates new policy ideas and thus are 
similarly situated.  In this sample colleges and universities are lobbying the 
aforementioned issues along with privacy issues, student gambling issues, nationality and 
immigration issues and appropriations for specific programs or projects. 
 
Table 8: Access to Hearings by Type of Interest Group 
Type   Lobbying Opportunities Testifying % of Success 
Business      1042        148   14.2% 
 
Trade Association       756        263   34.8% 
 
Membership        292         81   27.7% 
 
Government        123         18   14.6% 
 
College/University       147         73   49.7% 
 
Union           86         20   23.3% 
 
Coalition          23           3    13.0% 
 
Unknown          16           3    18.8% 
 
Think Tank            3           3   100%          
 
Total       2488       612   24.6% 
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Trade associations were successful about a third of the time.  The expertise of 
trade associations probably plays a role.  Since trade associations (and professional 
associations which here are classified together) are comprised of all the practitioners in a 
given field, if one wants knowledge about that field, it would be logical to seek out that 
trade association.  For example, the Mortgage Bankers Association of America lobbied 
and was invited to testify on home mortgage subprime lending.  In another instance, in 
2003, the National Association of Water Companies was invited to testify at a hearing on 
the public health effects of and cause of high levels of lead in public drinking water 
supplies, an issue which they had been lobbying.  Not only are trade associations able to 
give expertise on policy but, since they have contact with so many members of an 
industry, they often times are able to communicate political information about the 
implications of enacting certain policy.  Membership groups are successful a little over a  
quarter of the time, and unions a little under a quarter of the time.  Less successful in their 
attempts at testifying are businesses who gained entrée only 14.2% of the time.   This is 
somewhat surprising given how this type of interest group is touted as having 
disproportionate influence in government. 
 Businesses, it should be noted, not only lobby on their own behalf but often also 
belong to a trade association that is engaged in lobbying.   For some businesses, it is more 
efficient and economical to allow their trade association to lobby on their behalf rather 
than to expend their own lobbying resources.  It might also be the case that if a business 
and trade association are both lobbying the same issue, that an invitation to testify will be 
extended to only one.  Brady, Drutman, Schlozman and Verba (2007) examine this exact 
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question in their study of corporate lobbying.  Preliminary results show that businesses in 
the entertainment and consumer goods industries are more likely to rely on trade 
association representation foregoing business level representation.  The exact opposite is 
true for businesses in the fields of electronics, services and defense.  Businesses that used 
both their own lobbying as well as that of trade associations were those involved with 
raw materials, manufacturing, transportation, finance, energy, communications, health 
care and retail.   
Interest group scholars are quite familiar with the size of the population of 
political action committees (PACs) in contrast to the size of the overall population of 
organized interests.  Whereas conservative estimates count some 20,000 plus organized 
interests, there are roughly only 3000 political action committees that are connected to an 
organized interest, and another 1,000 that have no ties or linkages.  This is not to 
downplay the role of money; PACs contributed $225.4 million to House candidates in the 
2004 election30.  So, although there are far more organized interests who choose not to 
contribute money to congressional candidates, those that do contribute large amounts of 
money.  Knowing this, and being cognizant of the elitist critique of pluralism, it is 
interesting to see which types of groups in this sample make campaign contributions. 
Table 9 reveals how many of the groups in this sample do.  The type of group 
most active in contributing money, and well known for it, is organized labor.  Over two 
thirds of the labor unions in this sample actively contributed money through their PACs.  
Not only did many of the unions contribute, but they raised large amounts of money 
through their PACs.  In this sample the mean labor PAC contributions for the election 
 
30 This data was retrieved from the FEC’s website at www.fec.gov.   
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cycle was $880,174.  Almost half of the business groups and trade associations make 
PAC contributions.  The mean total of contributions for trade association PACs in one 
election cycle is $167,605.  The mean total of contributions made by businesses during 
one election cycle is $102,811 and it is $16,784 for membership groups.  A small share of 
membership groups has PACs, while the other types of interests have none.   Also it is 
the colleges and universities that make no PAC contributions that are much more 
efficient at gaining access to congressional hearings.   
The aggregate contributions made by trade association PACs, for the years under 
consideration are $126,388,861.  Business PACs contributed a total of $107,128,977 
followed by unions with $75,695,001 and membership groups with $4,884,264.  In all, 
the interest groups that comprise this sample contributed $314 million over four election 
cycles.  This is a considerable amount of money, given that not all interest groups make 
campaign contributions. 
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Table 9: Groups Making PAC Contributions by Type of Interest Group 
Type    Total Groups  with PAC % with PACs 
Business     276    128       46.4% 
 
Trade Association    145     71       49.0% 
 
Membership       67       6        9.0% 
 
Government       57       0        0.0% 
 
College/University      23       0        0.0% 
 
Coalition       13       0         0.0% 
 
Union          9       7       70.1% 
 
Unknown/Other       10       1        10.0%  
Total      600    213       35.5% 
 
 
The descriptive statistics, although interesting, only reveal so much.  The deeper 
question of what it takes to gain access to congressional hearings, a much sought after 
venue, requires a more complex analysis.  A number of hypotheses relating to this 
question are developed and tested.  The discussion of those hypotheses and the statistical 
model follow. 
 
Hypotheses for the Access Model 
 Following the interest group impact theory developed in Chapter 3, factors 
relating to both committee power and interest group resource theories are expected to 
influence whether interest groups receive invitations to testify in committee or 
subcommittee.  The factors derived from committee power theories are party influence, 
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ideological extremism, and chair influence.   In addition, the type of committee 
(constituency, policy, or prestige) can impact the type of access yielded. 
 According to the committee power theories, the three potential sources of power 
within committees are: party, committee or subcommittee leadership, or neither.  The 
difficulty in directly testing these theories in the access model is that all House sessions 
under consideration are uniformly described as conditional party government; meaning 
polarization between parties and unity within them.  This is confirmed, in part, by 
Congressional Quarterly Party Unity Scores (displayed in Table 10) and has also been 
verified by David Rohde31.   
 
Table 10: Congressional Quarterly’s Party Unity Scores for Each Party 
within the House of Representatives for 1998 – 2004 
Session Year    Republicans   Democrats 
105th  1998    86    82 
106th  1999    86    83 
   2000    88    82 
107th  2001    91    83 
  2002    90    86 
108th  2003    91    87 
  2004    88    86 
 
 
 
Additionally, all sessions are under Republican control.  Speaker Newt Gingrich 
inaugurated the new Republican majority in the House of Representatives in the 104th 
Congress (1995-1996) with a series of rules changes intended to increase the influence of 
party leaders.  For example, committee and subcommittee budgets were slashed, joint 
                                                 
31 This was confirmed in a personal conversation with David Rohde at the 2008 annual meeting of the 
Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago, Illinois. 
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referral of bills was eliminated, term limits on committee and subcommittee chairs were 
enacted, and the Speaker’s influence over the Steering and Rules Committees was 
increased.  Because Gingrich used procedure to strengthen the party position, and those 
rules remained in place throughout the time periods under consideration, cartel theory 
also aptly describes these House sessions.  In other words, during this time period, we do 
not have the necessary variation that would allow us to rigorously distinguish between 
conditional party government and party as cartel models.     
 Within the highly partisan environment, there is still expected to be enough 
autonomy residing within the committee and subcommittee chairs to allow them 
discretion in making many decisions.  One of these committee decisions is which groups 
to invite to testify in hearing.  While chairs are not immune to a highly polarized and 
partisan atmosphere, the effect of partisanship will be difficult to detect when it comes to 
compiling witness lists since most groups are not overtly partisan, or are purposefully 
bipartisan.  However, certain types of interests naturally align with the Republican Party 
or the Democratic Party.  For example, businesses are part of the Republican coalition 
and labor unions part of the Democratic constituency.   Therefore, business groups are 
expected to have more access to hearings than other types of groups since Republicans 
control the House for all periods studied. 
H1: Partisan affinity, as measured by businesses during Republican controlled 
Houses, will be positively related to the likelihood that an interest group receives 
an invitation to testify. 
 
The relationship between business groups and the Republican Party on one side, 
and labor unions and Democrats works both ways.  Business groups and labor unions do 
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not just receive preferential treatment from their respective parties without being 
expected to give anything in return; the parties expect support from the interest groups.  
Stories abound of the parties demanding interest groups within the party coalition to pay 
their dues in the form of campaign contributions.  House Republicans benefitted from the 
demands Tom Delay made of interest groups and lobbyists during his tenure as Majority 
Leader, just as Democrats profited when Tony Coelho headed the DCCC.  This is not to 
imply campaign contributions buy votes, it is to suggest access is given to those groups 
who hold up their end of a mutually beneficial relationship by supporting the party 
financially during elections.  Business groups that contribute money to House members 
are more likely to gain access than other groups, just as we would expect unions to gain 
access under a Democrat controlled if they made PAC contributions to House members. 
H2: Partisan affinity, as measured by the interaction of being a business and 
contributions given to House Republicans seated on the committee being lobbied, 
will be positively related to the likelihood an interest group receives an invitation 
to testify.  
 
 The effects of committee or subcommittee leadership are subsumed by ideological 
extremism.   The informational theorists (Gilligan & Krehbiel 1990; Krehbiel 1991) 
maintain policy preferences extend beyond partisan preferences, are multi-dimensional 
and suggest ideology factors into the position a legislator takes on a bill, among other 
considerations.  A liberal preference does not necessarily always have to align with the 
Democratic Party’s preference nor is the root of an ideological preference partisanship.  
Partisanship and ideology can be two distinct effects.  The interest group impact theory 
developed here maintains ideology will exert a distinct influence.  Specifically, it is 
anticipated extreme ideologues at both ends of the political spectrum will be more 
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exclusive with their hearing testimony invitations.  The amount of access granted by 
extreme ideologues differs than their more moderate colleagues because the extremists 
need to use testimony to build support for legislation they hope to get passed through the 
House.  Extreme ideologues are reluctant to allow dissenting testimony as this potentially 
weakens the committee position on the legislation being considered.  They prefer to 
present unanimous support hoping to snowball support for the bill as it progresses toward 
a House floor vote.   
H3: Ideological extremism, as measured by the committee or subcommittee chair 
ideology, will be negatively related to the likelihood that an interest group 
receives an invitation to testify. 
 
 The residual autonomy maintained by the committee and subcommittee chairs 
also will be manifested in chair influence.  Chair influence in this access model is 
measured by the House tenure of the chair.  Newer House members who chair 
committees and subcommittees will behave differently than their more senior colleagues.  
Members of Congress face a steep learning curve when they are first elected.  Although 
they bring some policy experience and knowledge with them to Washington, usually they 
still have a significant amount of learning to do to be effective policy makers.  In their 
earlier years they will rely on many resources to collect information, including interest 
group testimony.  Senior members, on the other hand, may become as knowledgeable as 
any other player when it comes to policy niches.  Having all the information they need to 
make policy, they are less dependent on testimony and are less interested in hearing 
testimony from a wide range of groups. 
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H4: Chair influence, as measured by the number of years a chair has been a 
House member, will be negatively related to the likelihood that an interest group 
receives an invitation to testify. 
 
 
 Several measures of partisan affinity are included in the access model since party 
is theoretically important.  Similarly, dummy variables for each individual chair are 
added as another measure of chair influence as are dummy variables for the parent 
committee before which an interest is seeking access.  The dummy variables for the 
parent committees will not only measure the effects each committee may exert over the 
process but also control for statistical abnormalities which might occur due to the nature 
of the sample being used for a pooled time series analysis.  Collectively, the variables 
included in the access model are designed to test for partisan affinity, ideological 
influence, ideological extremism, and chair influence. 
The interest group impact theory developed in Chapter 3 maintains features of the 
interest group also influence the decision of which groups to include in congressional 
hearings as witnesses.  Interest group resources, interest group legitimacy and political 
influence are all expected to be positively related to the likelihood an interest group will 
be invited to testify.   
Interest group resources include the number of lobbyists on staff and those hired 
on a contractual basis, the size of the group’s membership and budget, and the level of 
lobbying activity of the group.  The more resources a group has at its disposal, the more 
widespread its lobbying efforts and the reach of its lobbying efforts will be.   
H5: Interest group resources, as measured by the number of contract lobbyists 
and lobbyists on staff, will be positively related to the likelihood an interest group 
receives an invitation to testify. 
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H6: Interest group resources, as measured by the membership and budget of the 
group, will be positively related to the likelihood an interest group receives an 
invitation to testify32. 
 
H7: Interest group resources, as measured by the amount of lobbying activity of a 
group, will be positively related to an interest’s likelihood of receiving an 
invitation to testify. 
 
The reputation of an interest group likely plays a role in whether it is invited to 
testify as the committee or subcommittee chair has an interest in receiving good, reliable 
information.  There is no way to measure the reputation of an interest group directly.  
However, just as a reputation for being a reliable source will open doors to legislators, it 
opens doors to the media.  Just as congressmen and women look to interest groups for 
information, so do journalists.  Therefore an indirect measure of the group’s visibility can 
be gained via the proxy of media mentions.  Visible groups are cited more frequently by 
journalists than those who have a bad or no reputation.  It is also known that groups that 
tarnish their reputation do not last in the business of lobbying for very long (Ainsworth 
2002; Wolpe & Levine 1996).  Therefore, the more established the group, the stronger 
and more enduring its reputation.  Interest group visibility is measured by how frequently 
a group is mentioned in the news media and by the age of the group. 
H8: Interest group visibility, as measured by the number of active and passive 
media mentions of an interest group, will be positively related to an interest’s 
likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify. 
 
H9: Interest group visibility, as measured by the age of a group, will be positively 
related to an interest’s likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify. 
 
 
32 The log of both members and budget are used as neither are expected to be linear functions. 
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One cannot ignore the influence of money.  The literature clearly suggests the 
possibility of campaign contributions buying access.  Political influence is specified by 
the amount of PAC contributions an organization makes to House members, by 
contributions given to members seated on the committee or subcommittee the interest 
group is lobbying, and by contributions given the targeted committee or subcommittee 
chair.  Interest group potentially steer campaign contributions toward those members who 
are able to give them access like committee chairs or members seated on the committee. 
H10: Political influence, as measured by the amount of PAC contributions 
an interest group gives to all members of Congress, will be positively related to 
an interest’s likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify. 
 
H11: Political influence, as measured by the amount of PAC contributions an 
interest group gives to committee members, will be positively related to an 
interest group’s likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify. 
 
H12: Political influence, as measured by PAC contributions made to the 
committee and subcommittee chair, will be positively related to an interest 
group’s likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify. 
 
 
 Lastly, the politics involved in policy making theoretically operate according to 
the policy arena under observation.  The politics of regulatory policy making are much 
more contentious and involved more substantially more players than distributive policy 
making.  Since distributive policy making is said to operate within the subgovernment 
policy systems, it is expected interest groups will have more success in gaining access to 
hearings held on regulatory policy. 
 
H13: Regulatory policy arena, as measured by policy committees, will be 
positively related to an interest group’s likelihood of receiving an invitation to 
testify. 
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 Even though the access model is testing sessions of Congress that are described as 
highly partisan and polarized, committee and subcommittee chairs still retain the ability 
to exert influence over certain committee processes.  Underlying many of their decisions 
is the desire to make good policy and to collect the information needed to do so.  
Therefore a confluence of factors, driven by both the committees and interest groups 
determine whether access to committee hearings will be given to an interest group. 
   
Results 
 The access model presented here is done through a progression of analyses.  This 
enables one to see the effects of the different types of variables separately and 
collectively, allowing for the comparison of the effects of the separate groups of 
independent variables on the dependent variable.  There are two different groups of 
variables: those relating to the interest group and those measuring the chair or committee.  
The first three regressions will test the chair and committee variables and interest group 
variables separately.  The fourth regression will be run using both the interest groups 
variables and the chair/committee variables together.  Finally, a regression will be run 
separately for each session of Congress.  The final step, running a separate regression for 
each session of Congress is a necessary step to check for problems in the fully specified 
model such as auto-correlation between independent variables as it is symptomatic of 
pooled-time series analysis.  In addition to separating regressions for each session of 
Congress, dummy variables representing each parent committee are included in the 
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model, not only to test for the effects of these committees on interest group access, but 
also to ensure the error terms of the committees are not artificially inflating the results of 
the statistical analysis (Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998). 
 
Logistic Regression with only Chair and Committee Variables 
 Table 11 reveals the results of the first logistic regression in which the 
independent variables measuring committee and chair characteristics are regressed on the 
dependent variable measuring whether the interest group was asked to testify.  The null 
hypothesis is safely rejected.  The pseudo R2 indicates the fit of the data.  About 14% of 
the variance in the dependent variable is explained.33   
When the odds ratio of an independent variable is one, this indicates there is no 
relationship between that independent variable and the dependent variable.  None of the 
measures of partisan affinity, ideological extremism, or chair influence carry a statistical 
significance.  Having a representative seated on the committee before which an interest 
group seeks testimony is negatively related to access, and seeking testimony before 
policy committees is also negatively related to access.  In addition, several of the 
committee and subcommittee chair variables are statistically significant as are several of 
the dummy variables representing the parent committees.   
 
 
 
 
33 The pseudo R2 reported is the measure recommended by McFadden (1973). 
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Table 11: Probability of an Interest Group Being Invited to Testify with Committee 
Variables Only 
   Coef. Odds Ratio Std. Error z  P>z  
Partisanship  -.007    0.993 0.018            -0.39  .696  
Ratio R:D  -.246    0.782 0.369              -0.67  .506  
Tenure    .063    1.06  0.050             1.26  .208 
DW Chair   .918    2.50  1.224              0.75  .453 
Rep on Committee -.986    0.37  0.444            -2.22  .026 
Policy            -1.758    0.17  0.832            -2.11  .035  
Prestige   .330    1.39  0.644             0.51  .608  
Burton           -2.049    0.12  0.097            -2.71  .007 
Crane            -2.436    0.088 0.095            -2.24  .025 
Ehlers            -2.297    0.101 0.116            -2.00  .046   
Herger           -2.533    0.080 0.086            -2.34  .019   
Hoekstra            1.939    6.950 6.029             2.24  .025   
Johnson, Nancy      -2.145    0.117 0.118            -2.13  .033   
McIntosh          -3.134    0.044 0.049            -2.76  .006    
Mica            1.610    5.004 3.759  2.14  .032     
Oxley           -1.456    0.233 0.133            -2.55  .011               
Thomas          -2.517    0.081 0.077            -2.63  .009 
Armed Services      -3.470    0.031 0.025            -4.39  .000 
Finance           1.928    6.876 5.542  2.43  .015 
Govt Reform           1.756    5.791 4.758  2.14  .033 
Resources          -1.311    0.270 0.163            -2.16  .031 
Sm Business          -1.769    0.171 0.116            -2.60  .009   
Session-2nd yr            -.163    0.850 0.110            -1.26  .209  
Sixth             -.583    0.558 0.099            -3.30  .001 
Seventh            -.369    0.691 0.178            -1.43  .152 
Eighth             -.411    0.663 0.148            -1.85  .065 
Constant  .148   0.816  0.18  .856 
N= 2314               Pseudo R2 = .1438   Prob > chi2 = 0.000                 
 
 
Somewhat troubling, though, are several of the high standard errors appearing 
with some of the chair and committee dummy variables.  High standard error terms tend 
to indicate multicollinearity among the independent variables.  Multicollinearity tests 
applied to the data (Collin test in STATA) confirm this.  The dummy variables 
representing the individual chairs will be dropped to see if it eliminates the problem. 
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The measures of partisan affinity, ideological extremism, and chair influence are 
the theoretically important variables; since those measures account for what might have 
been of interest in the variation among chairs, eliminating the chair dummy variables 
should not in anyway detract from the model specification.  The results of the corrected 
model of committee and chair variables are displayed in Table 12. 
 
Table 12: Probability of an Interest Group Being Invited to Testify with Committee 
Variables Only (Corrected Model) 
   Coef.      Odds Ratio  Std. Error z  P>z  
Partisanship   .001  1.001             0.015             0.09  .928  
Ratio R:D        -.221  0.801             0.237              -0.75  .454  
Tenure             -.013  0.987             0.020            -0.62  .532 
DW Chair       -.236  0.789            0.278             -0.67  .502 
Reponcommittee  -9.09  0.403             0.169            -2.17  .030 
Policy                    -1.717  0.180           0.094            -3.28  .001  
Prestige           -.374  0.688        0.318            -0.81  .419  
Armed Services        -3.329  0.037      0.021            -5.84  .000 
Appropriations 1.409  4.092  1.273  4.53  .000 
Energy    .875  2.399  0.902  2.33  .020 
Finance  1.387  4.003  1.588  3.50  .000 
Govt Reform    .820  2.271  0.841  2.21  .027 
Sm Business           -1.831  0.160  0.075            -3.92  .000   
Session-2nd yr  -.116  0.891  0.110            -0.93  .351  
Sixth   -.470  0.625    0.099            -2.98  .003 
Seventh  -.155  0.857  0.192            -0.69  .490 
Eighth   -.185  0.831  0.143            -1.08  .280 
Constant    .789    0.619  1.28  .202 
N= 2341               Pseudo R2 = .0998   Prob > chi2 = 0.000                 
 
I should note that, although not reported here, I also ran a regression dropping the 
dummy variables representing the committees but still included those for each individual 
chair.  There were at least three dummy chair variables with standard errors above 1.000 
but fewer than 2.000, and while this is an improvement over the original model, it 
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eliminates the control for the committee error terms and is still producing some error 
terms that are higher than what I would feel comfortable with.  Thus the decision was 
made to include the dummy committee variables over the dummy chair variables. 
However, multicollinearity tests were run on the variables included in this second 
regression and there is still a problem between policy, prestige and the dummy variables 
representing the committees.  Policy and prestige will be dropped since the inclusion of 
the committee dummy variables is needed to protect against other issues related to pooled 
time-series analyses.  Table 13 shows the corrected model minus the policy and prestige 
variables. 
 
Table 13: Probability of an Interest Group Being Invited to Testify with Committee 
Variables Only (Second Corrected Model) 
   Coef.  Odds Ratio Std. Error z  P>z  
Partisanship  -.002             .998  0.015            -0.11  .911  
Ratio R:D  -.241             .786  0.298              -0.81  .418  
Tenure   -.025             .976  0.020            -1.25  .210 
DW Chair  -.145             .865  0.348             -0.42  .677 
Rep on Committee -.927             .396  0.417            -2.22  .026 
Agriculture   .712           2.037  0.332  2.14  .032 
Armed Services       -2.145           .117  0.455            -4.72  .000 
Appropriations         2.264           9.617  0.367  6.17  .000 
Finance   .819           2.268  0.331  2.48  .013 
Sm Business        -.734           .480  0.344            -2.14  .033   
Ways Means    .831           2.296  0.300  2.77  .006 
Session-2nd yr  -.121             .886  0.124            -0.98  .326  
Sixth   -.460                .631  0.157            -2.92  .003 
Seventh  -.124             .883  0.224            -0.55  .580 
Eighth   -.149             .862  0.171            -0.87  .385 
Constant  -.289    0.538            -0.54  .591 
N= 2341               Pseudo R2 = .0957   Prob > chi2 = 0.000                 
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As indicated in Table 13, none of the measures of partisan affinity, ideological 
extremism or chair influence are statistically significant.  An interest group that has a 
district representative seated on a committee is less likely to be asked to testify before the 
committee.  Although I hypothesized the opposite, it is possible that representatives 
seated on a committee are already familiar with the positions of interest groups located 
within their districts, and therefore reach out to other groups to testify before them.  This 
variable may also be statistically significant, because the groups that do get asked to 
testify are those that are headquartered in Washington D.C.  Having a district 
representative seated on a committee presupposes the group is not headquartered in the 
capital. 
Additionally several of the dummy variables representing the committees are 
statistically significant.  Note that those committees which were not statistically 
significant (Banking, Commerce, Education, Energy, Government Reform, Judiciary, 
Resources, Science and Transportation & Infrastructure) are not reported.  Table 13 
shows that interest groups are more likely to be asked to testify when lobbying the 
Appropriations, Finance and Ways and Means committees.  Two of which are considered 
prestige committees.  Groups will find it more difficult to testify in front of the Armed 
Services and Small Business committees.  Overall the 106th Congress was the most 
difficult for interest groups to gain access. 
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Logistic Regression with only Interest Group Variables 
The next regression in this series of analyses is to consider the model with only 
those independent variables measuring attributes of the interest group.  This allows for a 
comparison with the preceding regression.  Table 14 reveals the result of this second 
logistic regression. 
Positively related to the likelihood of being asked to testify is the number of in-
house lobbyists a group has, how many members belong to the group, and how many 
times it is actively and passively mentioned in the media.  There is a negative relationship 
between an interest group’s level of lobbying activity and its likelihood of testifying.  
Trade associations and colleges and universities have an advantage over other types of 
interest groups when it comes to gaining access to hearings. 
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Table 14: Probability of an Interest Group Being Invited to Testify with Interest 
Group Variables Only 
   Coef. Odds Ratio Std. Error z P>z    
Hired-Guns  -.003    0.997 0.006            -0.50 .619    
Own Lobbyists  .060    1.062 0.012             5.26 .000    
Members (log)  .080    1.083 0.035  2.31 .021    
Budget (log)  -.051    0.950 0.037            -1.38 .168   
Lobbying Activity     -.087    0.917 0.013            -6.75 .000    
Active Media              .003    1.003 0.013  0.26 .793   
Passive Media  .004    1.004 0.001            3.63 .000    
Age (log)             -.006    0.994 0.091            -0.07 .945 
House PAC (log)        -.010    0.990 0.014            -0.69 .487 
Comm. PAC (log)        .002    1.003 0.021               0.13 .895 
Chair PAC (log)  .019    1.019 0.016             1.16 .245 
Business Money         -.014     0.987 0.020            -0.67 .503 
Business  -.270    0.764 0.315            -0.86 .392 
Trade Association  .714    2.042 0.338               2.11 .035    
Membership              .606    1.833 0.353             1.72 .086 
College/Univ             2.167    8.730 0.353             6.14 .000 
Session 2nd year           -.166    0.847 0.175            -0.95 .341    
Sixth               -.331    0.718 0.225            -1.47 .142 
Seventh               .114    1.120 0.292             0.39 .697 
Eighth               -.339    0.712 0.219              -1.55 .122  
Constant              -.584   0.805            -0.73 .468  
N= 1505                Pseudo R2 = .1658   Prob > chi2 = 0.000                 
 
 
 Notice that the number of observations in this first regression is only 1505.  This 
is low compared to the number of observations included in the access model for most 
variables.  Including the budget variable in this first regression lowers the number of 
observations as there is missing budget data for a number of groups.  Since the initial 
regression indicates no statistical relationship between testifying and budget, this analysis 
is regressed again dropping the budget variable.     
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Table 15: Probability of an Interest Group Being Invited to Testify with Interest 
Group Variables Only (dropping Budget) 
   Coef.  Odds Ratio Std. Error z P>z    
Hired-Guns   .003  1.003  0.005             0.56 .575   
Own Lobbyists  .054  1.056  0.010  5.70 .000    
Members (log)  .069  1.071  0.025               2.99 .003    
Lobbying Activity     -.070  0.932  0.009            -6.92 .000              
Active Media   .024  1.024  0.016  1.58 .114     
Passive Media  .003  1.003  0.001  2.85 .004    
Age (log)              .016  1.016  0.069             0.23 .818 
House PAC (log)      -.007  0.993  0.010              -0.63 .528 
Comm. PAC (log)  .013  1.013  0.015  0.88 .379 
Chair PAC (log)  .031  1.031  0.013             2.37 .018 
Business Money       -.034   0.967  0.015              -2.12 .034 
Business             -.462  0.630  0.141            -2.07 .039    
Trade Association  .766  2.152  0.488             3.38 .001    
Membership              .479  1.615  0.411               1.88 .060 
College/Univ            1.963  7.120  1.953             7.15 .000 
Session 2nd year          -.196  0.822  0.114              -1.42 .157 
Sixth    -.348  0.706  0.125            -1.97 .049    
Seventh  -.219  0.803  0.184            -0.95 .340 
Eighth   -.382  0.682  0.119            -2.18 .029 
Constant           -1.398    0.431            -3.34 .001  
   
N= 2234                Pseudo R2 = .1244  Prob > chi2 = 0.000                 
 
 
 The regression results without the budget variable are found in Table 15.  By 
dropping the interest group budget variable 729 more observations are included in this 
regression, although the overall fit of this grouping of interest group variables is reduced 
to a pseudo R2 of 0.1244 (from 0.1658) which can be interpreted as about 12 percent of 
the variance in the dependent variable.  The other results of the regression analysis 
remain mostly the same with two notable exceptions.  Contributions given to the chair of 
the committee the interest group is lobbying is positively related to the likelihood of 
receiving an invitation to testify, and the interaction between being a business group and 
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giving money to Republican members of the committee is negatively related to the 
likelihood of gaining access.  While it is easy to understand the positive relationship 
between money contributed to chairs and access, the second relationship is odd.  
However it is premature to speculate about the relationship without seeing the results of 
the fully specified model with both committee and interest group measures.   
 
Logistic Regression with Interest Group and Committee Variables 
 The next logistic regression analysis (results in Table 16) examines the two blocks 
of variables for the committee/chairs and interest groups together.  Unlike OLS 
regression, with logistic regression it is difficult to separate out the effects of each 
individual variable in a model.  Variables included in a logistic regression will have an 
effect on one another.  As this is the case, it is possible that by combining both sets of 
variables in one analysis will not only improve the overall fit of the model, but also 
reveal new statistically significant relationships.   
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Table 16: Probability of an Interest Group Being Invited to Testify with Interest 
Group Variables and Committee Variables  
                              Coef.  Odds Ratio Std. Error z P>z    
Partisanship  -.008     .992  0.017            -0.46 .644  
Ratio R:D  -.451             .637  0.379            -1.19 .234    
Tenure   -.027   .974  0.023            -1.18 .237 
DW Chair  -.013             .987  0.397              -0.03 .973 
Rep. on Committee -.860             .423  0.490            -1.76 .079  
Hired-Guns   .002           1.002  0.005             0.32 .746 
Own Lobbyist  .062           1.064   0.010  6.09 .000   
Members (log)  .060           1.062  0.025  2.43 .015    
Lobbying Activity -.076   .926  0.011            -6.97 .000   
Active Media   .083           1.086   0.023  3.52 .000    
Passive Media    .003           1.003    0.001  2.72 .006     
Age (log)  -.020             .980  0.072            -0.28 .779 
House PAC (log) -.001            .999   0.011            -0.11 .916 
Comm. PAC (log)  .002           1.002  0.016             0.14 .892 
Chair PAC (log)  .025           1.026  0.014             1.84 .066  
BusinessMoney -.031                .969  0.017              -1.85 .065 
Business  -.284             .753  0.240            -1.19 .236 
Trade Association  .858           2.357    0.246  3.49 .000    
Membership   .567           1.763   0.276  2.05 .040    
College/Univ            2.472         11.842  0.307  8.04 .000 
Agriculture   .859           2.360  0.376               2.28 .022 
Armed Services       -2.243  .106  0.484              -4.63 .000 
Appropriations         2.541         12.691    0.424  5.99 .000 
Science   .908           2.479  0.373  2.43 .015 
Ways Means            1.055              2.871  0.346  3.05 .002 
Session-2nd year -.261             .770  0.151              -1.73 .083 
Sixth   -.283            .753  0.196            -1.45 .148  
Seventh  -.252             .778  0.265            -0.95 .343  
Eighth   -.315   .730  0.207            -1.52 .128 
Constant  -.715     0.775            -0.92 .356 
N= 2157                Pseudo R2 = .2199   Prob > chi2 = 0.000                 
 
 
 The overall fit of this regression is .2199 which can be interpreted as about 22% 
of the variance within the dependent variable is being explained by the interest group and 
committee/chair variables.  Ideological extremism, chair influence, and partisan affinity 
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do not factor into the decision of whether to allow a group to testify.  Interest group 
resources and interest group legitimacy do.  Also, one measure of political influence is 
nearing statistical significance.     
Logistic regression interprets the odds ratios of testifying for each independent 
variable.  However, these numbers are still difficult to interpret since the probabilities of 
testifying are not linear and different values of the independent variable yield different 
probabilities.  For the discussion of the results, CLARIFY software will be used to 
predict estimated values of the dependent variable for different values of the independent 
variables (Tomsz, Wittenberg and King, 2003).   
The first statistically significant measure of interest group resources is the number 
of lobbyists on staff (own lobbyists).  The relationship between this variable and the 
likelihood of testifying is depicted in Graph 1.  Imputing the mean number of lobbyists 
on staff for the access sample, the predicted probability of testifying is 0.493 for business 
groups, 0.677 for trade associations, 0.645 for membership groups and 0.901 for colleges 
and universities.  The greatest number of lobbyists on staff for any group considered in 
this sample is 42.  At this number, the predicted probability of testifying for businesses is 
0.849, 0.932 for trade associations, 0.921 for membership groups and 0.985 for colleges 
and universities.  As shown in Graph 5.1 the advantages in testifying that accrue to hiring 
more staff lobbyists diminishes approaching the maximum value and the advantages 
among the various types of interest groups lessens.  In this sample, the Chamber of 
Commerce has 42 staff lobbyists, the American Petroleum Institute has 34, Edison 
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Electric Institute has 30 and the National Association of Manufacturers has 29.  These 
groups do not represent the norm among interest groups.   
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Graph 1: Probablity of Testifying
 
 
 Another interest group resource that is statistically significant and positively 
related to interest group access is the level of membership within the group.  While  
The level of membership has a large range for groups included in this sample.  As you 
can see in Graph 2, once you reach a certain level of membership (here around the 
median level of membership which is 23,483), the benefits to adding more membership 
in terms of gaining access, diminish greatly.  For example, there is no real difference in 
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terms of predicted probabilities of testifying between trade associations that have 100,00 
members (0.820) and 1,000,000 members (0.827).  What appears to make a difference, is 
that an interest group can reach, and potentially influence the voting, of some number of 
people, it does not make much of a difference whether the number is very large or not, so 
long as there is some constituency (membership) associated with the interest group. 
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 The level of lobbying activity is the last statistically significant interest group 
resource variable.  Depicted in Graph 3, you can see this is a negative relationship.  In 
this sampling of interest groups, the mean number of issues lobbied by a group is just 
under 10.  At this value, the predicted probability of a business group testifying is 0.386.  
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The predicted probability of testifying at the mean value for trade associations is 0.635, 
for membership groups is 0.569 and for colleges and universities is 0.878.  The 
probability of testifying drops fairly steadily, in almost a linear relationship for each 
additional issue a group lobbies.  The maximum number of issues lobbied by groups in 
this sample is 34. 
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 In addition to the interest group resources, a positive relationship is found 
between interest group legitimacy and testifying.  Both active media and passive media 
mentions work in the favor of an interest group.  Having no active or passive references 
in the Washington Post and New York Times has a probability of 0.561 and 0.579 
respectively for business groups.  Having 100 active or passive media mentions increases 
the probability to 0.998 and 0.614 for businesses.  Graphs 4 and 5 show the relationships 
between the interest group legitimacy variables and the probabilities of being asked to 
testify. 
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Logistic Regression Comparison by Session of Congress 
 The last analysis involves running a separate regression for each session of 
Congress so as to compare the odds ratios.  This will allow us to see whether there is 
anything unusual that is occurring in any particular session.  It is yet another measure to 
be sure that in the fully specified model, there are not any error patterns being exerted by 
each session that might distort the effects of the model (an effect commonly manifested 
in time series analyses).  Table 17 reveals the comparison across sessions of Congress.  In 
these regressions, the dummy variables representing the chairs were excluded in order to 
decrease the number of independent variables since the number of observations in each 
regression is much fewer. 
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Table 17: Comparison of Odds Coefficients for each Session of Congress 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable  105th  106th  107th  108th  
    1998            1999-2000    2001            2003-2004 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Partisanship  -.032   .004  -.158   .044 
RatioRD  -.522            2.420   .491  -.907 
Tenure    .061   .024   .051  -.114* 
DWchair            1.013   .467  -.537           -1.050 
Reponcommittee -.094           -1.417  (dropped)  .496 
Hired-Guns  -.031   .046** -.008  -.004 
Own-Lobbyist   .120***  .044   .055   .025 
Members (log) -.009   .187**  .186*  -.012 
Lobbying Activity -.125*** -.093*** -.106  -.058**   
Active Media   .090   .356**  .056   .085* 
Passive Media   .000   .008*   .010*   .005* 
Age (log)   .055   .072  -.972***  .184 
House PAC (log) -.042  -.027  -.055   .013 
Comm. PAC (log) -.034  -.000   .056   .052 
Chair PAC (log)  .140**  .043   .011   .007 
Business Money  .037  -.046   .029  -.061 
Business  -.786    .983           -1.744  -.463 
Trade Assn  -.496             2.569*** -.031            1.002* 
Membership  -.516             2.770***        -2.384*            1.444** 
College/Univ            1.265             4.151***         2.135              2.419*** 
Agriculture  -.597             2.537**           1.209   .336 
Armed Services (dropped)       -2.601*    .005           -2.996*** 
Appropriations 2.806*** 2.809*             3.690              .821 
Banking   .675  1.847*  (dropped)         (dropped) 
Education   .1116  1.611*         .560            -2.205** 
Finance  (dropped) (dropped)        2.878*            -1.186 
Govt. Reform   .118  1.410         1.889             -.958** 
Judiciary  -.129    .477  1.273           -2.449** 
Science  1.827*  2.088*  2.531  -.904 
Sm Business  -.142    .546  2.119           -2.528** 
Session-2nd year -.058  -.683  (dropped)  .059 
 
N   391  812  279  670 
Pseudo R2  0.2374  0.3164  0.2822  0.3158 
*** significant .001 level     ** significant .005 level       *significant .050 level 
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 For ease of presentation, in Table 17 only the odds coefficients are reported and 
the level at which they are significant.  Overall, the level of lobbying activity of a group 
indicates a negative relationship with the group’s chances of being asked to testify.  On 
the positive side are the number of lobbyists on staff, the press attention the group 
receives, and the type of organization attempting to testify.  However, the 105th Congress 
emerges with a unique finding as does the 108th.  Contributions made to chairs of the 
committees before which interest groups sought to testify are positively related with the 
likelihood of doing so.  It is a modest effect but it differentiates the 105th Congress from 
the other sessions.  During the 108th Congress the tenure of the chair comes into play, 
exhibiting a negative relationship with the likelihood of success.  This suggests chairs 
were able to maintain some autonomy from the party leadership for this particular 
legislative process even under conditions of party government.  Neither effect was strong 
enough however, to carry a statistical significance in the fully specified model.  These 
analyses do not reveal anything problematic with the full access model. 
Eleven hypotheses were developed to be tested by this model.  They are laid out 
in Table 18 along with whether they are supported by the results of the fully specified 
access model.  The results are decidedly mixed.  There is support for the theory that 
interest group resources make a group powerful; power in this situation relating to a 
group’s ability to secure an invitation to testify on an issue which it is lobbying.  
Hypotheses five and six are supported by the data.  Interest group legitimacy is also an 
important factor.  Getting press coverage for this issue being lobbied or just for the group 
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itself has a positive impact on gaining access.  And while the seventh hypothesis is 
supported by the data, it is revealing a relationship opposite of what was expected. 
 
Table 18: Were the Access Hypotheses Supported? 
________________________________________________________________________ 
H1: Partisan affinity, as measured by businesses during Republican No 
controlled Houses, will be positively related to the likelihood an 
interest group receives an invitation to testify. 
 
H2: Partisan affinity, as measured by the interaction of being a  No  
business and contributions given to House Republicans seated on  
the committee being lobbied, will be positively related to the  
likelihood an interest group receives an invitation to testify.  
 
H3: Ideological extremism, as measured by the ideology of the  No 
committee or subcommittee chair, will be negatively related to  
the likelihood an interest group receives an invitation to testify. 
 
H4: Chair influence, as measured by the number of years a chair No 
has been a House member, will be negatively related to the  
likelihood an interest group receives an invitation to testify. 
  
H5: Interest group resources, as measured by the number of contract Yes – lobbyists on staff 
lobbyists and lobbyists on staff, will be positively related to the 
likelihood an interest group receives an invitation to testify. 
 
H6: Interest group resources, as measured by the membership Yes – membership 
and budget of the group, will be positively related to the likelihood 
an interest receives an invitation to testify. 
 
H7: Interest group resources, as measured by the amount of lobbying No – it’s a negative relationship 
activity of a group, will be positively related to an interest’s likelihood 
of receiving an invitation to testify. 
 
H8: Interest group visibility, as measured by the number of active Yes 
and passive media mentions of an interest group, will be positively  
related to an interest’s likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify. 
 
H9: Interest group visibility, as measured by the age of a group,  No 
will be positively related to an interest’s likelihood or receiving an 
invitation to testify. 
 
H10: Political influence, as measured by the amount of PAC  No 
contributions an interest group gives to all members of Congress,  
will be positively related to an interest’s likelihood of receiving  
an invitation to testify. 
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H11: Political influence, as measured by PAC contributions to  No 
committee members, will be positively related to an interest  
group’s likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify. 
 
H12: Political influence, as measured by PAC contributions   No 
made to the committee and subcommittee chair, will be positively  
related to an interest group’s likelihood of receiving an invitation to 
testify. 
 
H13: Regulatory policy arena, as measured by policy committees,  Dropped due to correlation 
will be positively related to an interest group’s likelihood of  
receiving an invitation to testify. 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Discussion 
 The interest group impact theory on access is largely not supported by partisan 
affinity, ideological extremism or chair influence.  None of the attributes relating to the 
committee or subcommittee are exerting an influence other than the dummy variables 
representing the committees themselves.   
 Partisan affinity as measured by the partisanship variable is not statistically 
significant.  This variable is a unique measure created by looking at how many majority 
sponsored bills receive action in committees and subcommittees over minority sponsored 
bills.  Confident this measure is a valid measure of partisanship I believe it is not 
significant because partisanship is not a central consideration when it comes to compiling 
witness lists. The other measure of partisan affinity, the interaction between being a 
business group and making contributions to GOP committee members is also not 
significant. 
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 Neither is interest group access impacted by ideological extremism.  The ideology 
of the committee and subcommittee chairs is not statistically significant.  This process is 
driven by considerations other than a chair’s individual ideological preferences. 
Tenure measures chair influence, along with a series of dummy variables 
representing all of the committees.  Tenure is another variable that is not a statistically 
significant.  Originally I had planned to also include dummy variables representing the 
committee and subcommittee chairs.  But due to problems of multicollinearity (mostly 
with the committee dummy variables) they were withdrawn from the analysis.  Two other 
variables that were eliminated were the prestige and policy variables which were used to 
measure the type of committee before which the interest group sought access. 
The effects of the prestige and policy variables were being picked up in part by 
the dummy variables representing the parent committees.  Of those, there is a statistically 
significant relationship for the Agriculture, Appropriations, Science and Ways and Means 
committees.  Two of those, Appropriations and Ways and Means are prestige 
committees.  Prestige committees deal with money issues and so tend to operate 
differently than other committees.  They would not have been the committees I would 
have thought to have a positive relationship with the likelihood of testifying.  However, 
looking into the issues groups were lobbying one thing immediately becomes apparent.  
Ways and Means had part jurisdiction over the heavily debated Medicare prescription 
drug reform.  This issue was identified by Congressional Quarterly as being one of the 
“key votes” in the 106th, 107th and 108th Congresses.  Many hearings were held on the 
matter enabling significantly more opportunities for interest groups to be invited to 
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testify.  Further, Ways and Means also had jurisdiction over the estate tax, another “key 
vote” in the 106th Congress. 
The Agriculture and Science committees are more easily understood in terms of 
having a positive relationship with the likelihood of testifying.  Theoretically, regulatory 
policy making includes a wide range of interests.  In contrast to distributive policy 
subgovernments, regulatory policy is made in much more open and fluid issue networks. 
The data here confirm the theory in that interest groups have a greater likelihood of 
receiving invitation to testify before committees considering regulatory policy.  
The only committee to exert a statistically significant negative relationship with 
the likelihood of testifying is the Armed Services committee.  There is a wide range of 
interests lobbying this committee for any number of defense authorizations, which 
typically lead to contracting of private companies.  These contracts are highly desirable 
and attract a lot of lobbying activity when only a select few ever get to testify in hearing. 
 Supporting the interest group impact theory on access, interest group resources, 
interest group visibility and political influence do matter.  Interest group resources as 
measured by an organization’s own lobbyists positively affects the likelihood of 
receiving an invitation to testify but external representation does not.  There are distinct 
differences between contract lobbyists and in-house lobbyists.  Although for the most 
part, contract lobbyists, through their experience in government and lobbying may 
develop expertise in a particular policy area, they are more valuable for the relationships 
they have in Congress and for their knowledge about how things work.  They are not like 
in-house lobbyists who are hired for their policy expertise or their dedication to the 
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interest group’s goals and mission.  Additionally, hired guns, since they are contracted by 
a number of groups at one time, can never give their full attention to lobbying the issue at 
hand.  They are not as effective as the full time, on-staff lobbyists who dedicate 100% of 
their time to the organization’s issue agenda.  All of these differences combined may 
explain why in-house lobbyists are statistically significant in this model and hired guns 
are not. 
 It is also the case that resource-rich organizations are able to maintain full time 
lobbying staffs, and frequently it is smaller interests who rely on short term contracting 
for their lobbying needs.  For example, in this research sample Paradise Canyon Resort, 
Folia Inc, Cash America, Intl, and the Security Industry Association all had hired two 
hired guns while maintaining no in-house lobbying staff.  At the same time the American 
Medical Association, Associated Builders and Contractors, and Friends of the Earth all 
had more than ten in-house lobbyists and contracted not a single hired gun.  This in part 
reflects the elite critique that interest groups with ample resources have an advantage 
over smaller or unorganized interests.  Reality is best described as a combination of both 
explanations.  
 Interest group resources, as measured by the membership size of a group, are also 
positively related to an interest group’s success in securing an invitation to testify.  The 
more members a group has (or employees in the cases of businesses and governmental 
entities) the stronger its chances of securing access to a congressional hearing.  While 
members are important to an organization for financial reasons, they also help leverage 
support for a group.  Interest groups always trumpet the number of individuals that 
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belong to the group as a way of signaling to a legislator, how many individuals the group 
can communicate with and mobilize when elections roll around.  Members of the House 
of Representatives are always facing the prospect of the next election and are wary of any 
vote they may or may not make that will trigger a group to mobilize its membership 
against him or her. Membership numbers always represent votes in an upcoming election 
and so they are used to leverage access or influence.  That membership is statistically 
significant in this model reflects that reality. 
 Not all political resources positively impact the likelihood of testifying.  The level 
of lobbying activity of a group, contrary to what is hypothesized, has a negative effect.  A 
group’s chances of participating in a hearing on which it is lobbying decreases with the 
number of other issues it is lobbying at the same time.  It is likely groups that are focused 
on a small number of issues and that concentrate their resources on those issues are more 
effective than those that seek to influence every type of policy.  Furthermore, focused 
groups likely have a policy niche in which they are considered the experts.  For example 
the Education Policy Institute, an organization that engages in policy research aimed at 
advocating for parental school choice is more likely to be asked to testify on a school 
voucher program, since this is its primary focus, than the AFL-CIO which lobbies on 
hundreds of issues, including school vouchers.  This is in line with the intuition regarding 
in-house lobbyists versus contract lobbyists.  It was suggested that in-house lobbyists are 
more effective than hired guns when it comes to providing information to law makers 
since they are focused only on the policy issues pursued by their group.  Hired guns may 
know people in government, but they often lobby multiple issues for multiple clients 
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simultaneously, taking away from their ability to become a policy expert.  It follows that 
the more issues a group lobbies, the less able they are to become the “go-to” expert on 
any one issue, decreasing its likelihood of being asked to testify. 
 Political influence, in the form of PAC contributions to House members does not 
carry a statistical significance but nearing statistical influence is contributions made to the 
committee or subcommittee chair.  Interest groups that make contributions to the 
committee or subcommittee chair in the two-year election cycle preceding the hearing 
were slightly more likely to receive an invitation to testify.  If indeed organizations use 
PAC contributions as a means of buying access, it makes sense that they would seek 
access to the committees and subcommittees whose jurisdiction coincides with their own 
interests.  In the case of trying to secure invitations to participate in committee and 
subcommittee hearings, this strategy works. 
As revealed through passive and active media mentions, political visibility is also 
positively related to interest group access.  Being mentioned in the New York Times or 
Washington Post for the issue being lobbied in the two year period prior to the 
congressional hearing increases the probability of being asked to testify on that issue.  
Even if the story in which the group is mentioned is not about the issue at hand, the 
percentage odds of receiving an invitation to testify still increases.  This is a very subtle 
advantage, but still important.  Being mentioned in the media is a reflection of the interest 
group’s legitimacy.  Even if receiving the media spot light does not reflect a group’s 
reputation that they are known as being active in a particular issue area helps them gain 
an invitation to testify.  A committee or subcommittee chair conceivably wants to include 
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in hearings the most interested and active organizations on the issues.  Interestingly, even 
if the interest group is mentioned on an unrelated issue its chances of being asked to 
testify increase.  This seems reasonable as most chairs would want recognizable 
participants at the hearing rather than groups that have no pertinent knowledge or group 
that will not help raise the profile of the issue. 
 Interest group resources that are not statistically significant include the size of 
organizational budget.  Since budget is not exerting a statistically significant influence, it 
was dropped in order to increase the number of observations in the model.  There are 
many observations in the dataset for which there is missing budget data.  Dropping this 
variable increased the number of observations included in the regression by 729.  The 
budget variable may not be exerting a statistical influence because there might be better 
ways to measure this variable.  The budget specification had to be expanded to include 
groups that do not have a budget.  For instance, net income was used instead of the 
organizational budget.  This likely stretched the concept too far and thus no relationships 
were detected.  Future attempts to include budget variables should be better specified. 
 Political visibility specified as the age of an organization also fails to impact 
interest group access.  Unlike what was expected, being a more established, older group 
does not gain an advantage when it comes to being asked to testify.  Some groups like 
Anheuser-Busch and the American Library Association have been active in government 
affairs since the 19th century.  Other groups like RetireSafe and the Electronic Industries 
Alliance are only a couple of years old.  But when it comes to gaining access to House 
hearings, organizational age does not matter. 
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 It is surprising PAC contributions, an important measure of political influence are 
not statistically significant in the full model.  The more pointed measure of contributions 
made to the committee or subcommittee chair are significant and as this analysis 
suggests, the more important type of contribution to make if a group is working to gain 
access.  Also included in the analysis is a measure for contributions made to members of 
the committee or subcommittee being lobbied.  This variable is not statistically 
significant likely because it is solely the chair’s decision whom to invite to testify. 
 The other series of dummy variables included in the statistical model measure the 
type of interest group seeking access.  Trade associations, membership groups and 
especially colleges and universities have an advantage over other groups.  They have an 
advantage over businesses which might be unexpected considering the purported close 
relationship between businesses and the Republican Party.  The explanation for why 
these groups have an advantage over others is their expertise.  Colleges and universities 
are centers of research; much of which can become valuable information for policy 
makers when deliberating legislation.  While trade associations typically do not engage in 
research they are storehouses of knowledge about the industries they represent.  Because 
they pull together many companies in one field, they can compile industry wide 
information that proves useful not only to their members, but also to legislators.  Lastly 
are membership groups.  There are a wide range of membership groups.  Some like the 
Center for Science in the Public Interest actively research policy issues and have research 
scientists on staff.  Others like Concerned Women for America and the American Jewish 
Committee do not.  But even when a membership group does not maintain a research 
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staff, it does tend to develop policy niches of which it maintains expertise.  If the 
purported function of interest groups is to provide information, as the interest group 
impact theory being developed here does, then it comes as no surprise that these types of 
groups have an advantage over others when it comes to accessing committee and 
subcommittee hearings as witnesses. 
 The interest group access model develops a picture in which interest group 
resources, interest group legitimacy, and political influence affect the likelihood of 
testifying.  The interest group resources and interest group legitimacy signaling to the 
chair which interest groups would bring the most pertinent information to the table.  
Good purveyors of information are sought out, perhaps again pointing to the interest 
group access theory.   
     
Conclusion 
 
 There is considerable interest in the ability of interest groups to gain access in 
government.  Although we know that access is given and groups can be influential, the 
logistics are less clear.   It’s the details that matter.  Pluralists want to ensure all 
organizations have equal access.  The ideal does not hold if any one group or category of 
groups has an unfair advantage over others.  We also want to be sure that the politics are 
clean: that money is not being used to purchase special consideration.  Even if there is 
certainty about the integrity of the system, scholars are interested in the particulars of the 
functions. 
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 Limitations withstanding, there is some support found for the interest group 
impact theory developed here.  Interest group resources and interest group legitimacy 
matter in a way that seems to indicate chairs are distributing invitations based on the 
potential information that can be gained in return.  Interest groups are touting their 
expertise and are getting selected for it.  That there are some dummy variables for the 
committees that are coming into play also is evidence that there are different ways in 
which different committees approach this process and that the chairs have some 
autonomy to make this decision independent of any party effects.  This supports the 
interest group impact theory nicely.   
 The next chapter addresses the influence dimension of the theory.  While 
theoretically both the access and influence models would contain similar variables, there 
is now a heightened expectation about how partisan affinity and ideological extremism 
will manifest in the influence model.  There is power at stake when allowing interest 
group testimony to impact legislation and so the considerations should shift to reflect this.
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE INFLUENCE OF INTEREST GROUP TESTIMONY ON LEGISLATIVE 
MARKUPS 
Two processes are at work when it comes to interest group testimony in House 
committees and subcommittees.  The first, which was discussed and tested in the 
previous chapter, is deciding which groups will be asked to testify.  Theoretically the 
same variables used in the access model should also be used in the influence model.  The 
access model provides evidence that access to testifying in committee and subcommittee 
is primarily a process driven by interest group resources, interest group legitimacy, and 
partially political influence.  Unexpectedly, partisan affinity, ideological extremism and 
chair influence did not affect the decisions made.  One of the functions of interest groups 
is to provide information.  The access model confirms this, as chairs seek out groups they 
believe have something to say and that are legitimate sources of information on the policy 
under consideration. 
Since legislators are interested in making good public policy many of the same 
considerations will drive the decision making behind whether or not the interest group’s 
recommendation offered in testimony is taken.  Particularly since there is more at stake in 
this decision as it affects legislation.  However, there is also the possibility that early 
anecdotal evidence about this process is true; interest groups are not invited to influence 
the policymaking process but rather serve as “window dressing” support for the chair and 
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the committee or subcommittee’s pre-formulated position on the legislation.  The 
only way to clarify what this process entails is to test the interest group impact theory on 
this dimension of influence.  That is the focus of this chapter. 
 
The Influence Model 
Similar to the access model, this model includes variables designed to measure 
partisan affinity, ideological extremism, chair influence, interest group resources, interest 
group visibility and political influence.  A unique data set was developed that includes 
4257 separate observations – an observation consists of an interest group 
recommendation made in hearing.  The dichotomous dependent variable indicates 
whether or not the recommendation was incorporated in the subsequent bill markup.  As 
explained in the research methods chapter, for each change (to the legislation) 
recommended in the testimony, a zero was assigned if the change was not made and a 
one designated the changes that were incorporated in the bill markups.  Of the 4257 
observations in this model (4257 recommended changes), 253 or 5.9% of them were 
included in the bill markups.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Before discussing the hypotheses developed for the influence model it is helpful 
to look at some of the descriptive aspects of these data since they reveal important 
information.  A common assertion is that businesses are over represented in the interest 
group universe leading to unfair advantages.  Looking at the composition of the interest 
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group universe in this sample is telling.  Table 19 highlights the different types of groups.  
The difference between this sample of groups and that used in the access model is that 
this pool of interest groups is made up of those testifying.  Table 19 does not reflect the 
interest group population as a whole, but rather the population of interest groups that 
testified in the 103rd, 106th and 108th Congresses before the committees on Agriculture,  
Education, Energy & Commerce, Financial Services, Resources and Transportation and 
all of their subcommittees.   Another difference between the sample in Chapter 5 and this 
chapter is that federal government agencies are not required to register as lobbyists with 
Congress and so they are excluded from the first sample; they are, however, represented 
here.   
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Table 19: Types of Interest Groups Comprising the Influence Data Set 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Type     Frequency   Percentage 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Trade Association    834    30.7 
 
Business     560    20.6 
 
Membership     415    15.3 
 
Fed. Government    325    12.0 
 
State & Local Government   262      9.6 
 
Coalition     114      4.2 
 
College/University      82      3.0 
 
Unions        61      2.2 
 
Individuals (no affiliation)     29      1.1 
 
Think Tanks       23      0.9 
 
Church         7      0.3 
 
Foreign Government        4      0.2 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Total      2716              100.1 
 
   
Looking at Table 19, trade associations, businesses and membership groups are 
represented at 30.7%, 20.6% and 15.3% of the sample population respectively.  
Descriptively, businesses do not appear to have a disproportionate level of representation 
when it comes to presenting testimony considering they constitute 46% of the overall 
interest group population sampled in this research.  Trade associations are better 
represented in hearings with 30.7% since they make up only 24.7% of the interest group 
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population sample.   Membership groups are similarly better off in this venue with 15.3% 
in contrast to their representation of 11.2% of the population as a whole.  Somewhat 
surprising is the relatively low percentage of federal government representation here at 
12.0%.  It seems as if in every hearing, the federal agency responsible for policy 
implementation is included, but the numbers say otherwise.  This stands in sharp contrast 
to the iron triangle models of policymaking that posit a cozy and exclusive relationship 
between the committee or subcommittee, the agency responsible for implementation, and 
select interest groups.  While the previous model indicated more success in receiving 
invitations to testify, colleges and universities still present only 3% of the total sampled 
recommendations. 
 Table 20 describes the sample of groups that testified in person which requires an 
invitation; this is an exclusive process.  If an interested party is not asked to testify but 
would still like to make policy recommendations at the hearing stage, they may do so by 
submitting written testimony; this is fully inclusive - anyone who wants to submit written 
testimony may.  Table 20 indicates the distribution of oral and written recommendations 
submitted to the committee and subcommittee.  By submitting written testimony in the 
sample, trade associations and membership groups are able to increase the 
recommendations they make to the committees and subcommittees while businesses and 
the federal government for the most part forego the opportunity to do so.  The data in 
Table 20 tells one of three stories.  The first is that membership groups, trade associations 
and individuals and any type of group that increases its representation by submitting 
written testimony, are not receiving enough formal invitations to testify to satisfy their 
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needs.  When these types of groups want to be included and are not, they go ahead and 
attempt to put their position on record through written testimony.  Following this line of 
thought, those types of groups who do not pursue written submissions are fully having 
their needs met; when they have something to say, they get included in the hearing.  This 
scenario is plausible as submitting written testimony is a fairly low cost venture that does 
not require extraordinary resources. 
 
Table 20: Types of Groups Testifying Orally as Compared to those Submitting 
Written Testimony   
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Type    % of Groups   % of Groups     
Testifying Orally Submitting 
    Written Testimony 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Fed. Government   94.8     5.2 
Business    89.3   10.7  
College / University     89.0   11.0 
Think Tanks     82.6   17.4 
State & Local Government  80.9   19.1   
Trade Association   75.1   24.9          
Coalition    74.6   25.4     
Membership     69.9   30.1     
Unions      65.6   34.4     
Individuals (no affiliation)    62.1   37.9      
Foreign Government            50.0   50.0 
Church    28.6   71.4     
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
A second possibility is that the types of groups who choose not to submit written 
testimony when they are not invited to testify know that submitting testimony will have 
no effect on the outcome of the legislation and as such do consider it a costly activity and 
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so do not participate.  Or they feel they can lobby more effectively in other ways such as 
meeting members of Congress in person.   
An alternate explanation is that those interest groups that are accountable to a 
membership, constituency, or board of directors find they have to act on legislation to 
appear they are “working” on an issue.  For example, the staff lobbyists for the National 
Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) may find themselves having to respond by 
written testimony to hearings held on consumer safety when they are not formally 
included as witnesses.  They may feel compelled even if this is not a priority issue for the 
NFIB because they need to show their member businesses they are active on consumer 
safety care issues.  Absent that activity, they may be seen as negligent in their jobs or not 
as effective as other lobbyists.  Submitting written testimony is then a symbolic act.  
Other types of interest groups such as businesses, membership groups and trade unions 
likely also face such pressures, needing to demonstrate legislative activity to the many 
small business that pay yearly membership fees to the group.  It is likely no one scenario 
describes the activities of all interest groups but rather each of the three scenarios is 
relevant in explaining interest group activity on written testimony.   
 Money is always a central consideration in American politics; therefore it is 
helpful to look at which types of interest groups are making PAC contributions.  Table 21 
shows this.  Unions, as might be expected, as a share of their total population, have much 
more active PACs than trade associations, businesses or membership groups.  The other 
types of groups not included in the table make absolutely no contributions at all: federal 
government, state & local government, think tanks, colleges/universities, coalitions and 
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churches.  Of all the groups in the influence sample, only 17.8% of them get involved in 
elections by making PAC contributions.  While the large amounts of money some of 
these interest groups spend always gain media attention, as a whole most groups refrain 
from giving money to candidates. 
 
 
Table 21: Percentage of Each Type of Interest Group Making PAC Contributions in 
the Influence Sample 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Type of Group  # of Groups  % Making PAC Contributions 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Union      58     60.3 
Trade Association  848     35.1 
Business   576     24.8 
Membership   423       5.4 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Overall             2834     17.8 
 
   
The heart of the research here is whether interest groups are able to influence 
policy through their testimony.  In Chapter 4 we learned that of all the testimony 
recommending some change in the legislation, less than 5% of the recommendations 
were incorporated in the markup34.  This is a low percentage as 73% of all testimony 
requests real changes in the legislation.  These are changes to the legislation; this a 
narrow definition of interest group success used in this research.  These are 
recommendations seeking to make real changes to the legislation either by adding 
amendments or by deleting clauses.  This does not incorporate the broader definition of 
 
34 The 5% refers to all recommendations made in this analysis and accepted of all the testimony I coded.  
After I randomly selected a set of recommendations to be included in this analysis, the number of 
observations drops from 13,177 to 4257.  Of those, 253 or 5.9% of them were included in the bill markup. 
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interest group success which also includes testimony supporting the current form of the 
legislation, be it a specific clause or the bill as a whole.  With the broader definition, 
interest group success is higher since in many cases it requires no action on the part of the 
committee or subcommittee members. 
In this chapter, the analyses begin with the broader definition of interest group 
success.  The success rate in these terms is 34.6%.  Although I begin with the more 
broadly defined dependent variable, I will later in the chapter use a model with the 
narrower definition of success as the comparison of the results is informative. 
Table 22 reveals what type of groups were successful in getting recommendations 
into the bill markups, using the narrow definition of success.   
 
 
Table 22: Groups that Successfully Made Recommendations by Type 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Type     Number of Successful Changes Success Rate 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Think Tank        4             11.1% 
State & Local Government    25    8.1% 
College / University       7    7.5% 
Federal Government     34    7.3% 
Coalition      11    7.2% 
Membership      32    6.2% 
Trade Association     55    5.6% 
Business      36    4.7% 
Churches        0    0.0% 
Foreign Government       0    0.0% 
Unions         0    0.0% 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
  159  
    
As a percentage of attempts to change policy through testimony, think tanks are 
most successful while trade associations and businesses are significantly less so.  Think 
tanks are a unique type of interest group in that they focus all of their energy and 
resources on researching policy and, based on that research, make policy 
recommendations.  It is not unusual for think tanks to be a source of policy alternatives 
that are debated in Congress.  Colleges and universities also are near the top of the charts 
and this again relates to the credibility of the research being conducted in various policy 
areas, only in this case it is being conducted by academics. 
Federal government ranks fourth in terms of success rate.  Looking more closely 
at which agencies within federal government are successful, it is interesting as one 
agency is disproportionately more successful than others: the Army Corps of Engineers.  
Consulting Appendix B which lists the interest groups successful in getting their changes 
incorporated in the bill markup, the Army Corps was successful on 23 recommended 
changes.  This testimony was technical in nature, rather than political and often on 
regulatory policy.  It should come as no surprise the expert testimony from the Army 
Corps is not only valued, but influential. 
 Those who contend that business has an unfair advantage over other interests 
because of the resources at their disposal find limited support in this data.  Often times 
these critics envision business interests to be the large corporate conglomerates; they 
forget that many businesses are small, independent enterprises.  While American 
Airlines, Bank of America and Citigroup are all represented in the sample, many more 
businesses are not large corporations.  For example, in the sample you will also find A. 
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Duda & Sons, County State Bank of Miller, South Dakota, JK Creative Printers and Lehn 
& Fink Products.  Even if the picture consisted of businesses whose size gives them an 
advantage (resource-wise) over other types of groups, increasingly there is more support 
being found that the reason they have to expend so many resources lobbying is because 
policy is not favorable to their interests (Kamieniecki 2006).  If businesses were truly 
advantaged they would not have to expend so many resources lobbying, in fact they 
would not require a business presence at all.   
 Labor unions similarly are deemed to have an unfair lobbying advantage because 
of the large amounts of money they contribute in elections.  During the 2003-04 election 
cycle three of the top ten PACs represented labor unions.  The Laborers Union 
contributed $2.7 million, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) 
spent $2.4 million in contributions and the United Auto Workers gave $2.1 million.  
Similar patterns of giving are found each election year.  With such large amounts of 
money being spent, conventional wisdom suggests they must be receiving influence in 
exchange.  Yet the data do not support this claim.  Labor unions were worse off than 
businesses when it comes to being able to use congressional testimony to force change; 
they were not able to get a single recommended change incorporated into bill markups.   
The popular view that those interest groups with more resources will be more 
successful in their lobbying efforts than other groups is one of many hypotheses that will 
be tested in the influence model.  Certainly this research is only looking at a narrow range 
of influence - within House congressional committees via hearing testimony.  However, 
  161  
    
results from this research contribute to our understanding of interest group influence 
more broadly.  The next section lays out the hypotheses. 
 
Hypotheses for the Influence Model 
The congressional literature suggests the source of influence in committees 
emanates from congressional leadership, from parties or from individual preferences.  
Variables designed to incorporate these elements are included in this analysis and are 
classified as partisan affinity, ideological extremism or chair influence.  Ideally this 
research would test the competing theories of committee power, but there are several 
barriers preventing this.   
 
Table 23: Congressional Quarterly’s Party Unity Scores for Each Party 
within the House of Representatives for the 103rd, 106th and 108th Sessions 
Year   Republicans  Democrats 
103rd 1993   84    85 
 1994   83    83 
 
106th 1999   86    83 
 2000   88    82 
  
108th 2003   91    87 
 2004   88    86 
 
 
 
First, as was the case in the access model, all the House sessions under 
observation are aptly described as conditional party government.  The Republican 
takeover of the House in 1994 did not prompt strong party loyalties and division between 
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parties.  That environment existed even when the Democrats had control.  Similarly, the 
party cartel model can describe all periods in this sample.  The Republican leadership, 
although very sharp and resourceful, did not create the art of using House procedure to 
wrest advantages for their party.  They learned how to do that from their masterful 
predecessors.  Referring to the Democratic Speaker Jim Wright (1987-1989), 
congressional observers Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein write: “On major bills, 
Democrats took to using special rules that restricted debate, disallowed most 
amendments, and provided blanket waivers against points of order.  On key legislation, 
especially if there was any Republican alternative brewing, Wright has a hand in crafting 
the rules strategy” (Mann & Ornstein, 2006).  All sessions of the House used in this study 
meet the standards of conditional party government and the party cartel model.35  Table 
6.5 shows the party unity scores for these sessions.  Without significant variance among 
the sessions in party unity, the conditional government model cannot be tested.  Although 
the conditional party government cannot be directly tested, party affinity measures are 
included.  The party affinity measures speak more directly to normative concerns being 
addressed in this research. 
The second obstacle to testing the committee power theories is the inability to 
code the interest groups according to their party preferences.  While we know that labor 
unions align nicely with the Democratic Party and oil interests with the Republican Party, 
there is no classification or scale to apply the vast majority of groups that seemingly have 
no preference.  For example, how would you classify the America Outdoors Association, 
 
35 This was confirmed by David Rohde in a conversation we had at the Midwest Political Science 
Association’s annual meeting in Chicago, Illinois in April, 2008. 
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the National Community Capital Association, Investor-Owned Utilities of the Northwest 
or even Citigroup?  Citigroup, a major banking corporation, might be categorized by 
some as a Republican interest.  However, looking at their PAC contributions, they have 
contributed almost equal amounts of money to Democrats and Republicans.   
Even though the competing committee power theories cannot be tested against 
each other they are instructive in indicating what are likely to be the important variables.  
Measures of partisan affinity, ideological extremism and chair influence are all expected 
to impact interest group success.  While there are no specific measures for partisanship 
for all groups, I will be testing to see whether business is generally advantaged by 
Republican control and whether labor unions receive special treatment under Democratic 
control.   
H1: Partisan affinity, as measured by businesses during Republican controlled 
Houses, will be positively related to the likelihood an interest group’s 
recommended change is included in the bill markup. 
 
H2: Partisan affinity, as measured by labor unions during a Democratic 
controlled House, will be positively related to the likelihood an interest group’s 
recommended change is included in the bill markup. 
 
A variable measuring the level of partisanship is included in the analysis because 
of its theoretical importance.  Although interest groups cannot be measured in terms of 
their partisanship, the committees and subcommittees can.  Stronger partisans in 
Congress are more likely to favor groups aligned with their party only, and not all interest 
groups more generally.  Because of this, a negative relationship between the level of 
partisanship within a committee or subcommittee and the likelihood of success is 
expected.  
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H3: Partisan affinity, as measured by the level of partisanship within a committee 
or subcommittee, will be negatively related to the likelihood an interest group’s 
recommended change is included in the bill markup. 
 
 Even though all sessions of Congress in this study are party dominated, the 
Interest Group Impact theory posits chairs are still able to maintain some autonomy and 
influence some decisions.  Their influence will be felt both through their ideological 
preferences and their positions as committee and subcommittee chairs.  Ideologically 
extreme committees and subcommittees are expected to use their hearings to showcase 
support for their positions.  This being the case, they will not only invite “friendly” 
interests to testify, but should any recommended changes be made, they will not be 
heeded.  The less extreme the committee or subcommittee is in its ideology (the closer 
their ideology is to the House mean ideology) the more willing they will be to consider 
witness testimony and allow it to influence their legislative markups.   
H4: Ideological extremism, as measured by the ideology of the committee or 
subcommittee, will be negatively related to the likelihood that an interest group’s 
recommended change will be included in the bill markup. 
 
 Just as more tenured House members who served as chairs are predicted to be 
more exclusive with their witness lists, they are predicted to be more unwilling to allow a 
group’s testimony to influence bill markups.  Again this is because older members are 
expected to be less dependent on interest groups for their informational needs.  Newer 
House members who are still learning about the policy under their committee or 
subcommittee’s jurisdiction will be more open to the suggestions of interest groups as 
they provide much needed policy input.  Although every committee or subcommittee 
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member has a vote on markups, it is expected that the chair is able to influence the votes 
of at least his or her own party which would constitute a majority. 
H5: Chair influence, as measured by the number of years a chair has been a 
House member, will be negatively related to the likelihood an interest group’s 
recommended change will be included in the bill markup. 
 
In addition to the measures just discussed, dummy variables indicating the parent 
committees are included as is a variable indicating whether the policy under 
consideration is regulatory in nature.  The committee dummy variables will serve as both 
control measures in this pooled time-series analysis as well as variables to test for the 
independent effects of the committees on interest group influence.  The variable 
measuring the type of policy is included since the classic iron triangle literature relates to 
distributive policy not regulatory policy.  Therefore it would be expected privileged 
interest groups would likely have influence over distributive policy. 
The second set of variables is designed to test for interest group resources, Interest 
group legitimacy and political influence.  All of these factors are theorized to have a 
positive influence on interest group success.      
Interest group resources are measured by the membership size and budget of an 
interest group, and by the number of internal and external lobbyists an interest group has. 
Interest groups with more resources are expected to have greater influence and as such, a 
greater chance at getting their recommendations into the bill markup.   
H6: Interest group resources, as measured by the membership size and budget of 
an interest group, will be positively related to an interest’s likelihood of having its 
requested change included in the bill markup. 
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H7: Interest group resources, as measured by the number of contract lobbyists 
and lobbyists on staff, will be positively related to the likelihood that an interest 
group’s requested change will be included in the bill markup.  
 
 According to the Interest Group Impact theory, the function of interest groups in 
committees is to provide information.  The currency of interest groups is the information 
they possess.  But only groups that have reliable, credible, and useful information will 
develop a good reputation.  Only legitimate groups will gain access to lawmakers and 
have the ability to influence legislation.  Interest group legitimacy is measured by how 
often an organization is mentioned in the New York Times and Washington Post in the 
two years prior to the hearing.  It is also measured by how long the interest group has 
existed.  Both measures of legitimacy are expected to positively impact interest group 
influence. 
H8: Interest group visibility, as measured by the number of media mentions an 
interest group receives, will be positively related to the likelihood its requested 
change will be included in the bill markup. 
  
H9: Interest group visibility, as measured by the age of an interest group, will be 
positively related to the likelihood an interest’s requested change is included in 
the bill markup. 
 
 There is enough anecdotal and empirical evidence to suggest political influence in 
the form of PAC contributions will be positively related to interest group success.  
Interest groups contribute money to those individuals who hold positions of consequence 
to groups.  For example, it is not uncommon for committee and subcommittee chairs to 
receive more contributions than other members simply because they hold a position of 
influence.  One of the findings of the access model tested in chapter five is the greater 
likelihood of committee and subcommittee chairs to grant access to interest groups that 
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had given them campaign contributions.  I expect contributions would also grant them a 
greater likelihood of influence over bill markups.  There is also the possibility of 
members of Congress voting in favor of interest groups (or their policy 
recommendations) that do regularly make campaign contributions in the hopes of 
attracting contributions for themselves in future elections. 
H10: Political influence, as measured by an interest group’s PAC contributions to 
House members, will be positively related to the likelihood its requested change 
will be included in the bill markup. 
 
H11: Political influence, as measured by an interest group’s PAC contributions to 
members sitting on the committee holding the markup, will be positively related to 
the likelihood its requested change will be included in the bill markup. 
 
H12: Political influence, as measured by an interest group’s PAC contributions to 
the chair of the committee holding the markup, will be positively related to the 
likelihood its requested change will be included in the bill markup. 
 
 Just as was hypothesized in the Chapter 5, the politics of making distributive 
policy is expected to be different from regulatory policy.  Theoretically, distributive 
policy is made in policy subgovernments.  Understanding access into the committee or 
subcommittee hearing comes first, it follows that interest groups included in hearings on 
distributive policy are more likely to influence the legislation than they would if they 
were testifying on regulatory policy.  This is because there are many more actors 
involved in regulatory policy consideration and so the likelihood of any one group having 
influence is diminished. 
 
H13: Regulatory policy arena, as measured by regulatory policy, will be 
negatively related to the likelihood an interest group’s requested change is 
included in the bill markup. 
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 The preceding thirteen hypotheses test the Interest Group Impact theory as 
applied to the influence model.  Any support for the hypotheses will in turn support the 
Interest Group Impact theory which has already been supported by the access model. 
 
Results 
 Logistic regression is applied to the influence model.  A series of logistic 
regressions was run with each progressive run testing a separate set of variables or adding 
another set to the model.  The benefit of proceeding in such a manner is being able to 
compare the models with each added set of variables.  It also enables a comparison fit of 
the model with only interest group variables against a model with only the chair and 
committee and subcommittee variables.  The last series of regressions tests the model for 
each session of Congress under consideration: 103rd (1993-94), 106th (1999-00) and 108th 
(2003-04).   
 
Logistic Regression with Only Committee Variables 
 The first regression analysis tests the variables which measure committee 
conditions, specifically partisan affinity, ideological extremism, and chair influence. The 
results are shown in Table 24.  One measure of partisan affinity, ratio maj:min, is 
significant as are both measures of ideological extremism and chair influence.  The ratio 
of seats held by the majority party as compared to the minority party is negatively related 
to the predicted probability of interest group impact.  Committees or subcommittees 
where the majority party has a higher proportion of seats as compared to the majority 
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party are less likely to include interest group’s recommended changes in their bill 
markups.  Interest groups will face difficulties when testifying before more ideologically 
extreme committees and subcommittees.   They will also have a lower probability of 
influence when they testify before committees and subcommittees chaired by more 
tenured members of the House.  The overall fit of this regression is 0.0065, so while 
several of the variables are carrying a statistical influence there is a lot of variance in 
whether interest group testimony is included in the bill markup that is still unexplained. 
 
Table 24: Probability an Interest Group’s Recommended Change is Included in the 
Bill Markup with Committee Variables Only  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable  Coefficient  Odds Ratio Std. Error z P > |z| 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Partisanship            -0.008              0.992  0.010            -0.82 .410 
Ratio Maj : Min       -0.470            0.625  0.108            -4.34 .000 
Ideology            -0.693            0.500  0.166            -4.16 .000 
Tenure            -0.029             0.971  0.010            -2.97 .003 
Constant  0.548    0.172  3.19 .001 
________________________________________________________________________ 
N = 4257 Prob > chi2 = 0.000  Pseudo R2 = .0065  
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Logistic Regression with only Interest Group Variables 
 
Table 25: Probability an Interest Group’s Recommended Change is Included in the 
Bill Markup with Interest Group Variables Only  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable   Coefficient Odds Ratio Std.Error z P > |z| 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Members (log)           -0.028  0.973  0.033            -0.84 .399 
Budget (log)  0.035             1.036  0.033             1.06 .290 
Hired Guns            -0.059             0.942  0.031            -1.93 .053 
Own Lobbyists 0.042             1.043  0.019             2.21 .027 
Media (log)            -0.044               0.957  0.023            -1.96 .050 
Age (log)  0.154             1.167  0.154  1.00 .317 
House PAC (log) 0.018  1.018  0.038             0.46 .643  
Chair PAC (log) 0.054  1.055  0.042  1.27 .204 
Com PAC (log)          -0.175             0.839  0.168            -1.04 .299 
ComMaj PAC (log) 0.092  1.097  0.169  0.55 .585 
Constant            -3.468    0.689              -5.03  .000 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
N=1735    Prob >chi2 = 0.0194  Pseudo R2 = .0234 
  
The next regression analysis tests variables based on characteristics of the interest 
group, specifically interest group resources, interest group legitimacy and political 
influence.  The results are found in Table 25.  Most of the results are not significant.  
However, one measure of interest group resources and another of interest group visibility 
are statistically significant.  The predicted probability of interest group success is 
positively related to the number of lobbyists it has on staff.  Also the predicted 
probability of interest group success is negatively related to the number of contract 
lobbyists it hires.  This disparity is due to the difference in these two types of lobbyists.  
Staff lobbyists work only for the organization that employs them.  Typically they are 
hired for their policy expertise or are able to develop it by working for the interest group 
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over a number of years.  Contract lobbyists however tend to get hired not for their policy 
expertise but rather for their knowledge of how the policy making process works or for 
the relationships they have with policy makers.  If interest groups are being invited to 
share their expertise in committee and subcommittee hearings, then it makes sense that 
law makers are more willing to accept the advice of interest groups who have more staff 
lobbyists.  The number of staff lobbyists serves, in this capacity, as a signal to the 
legislators about the quality of information being presented.  Interest groups that have a 
tendency to rely on hired lobbyists are perceived as having lower quality policy 
information.   
The other statistically significant variable is media.  This is a measure of interest 
group legitimacy.  However, contrary to what is expected, there is a negative relationship 
with the probability of interest group success.  The more frequently the media mentions 
the interest group, the less likely it will succeed in getting its recommendation into the 
markup.  It is plausible that groups who are more frequently being mentioned in the 
media are attracting that attention because they lobby on a wide range of issues, not just 
the one in my data set.  If this is the case, law makers may be more resistant to 
incorporate their information than they would be to include the recommendations of an 
interest group whose sole focus was the policy at hand.   
The number of observations in the model in Table 25 is comparatively low with 
only 1,735 cases.  The low number of observations is due to a number of missing data for 
the budget variable.  In order to increase the number of observations, budget will be 
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dropped.  Eliminating this variable adds 898 observations36.  This variable is not included 
in any of the remaining regressions.  The regression is rerun without budget with results 
shown in Table 26. 
 
Table 26: Probability an Interest Group’s Recommended Change is Included in the 
Bill Markup with Interest Group Variables Only (dropping budget) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable   Coefficient Odds Ratio Std. Error z P > |z| 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Members (log)           -0.031             0.969  0.024            -1.27 .205 
Hired Guns            -0.053             0.948  0.024            -2.16 .031 
Own Lobbyists 0.031             1.032  0.015             2.14 .032 
Media (log)            -0.012             0.988  0.015              -0.80 .426 
Age (log)             0.154             1.167  0.138  1.30 .193 
House PAC (log)       -0.093             0.911  0.023            -3.67 .000 
Chair PAC (log)          -0.016             0.984  0.023            -0.66 .510  
Com PAC (log) 0.079  1.082  0.058             1.47 .141 
MajCom PAC (log) 0006             1.006  0.050  0.12 .905 
Constant            -3.031    0.489            -6.20 .000 
______________________________________________________________________ 
N=2633 Prob >chi2 = 0.0005  Pseudo R2 = .0220 
 
 
 
In this model, both hired guns and own lobbyists are carrying a statistical 
influence in the same direction as the previous regression.  Media is no longer 
statistically significant but one measure of political influence: House contributions.  The 
relationship between PAC contributions made to House members and the probability of 
success is negative though, contrary to what was expected.  Possibly again, the perception 
is that the larger groups who are giving vast contributions to all members are not 
providing as high quality information as groups who are solely focused on providing 
 
36 The budget variable, where I was forced to include business revenues as a proxy for membership group 
budgets, is perhaps not the most valid measure in any case and so dropping it is not problematic. 
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information to committee or subcommittee.  Members is another variable with a number 
of missing data as is shown in Table 26.  Dropping members from the model adds another 
1682 observations.  Table 27 reveals the results of this final limited model with only 
interest group variables.   
 
 
 
Table 27: Probability an Interest Group’s Recommended Change is Included in the 
Bill Markup with Interest Group Variables Only (dropping budget & members) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable   Coefficient Odds Ratio Std. Error z P > |z|  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Hired Guns            -0.000             1.000  0.005            -0.02 .988  
Own Lobbyists 0.009             1.009  0.006             1.42 .156 
Media (log)  0.006             1.006  0.007             0.97 .334 
Age (log)  0.184             1.203  0.053             4.16 .000 
House PAC (log) 0.006             1.006  0.012             0.56 .577 
Chair PAC (log)       -0.022             0.978  0.009            -2.43 .015 
Comm PAC (log)        -0.039             0.962  0.020            -1.87 .061   
MajCom PAC (log)    0.041  1.042  0.019  2.26 .024 
Constant            -1.474    0.187            -7.89 .000 
______________________________________________________________________ 
N=4315     Prob >chi2 = 0.0000  Pseudo R2 = .0067 
 
 
 
This regression reveals statistical significance for one measure of interest group 
legitimacy and two measures of political influence.  Age is positively related to the 
likelihood the interest group’s recommendation will be incorporated in the bill markup.  
The older a group is, the more likely it will see success.  Looking at political influence, 
House PAC is no longer statistically significant, but contributions made to the committee 
or subcommittee chair as well as to the majority party members of the committee or 
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subcommittee are.  But to confuse things, making a contribution to the chair is negatively 
related to interest group influence whereas contributions made to majority party members 
seated on the committee or subcommittee is positively related.   
These results are contradictory almost.  To be sure these results are not being 
offset by any problems with the model specification the variables have been tested for 
multicollinearity using the Collin test in STATA.  The resultant VIF values for the 
political influence variables do indicate multicollinearity.   To alleviate this problem, the 
only measures of political influence to be kept in the model are chair PAC and comm 
PAC.  Table 28 reveals the results of the corrected model. 
 
Table 28: Probability an Interest Group’s Recommended Change is Included in the 
Bill Markup with Interest Group Variables Only (dropping budget & members, 
corrected) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable   Coefficient Odds Ratio Std. Error z P > |z|  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Hired Guns            -0.000             1.000  0.005            -0.01 .991  
Own Lobbyists 0.010             1.010  0.006             1.64 .101 
Media (log)  0.006             1.006  0.006             0.91 .361 
Age (log)  0.185             1.204  0.044             4.18 .000 
Chair PAC (log)       -0.017             0.983  0.009            -1.96 .050 
Comm PAC (log)        0.003             1.003  0.007             0.43 .668   
Constant            -1.484    0.187            -7.95 .000 
______________________________________________________________________ 
N=4315     Prob >chi2 = 0.0000  Pseudo R2 = .0057 
 
 
The model is better specified but the counterintuitive relationship between chair 
PAC and influence remains.  This is not the fully specified model and it remains to be 
seen whether this relationship will persist and maintain significance.  At this stage, 
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preliminary speculation is reluctance on the part of any chair to be engaging in any type 
of behavior which might be construed as “vote buying.”  While it is not necessarily the 
case that a chair who receives money from an interest group and then yields them 
influence on a committee markup is engaging in any unethical behavior, the appearance 
may lead others to think otherwise.  If this is the case, the negative relationship between 
chair PAC and the likelihood of getting a recommendation included in the bill markup is 
logical. 
The other significant variable is age, which is positively related to interest group 
success.  Older, more established groups are more likely to get their recommendations 
marked up into the bill.  Political visibility comes with age and experience. 
 
Logistic Regression with Committee and Interest Group Variables 
The next model combines the interest group variables and committee and chair 
variables.  It also includes dummy variables to measure the parent committee for the 
committees and subcommittees used in the research sample.  For example, the 
Agriculture Subcommittees on Livestock and Horticulture are both measured by their 
parent Agriculture Committee.  The Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on 
Aviation is measured as a Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.37  The results of 
this fully specified model are shown in Table 29.  In addition, dummy variables 
representing the type of interest group and the session of Congress are included to control 
 
37 This is done since many subcommittees have no instances of accepting an interest group’s 
recommended change and were predicting failure perfectly.  When this occurs, STATA drops them.  There 
were also many subcommittees being dropped due to correlation with one another.  Using the parent 
committees for the dummy variables resolved this issue. 
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for the effects they may exert in a pooled time-series analysis.  Lastly, a variable to 
measure whether the testimony is submitted in writing (rather than in person) is added. 
 
 
Table 29: Probability an Interest Group’s Recommended Change is Included in the 
Bill Markup  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable  Coefficient Odds Ratio Std. Error z P > |z| 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Partisanship            -0.071  0.931  0.014            -4.96 .000 
Ratio Maj : Min 0.740  2.096               0.357             2.07 .038 
Ideology            -0.774             0.461  0.236              -3.28 .001 
Tenure             -0.016              0.984  0.015              -1.11 .269 
Regulatory  0.445  1.560  0.084  5.31 .000 
Hired Guns            -0.004             0.996  0.005            -0.73 .463   
Own Lobbyists 0.011             1.011  0.007             1.59 .111 
Media (log)  0.003               1.003  0.008           0.44 .661 
Age (log)  0.153             1.165  0.048             3.17 .002 
Chair PAC (log)         -0.007             0.993  0.009            -0.73 .463 
Comm PAC (log) 0.003             1.003  0.008             0.39 .693 
Business  0.011             1.011  0.137   0.08 .934   
Trade Assn  0.079             1.082  0.112               0.70 .481   
Membership            -0.208             0.812  0.131            -1.59 .113   
Fed Govt  0.163             1.177  0.130             1.26 .209 
Union              -1.216             0.297  0.327            -3.72 .000 
Agriculture            -1.004             0.366  0.173            -5.80 .000   
Banking            -0.554             0.575  0.161            -3.44 .001    
Commerce             -0.701             0.496  0.162            -4.31 .000   
Resources            -1.579               0.206  0.209              -7.56 .000 
Transportation         -0.793               0.452  0.168            -4.72 .000 
106th   0.370             1.447  0.207             1.79 .074 
108th   0.307             1.360  0.215             1.43 .152  
Submitted            -0.098             0.907  0.091            -1.07 .283 
Constant            -1.394    0.758            -1.84 .066 
________________________________________________________________________ 
N = 4311 Prob > chi2 = 0.000  Pseudo R2 = .0337  
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 This model confirms the importance of partisanship.  The more partisan a 
committee or subcommittee, the less likely an interest group is to get its recommendation 
included in the bill markup.  The mean level of partisanship for all committees and 
subcommittees in the sample is 3.526.  The predicted probability of an interest group 
having its recommendation taken, with all other variables set at their mean values is 
0.184.  The predicted probability at the mean partisanship level during for businesses is 
0.186 and the odds rise to 0.195 for trade associations.  Membership groups face a 0.157 
probability of success at mean levels of partisanship and agencies of the federal 
government a probability of 0.208.  Graph 6 shows the predicted probabilities at other 
values of Partisanship using CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg & King 2003). 
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Graph 6a charts the difference in probabilities for various levels of partisanship 
while testifying before the various groups of committees.  
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Graph 6a: Predicted Probability of Interest Group Impact
 
The other measure of partisan affinity is also revealing a statistically significant, 
but positive relationship with interest group influence.  Unlike with partisanship, the 
greater the number of majority party members seated on a committee or subcommittee to 
minority party members, the greater the likelihood an interest group will get its 
recommendation included in the markup.  Graph 7 illustrates the relationship between 
this ratio of seats and the predicted probability of interest group success.  The predicted 
probability of interest group influence for a business group testifying before a committee 
or subcommittee with the mean ratio of seats is 0.115.  The probability under similar 
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circumstance for a trade association is 0.195, 0.157 for membership groups, 0.208 for the 
federal government and only 0.070 for labor unions. 
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Graph 7a shows the predicted probabilities of success for an interest group 
testifying in front of various committees.  Testifying before the Agriculture Committee or 
any of its subcommittees with a mean ratio of seats yields a predicted probability of 
0.077.  The same conditions within the Banking Committee or any of its subcommittees 
give a probability of 0.115.  The predicted probability before Commerce with a mean 
ratio or majority party to minority party seats is 0.1015, and before Transportation is 
0.093. 
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Ideological extremism also has an impact; it is negatively related to interest group 
success.  The farther the mean ideology of a committee or subcommittee is from the 
House mean ideology, the more difficult it is for interest group testimony to have an 
impact.  Inputting the mean ideology value of 0.341 yields a predicted probability of 
0.1843 for interest group success for businesses, holding all other variables at their 
means.  The predicted probabilities for trade associations, membership group, the federal 
government and labor unions testifying before committees or subcommittees with a mean 
value of ideology is 0.192, 0.155, 0.204 and 0.067 respectively.  These probabilities are 
shown in Graph 8.  
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 Graph 8a depicts the predicted probabilities of interest group impact by the type 
of committee or subcommittee to which they are testifying.  Testifying before the 
Agriculture Committee or any of its subcommittees that have a mean value ideology 
yields a predicted probability 0.026.  On the other extreme it is easier to be successful if 
testifying before a Banking committee or subcommittee with a mean value of ideology as 
that yields a predicted probability of 0.039.  But note that difference between the two 
predicted probabilities is slight, as they are for all the variables. 
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Chair influence is not supported by the statistical model as tenure is not 
statistically significant.  However, all of the dummy variables for the committees (and 
their subcommittees) are statistically significant and reveal negative relationships with 
interest group success.  The Committee on Natural Resources and its subcommittees were 
not included in the regression model and serve as the base. 
Interest group legitimacy also finds support in this model, although interest group 
resources and political influence do not.  Looking at interest group legitimacy, one 
variable, age, is positively related to the probability of interest group success.  At the 
mean value of age, which is 70 years old (interest groups founded in 1938), the 
probability of success for business groups is 0.332.  For trade associations of the mean 
age, the probability is 0.347 and it is 0.291, 0.362 and 0.143 for membership groups, 
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federal government agencies and labor unions respectively.  These probabilities along 
with those for other values of age are depicted in Graph 9.  
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The predicted probabilities for interest group impact, testifying before the various 
committees and subcommittees are charted in Graph 9a.  It is, once again slightly easier 
for a group to have its recommendation included in the bill markup if it is testifying 
before the Banking Committee or any of its subcommittees and slightly more difficult 
testifying before Agriculture.  Note also in terms of the number of years it takes to 
become a legitimate interest, the data show most of the impact comes within the first 50 
years of an organization’s existence, beyond that each additional year adds little more. 
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 The dummy variable measuring whether a bill is regulatory in nature also carries 
a statistical influence.  Interest groups are much more likely to see their recommendations 
included in the bill markup if they are testifying on regulatory policy.  This likely is the 
case because the information they are providing in testimony is more technical in nature.  
For example, testifying on the Interstate Banking and Branching Act of 1994, Arthur 
Wilmarth of George Washington University recommended in testimony the prohibition 
of any bank from holding more than 10% of the total deposits held by insured depository 
institutions in the US, or from holding more than 25-30% of the total deposits held by 
such institutions in any state.  He justifies his recommendation in testimony.  Similarly, 
in his testimony on the Comprehensive One-Call Notification Act of 1994, Walter Garner 
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of the National Utility Contractors Association urges the committee to consider an 
additional program element whereby the states would establish guidelines requiring 
facility operators to ensure that new underground construction and installations can be 
reasonably located at a later date as built.  The recommendation was technical.  Technical 
information in the form of a policy recommendation plausibly has a better chance of 
impacting bill markups.  
 Before proceeding to the last analyses, I would like to look at the preceding 
regression analyses, but with the narrower definition of influence.  All of the influence 
models have been examined using all of those recommendations that were supported by 
the subsequent bill markups, whether they were seeking changes or whether they testified 
in support of already existing portions of the bill.  Recommendations accepted using this 
definition comprise 34.6% of the observations.  Based on our understanding of influence, 
particularly as it is conceptualized by Cox and McCubbins (1993) in relation to negative 
agenda control, it is exerted both offensively and defensively.  The results restricting 
influence to explicitly changing some part of the bill are presented in Table 30.  Using 
this narrower definition of impact, only 4.3% of the recommendations are incorporated in 
the bill markups.  The results present some interesting changes.  
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Table 30: Probability an Interest Group’s Recommended Change is Included in the 
Bill Markup (narrower definition of impact) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable  Coefficient Odds Ratio Std. Error z P > |z| 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Partisanship  -0.130             0.878  0.035            -3.77 .000 
Ratio Maj : Min -1.746              0.174  0.848            -2.06 .040 
Ideology  -1.328             0.265  0.548              -2.42 .015 
Tenure  -0.144              0.866  0.032              -4.53 .000 
Regulatory              0.188  1.207  0.191  0.99 .324 
Hired Guns  -0.050             0.952  0.024            -2.07 .038   
Own Lobbyists -0.010             0.990  0.018            -0.53 .593 
Media (log)  -0.012              0.988  0.016            -0.74 .459 
Age (log)  -0.013             0.987  0.107            -0.13 .900 
Chair PAC (log)  0.010  1.010  0.025             0.42 .672 
Comm PAC (log)  0.001             1.001  0.020             0.04 .968 
Business  -0.219             0.803  0.283            -0.78 .438   
Trade Assn  -0.517             0.596  0.226              -2.28 .022    
Membership  -0.219             0.803  0.264            -0.83 .406   
Fed Govt  -0.368  0.692  0.273            -1.35 .178 
Union    n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a n/a 
Agriculture  -2.141              0.118  0.401            -5.33 .000   
Banking  -1.985             0.137  0.405            -4.90 .000    
Commerce   -1.155             0.315  0.383            -3.02 .003   
Resources  -2.185              0.060  0.660              -4.27 .000 
Transportation -2.160              0.115  0.407            -5.30 .000 
106th   -1.726             0.178  0.481            -3.59 .000 
108th   -2.891             0.056  0.538            -5.38 .000  
Submitted   0.093   1.097  0.190             0.49 .626 
Constant   4.876    1.750  2.79 .005 
________________________________________________________________________ 
N = 4213 Prob > chi2 = 0.000  Pseudo R2 = .0891  
 
 
First, the direction of the relationship between the ratio of majority party members 
to minority party members seated on a committee or subcommittee and interest group 
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impact changes.  Here the relationship is negative, indicating it is easier for interest 
groups to set their policy in committees where the margin of seats between the majority 
party and minority party is slimmer.  It could be that for highly politicized bills on highly 
politicized committees, interest groups that are aligned ideologically with the majority 
party are more likely to offer testimony seeking to preserve the bill in its original form as 
it heads into markup, and then in markup their position prevails.  While on the other 
hand, interest groups seeking to change the bill in its original form have a more difficult 
time gaining votes from the majority party members on a committee or subcommittee; 
they are more likely to prevail when the committee seats are more evenly distributed. 
The other interesting change when defining the dependent variable more narrowly 
is the appearance of tenure as being statistically relevant.  The more senior chairs in the 
House are less likely to yield influence to interest group recommendations when the 
group is trying to change the bill.  This is what is expected.  Over time members in the 
House gain policy expertise through committee work.  Individuals who have more years 
of service likely have more expertise and therefore are reluctant to change bills they 
likely had a hand in creating.  This variable wouldn’t impact the more broadly defined 
dependent variable because chairs want interest groups to testify in support of their bills. 
The political resource of contract lobbyists also impacts the likelihood of success 
with the narrower dependent variable.  There is a negative relationship between the 
number of contract lobbyists hired, and the group’s ability to change the bill.  Committee 
members likely identify the presence of contract lobbyists as partially a political ploy and 
partially as a signal to the salience of the issue at hand.  While most of the work 
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occurring in committee goes unnoticed, this is not true of political and salient issues.  It 
seems reasonable that committee and subcommittee members would be more reluctant to 
incorporate an interest group’s recommendations under these conditions.  Although the 
change would please the group it would likely not please others and members of 
Congress are careful with their votes when the issue is politicized. 
The only other difference between the two regression models is that interest group 
legitimacy as measured by age is supported by the first model but not by the second.   
 
Logistic Regression Comparison by Session of Congress 
The last analysis examines the influence model for each House session separately.  
Since all three sessions operate under the conditional party government model this helps 
to see whether interest group impact operates similarly when the Democrats control the 
House of Representatives as when the Republicans do.  The results of these regressions 
are found in Table 31. 
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Table 31: Probability an Interest Group’s Recommended Change is Included in the 
Bill Markup by Session of Congress (w/submitted, y1) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable  Coefficient Odds Ratio Std. Error z P > |z| 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Democrats (103rd) 
Partisanship  -0.081             0.922  0.023            -3.52 .000 
Ratio Maj : Min -0.698              0.497   0.596            -1.17 .241 
Ideology  -0.982             0.374  0.317              -3.10 .002 
Tenure  -0.073    0.930  0.030              -2.44 .015 
Regulatory   0.414  1.513   0.137   3.03 .002 
Hired Guns  -0.005             0.995  0.011            -0.47 .641   
Own Lobbyists -0.009             0.992   0.011            -0.79 .431 
Media (log)   0.014              1.014   0.013             1.09 .277 
Age (log)   0.204             1.226   0.093             2.20 .028 
Chair PAC (log) -0.003             0.997   0.016            -0.16 .874 
Comm PAC (log) -0.005             0.995  0.013            -0.35 .728 
Business  -0.036             0.965  0.240            -0.15 .881   
Trade Assn   0.197   1.218  0.187               1.05    .292    
Membership   0.193             1.213   0.221             0.87 .382   
Fed govt   0.138  1.148   0.220  0.63 .531 
Union    -1.895             0.150   0.562            -3.37 .001 
Submitted  -0.267             0.766  0.149            -1.79 .074 
Constant   0.695    1.423  0.49 .625 
________________________________________________________________________ 
N = 1747 Prob > chi2 = 0.000  Pseudo R2 = .0493  
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Republicans (106th) 
Partisanship  -0.059             0.942  0.044            -1.34 .181 
Ratio Maj : Min  6.049   423.9  1.501  4.03 .000 
Ideology  -0.514             0.598             0.610              -0.84 .399 
Tenure    0.044             1.045  0.035               1.24 .216 
Regulatory  -0.336             0.715  0.177            -1.90 .058 
Hired Guns   0.004             1.004  0.011             0.35 .728   
Own Lobbyists  0.021             1.021  0.016             1.34 .182 
Media (log)  -0.007              0.993  0.015            -0.49 .621 
Age (log)   0.098             1.103  0.084             1.17 .243 
Chair PAC (log) -0.008             0.992  0.018            -0.43 .669 
Comm PAC (log)  0.001             1.001  0.014             0.05 .958 
Business   0.044             1.045  0.239             0.18 .854   
Trade Assn  -0.178             0.837  0.201              -0.88  .377    
Membership  -0.659             0.517  0.250            -2.64 .008   
Fed govt  -0.059  0.942  0.231            -0.26 .797 
Union    n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a n/a 
Submitted   0.186             0.209  0.174             1.07 .284 
Constant  -7.969    1.872            -4.26 .000  
________________________________________________________________________ 
N = 1165 Prob > chi2 = 0.000  Pseudo R2=0.0290 
 
 
Republicans (108th) 
Partisanship   0.023             1.024  0.023             1.01 .310 
Ratio Maj : Min  0.431              1.539             0.575             0.75 .453 
Ideology   0.269             1.309             0.476               0.57 .572 
Tenure   -0.039              0.962  0.036              -1.07 .284 
Regulatory   0.218             1.243  0.148             1.47 .141 
Hired Guns  -0.009             0.991  0.008            -1.20 .232   
Own Lobbyists  0.021             1.021  0.011  1.95 .051 
Media (log)   0.018              1.018  0.014             1.26 .207 
Age (log)   0.081             1.085  0.079             1.02 .305 
Chair PAC (log) -0.009             0.991  0.017            -0.56 .578 
Comm PAC (log)  0.007             1.007  0.014             0.51 .608 
Business   0.179             1.195  0.242             0.74 .460   
Trade Assn   0.312             1.366  0.195               1.60    .109    
Membership  -0.351             0.704  0.221            -1.59 .112   
Fed govt   0.381             1.464  0.229             1.67 .096 
Union    -0.366             0.693  0.493            -0.74 .457 
Submitted  -0.019             0.981  0.157            -0.12 .904 
Constant  -1.658    0.800            -2.07 .038  
________________________________________________________________________ 
N = 1398 Prob > chi2 = 0.000  Pseudo R2 = .0264  
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 Some important differences are gleaned when running the regression for each 
separate session of Congress.  Many of the statistically significant effects are coming 
from the Democratic controlled 103rd House.  There are no variables with statistical 
significance for the 108th session and while the 106th session yields two statistically 
significant variables, ideology and tenure are not statistically significant.  This means 
individual characteristics of the chairs impact the likelihood of interest group success 
under Democratic control, but not under Republican control.  The difference can be 
attributed stronger, more centralized control under Republican leadership which leaves 
little autonomy (or less so than existed under Democratic control) for the chairs.  On the 
other hand, the distribution of seats on a committee between the majority and minority 
party is impacting decisions in the 106th Congress, under Republican control.  Interest 
groups see more success in committees with a greater share of the seats being held by 
Republicans.    
 To understand why the 103rd Congress is revealing statistical relationships and the 
others are not, I examined the percentage of successful recommendations made.  Table 32 
reveals this information.  A greater percentage of changes were successful, using the 
broader definition of the dependent variable, during the 106th and 108th Congresses than 
in the 103rd Congress, but the advantage is slight.  It could be that Republicans, under 
tight party leadership were careful to select supportive interest groups into committee 
hearings and they submitted affirming testimony.  Looking at the rates of success for the 
broader definition and comparing them to the success rates for the narrower definition 
which precludes affirmative testimony, this appears to be the case.    
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Table 32: Percentage of Recommended Changes Accepted by the 103rd, 106th and 
108th Congresses 
________________________________________________________________________ 
  # of Proposed Changes % Accepted  % Accepted 
(broad- y1)   (narrow –y2) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
103rd    2563    30.0%   5.9% 
106th    1690    37.4%   3.7%  
108th    1865    38.3%   2.5%  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
            
 Lastly, the regressions for each separate session of Congress enable testing of the 
partisan affinity hypotheses that labor unions would fare better under Democrat 
controlled sessions and businesses under Republicans.  Neither hypothesis is supported 
by the analysis.  Labor unions actually are negatively associated with interest group 
impact under the 103rd Congress which is the exact opposite of what is hypothesized.   
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Table 33: Were the Influence Hypotheses Supported? 
________________________________________________________________________ 
H1: Partisan affinity, as measured by businesses during Republican  No 
controlled Houses, will be positively related to the likelihood an 
interest group’s recommended change is included in the bill markup. 
 
H2: Partisan affinity, as measured by labor unions during a   No 
Democrat controlled House, will be positively related to the 
likelihood an interest group’s recommended change is included 
in the bill markup. 
 
H3: Partisan affinity, as measured by the level of partisanship within   Yes 
a committee or subcommittee, will be negatively related to the  
likelihood an interest group’s recommended change is included in  
the bill markup. 
 
H4: Ideological extremism, as measured by the ideology of committee  Yes 
or subcommittee, will be negatively related to the likelihood an 
interest group’s recommended change is included in the bill markup. 
 
H5: Chair influence, as measured by the number of years a chair  No 
has been a House member, will be negatively related to the  
likelihood of having its requested change included in the bill markup. 
 
H6: Interest group resources, as measured by the membership size and  No 
budget of an interest group, will be positively related to an interest’s  
likelihood of having its requested change included in the bill markup. 
 
H7: Interest group resources, as measured by the number of internal   No 
and external lobbyists,  will be positively related to the likelihood its 
 requested change will be included in the bill markup. 
 
H8: Interest group visibility, as measured by the number of media  No 
mentions an interest group receives, will be positively related to the 
likelihood an interest group’s requested change will be included in 
the bill markup. 
 
H9: Interest group visibility, as measured by the age of an interest  Yes 
group, will be positively related to the likelihood an interest group’s 
change is included in the bill markup. 
 
H10: Political influence, as measured by an interest group’s PAC  No  
contributions to House members, will be positively related to the  
likelihood its requested change will be included in the bill markup. 
 
H11: Political influence, as measured by an interest group’s PAC   No 
contributions to members sitting on the committee holding the markup,  
will be positively related to the likelihood its requested change will be  
included in the bill markup. 
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H12: Political influence, as measured by an interest group’s PAC  No 
contributions to the chair of the committee holding the markup, will be  
positively related to the likelihood its requested change will be  
included in the bill markup. 
 
H13: Regulatory policy arena, as measured by regulatory policy, will be  No – relationship is  
negatively related to the likelihood an interest group’s requested  positive 
change is included in the bill markup. 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 While theoretically the same variables that go into the decision making process of 
whom to invite to congressional hearings should also be pertinent when deciding whether 
to incorporate recommendations made in testimony, the results of the influence model 
show otherwise.  The most telling difference is that when it comes to deciding whether or 
not to incorporate an interest group’s recommendation, interest group resources and 
political influence do not enter into the equation while Democrats or Republicans are in 
control.  Hypotheses six, seven and ten, in Table 6.15 are not supported.  This runs 
counter to conventional wisdom suggesting money is the root of all influence, but is 
consistent with a fair amount of political science literature.  Money will not be influential 
in this particular venue whether it is in the form of PAC contributions, how many 
lobbyists are hired or how large budgets are.  None of the interest group factors affect 
whether or not that group’s testimony will be incorporated in the bill markup. 
 This is somewhat comforting, though.  What the regression results of this 
influence model indicate is there are no statistically significant effects detected by these 
variables.  This means here and there the resources of a group may come into play, but 
not frequently enough to establish a pattern of behavior.  The comfort lies in the 
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suggestion that if there is no discernible pattern in this regard, then committee and 
subcommittee members are listening to and considering testimony and then based on the 
merits of the recommendations, deciding whether or not to follow them. 
 Aiding in the comfort is the positive relationship between age and interest group 
success.  Interest group visibility is partially supported as older groups have an easier 
time impacting bill markups than newer groups, as is seen in the eighth hypothesis.  
Newer groups are not necessarily offering bad advice, but it may take them a bit longer to 
build their reputation on the Hill and for policy makers to perceive them as quality 
information providers.  In an environment where there is little time to research the 
information being offered by interest groups, the age of a group serves as a valuable cue. 
 While most interest group factors do not bear out, several measures of committee 
characteristics do.  First is ideological extremism.  As hypothesized, the fourth hypothesis 
listed in Table 33, there is a negative relationship with the level of ideology of the 
committee or subcommittee.  Extreme ideologues, whether liberal or conservative are 
less willing to allow interest group’s to change the legislation under consideration.  While 
there are a number of interest groups which can be considered ideologically extreme, 
most are more moderate, leaving the likelihood of interest group success negative. 
 One measure of partisan affinity, the level of partisanship within a committee or 
subcommittee is negatively related to the likelihood an interest group will get its 
recommended change into the markup.  This supports the third hypothesis.  This is not 
too surprising and was expected to be a statistically significant variable as all the sessions 
of Congress included in the data set are classified as conditional party government, as 
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well as the “party as cartel” model.  The hypothesized predictors of party affinity, being a 
business during Republican controlled Congresses and a union during Democrat 
controlled Congresses were off.  As was indicated previously, ideally the way to test 
party affinity would be to have some sort of partisan measure of each interest group in the 
sample.  Lacking such a measure, I chose to generalize the relationships between 
business and Republicans and between Democrats and unions.  In reality, however, not 
all businesses or business interests are aligned solely with the Republican Party.  Most 
interest groups are more pragmatic and work with both parties so as to not be 
disenfranchised when one or the other holds the majority.  Labor unions, on the other 
hand, still mostly align themselves with the Democratic Party.  Being part of the 
Democratic constituency appears not to give them an advantage in impacting policy as 
not a single union recommendation was incorporated in a bill markup. 
 Using these results to seek confirmation of the competing theories of committee 
power, evidence is found for both of the major variables: partisanship and ratio of 
majority to minority party members.  While all the congressional sessions under 
observation qualify as conditional party government, the regressions run on each separate 
session are even more revealing.   
 Partisanship, ideology and tenure are statistically significant for the 103rd 
Congress.  The ratio of majority to minority party members seated on a committee is 
statistically significant for the 106th Congress.  None of the variables are significant for 
the 108th.   Power in Congress is limited.  There is only so much of it.  If you have strong 
party leadership you will necessarily have less power within the committees.  On the 
  197  
    
other hand if you have more powerful committees, that would come at the expense of a 
strong centralized party leadership.  This is a simplistic understanding of power but it 
useful to think about the relationships revealed in the impact model.  The statistically 
significant variables for the 103rd are all variables linked to individuals either as chairs or 
as committee and subcommittee members.  In other words, individuals within the 
committee’s leadership and rank and file alike are influencing whether or not interest 
groups are successful in their attempts to impact policy.   On the other hand, in the 106th 
Congress, the statistically significant variable is linked not to individuals but to the 
committee itself.  It is an institutional characteristic.  If, none of the individuals within the 
committees for the 106th and 108th Congress are exerting an influence it could be 
indicating they do not have the power to do so, their loss of power is subsumed by a 
strong party leadership. 
 Although all three sessions of Congress can be described as conditional party 
government, it appears committee members and chairs were able to retain some 
autonomy under Democratic control.  This also fits in well with what we know about the 
Republican leadership during the 106th and 108th Congress – it was strong and 
centralized.  Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert is known for maintaining tight control 
over Republican House members with the help of majority leaders Armey (106th) and 
Delay (108th).  He kept in tact all of the institutional arrangements put in place by Newt 
Gingrich when the Republicans regained control as majority party in 1995. 
 Looking again at the comprehensive model, the dummy variable measuring 
whether the hearing considers regulatory policy is statistically significant.  Interest groups 
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are much more likely to see success when testifying on regulatory policy rather than 
distributive policy.  This runs counter to the hypothesized relationship.  I expected it to be 
easier for interest groups to have influence within the policy subgovernments considering 
distributive legislation, since their presence as testifiers indicates some status within the 
committee or subcommittee.  However, interest groups testifying on regulatory policy 
have a greater likelihood of impacting policy.  I had hypothesized the increased number 
of actors involved in the policymaking process would diminish the likelihood of success, 
but in reality it increases it.  The more groups involved in policymaking, the more likely 
any one of them will be influential in the process.  
  
Conclusion 
 One thing can definitively be concluded after examining the influence dimension 
of the interest group impact theory: interest group testimony plays a substantive role.  
Holding legislative hearings is an important step in the policymaking process.  It is a 
stage in which members gain information about the bill under consideration.  The 
evidence, dating back to the 1950s, anecdotal and otherwise (Del Sesto 1980; Farnsworth 
1961; Huitt 1954; Jones, Baumgartner and Talbert 1993; Lutzker 1969; Morrow 1969; 
Redman 1973) suggesting congressional hearings are orchestrated to show case the 
already configured legislation of the committee is not supported.  This is shown by 
looking at the recommendations made: almost 75% of all the recommendations made 
sought real changes in the legislation (as opposed to just supporting the bill as 
introduced).  This role of providing information to committee and subcommittee 
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members is one which interest groups take very seriously.  Not only are most 
recommendations seeking real changes, but the logistic regression results also indicate 
this is an information gathering stage.  No one type of group has an advantage, and no 
single resource gives a group an advantage.  The merits of the testimony are considered 
and if warranted they get incorporated into the markup. 
 While interest group characteristics are prevalent in the access model, they mostly 
are not in the influence model.  Rather partisan affinity and ideological extremism are 
important considerations.  Interest groups are assessed and vetted during the access stage.  
Their legitimacy is checked.  Interest groups that are more present, because of their ample 
resources, are included.  Once the group gains access, committee and subcommittee 
members can mostly rest assured they do not individually need to “assess” the reliability 
of the interest group as a source of information.  I say “mostly” since it appears 
committee and subcommittee members do take into consideration the legitimacy of the 
group is evidenced through the age of the group.  Nonetheless, since most of the vetting 
process occurs in the earlier stage, members can focus on what is being said rather than 
trying to figure out who is saying it. 
 The assessment of what is said in testimony is a different story.  Here is the stage 
where partisanship and ideology come into play.  The more partisan and ideologically 
extreme committees and subcommittees are reluctant to allow any interest group 
influence on policy.  The only possibility of interest group success seems would come 
from very friendly (in terms of ideology) interest groups.  However, if such a “close” 
relationship exists between a committee and interest group, it is highly unlikely the 
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interest group would be asking for any real changes in the legislation.  Instead it likely 
would offer up the type of testimony that affirms the legislation in part or whole.  In fact 
the regression results reveal with the broader definition of support groups have a greater 
likelihood of success in committees and subcommittees with a high ratio of majority to 
minority party members.  On the other hand, when the definition of influence is narrowed 
to include only recommendations that seek to “add’ provisions to the bill, interest groups 
have greater difficulty in testifying in committees that give a greater share of the seats to 
the majority party.  Committees are willing to allow interest group influence when the 
testimony includes broad support for the committee legislation, yet when the testimony 
seeks real changes the relationship turns negative.   
 Influencing legislation through congressional testimony is not easy.  Not many 
groups can successfully get their recommendations incorporated into the bill markups.  
But the opportunity is there and it is a popular option.  This is not the only way interest 
groups lobby, but it is a public platform and puts groups in direct contact with those most 
involved in making that particular policy.  For that reason, and still the possibility of 
being able to impact bill markups, is why testifying in committee remains a popular 
lobbying activity.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
 
Interest Group Impact Theory 
 Guided by the interest group and congressional committee literature, I have built 
the Interest Group Impact Theory.  This theory explains how interest groups gain access 
to congressional committee hearings and if they are invited to testify, under what 
conditions interest group testimony is able to impact legislative mark ups.  The theory 
maintains an informational role for interest groups in committee hearings; committee and 
subcommittee chairs seek out those groups they believe can best provide information 
about the policy under consideration.  Interest group proliferation in the 1970s coincided 
with House congressional reforms which opened up participation in the policymaking 
process to many inexperienced, rank and file House members.  Over the past couple of 
decades, interest groups and House members have come together in a symbiotic 
relationship in which legislators aid groups in their policy pursuits and interest groups 
provide information and campaign support in return.   
 According to the Interest Group Impact Theory, well reputed interest groups gain 
greater access to congressional committee hearings.  They are valuable to legislators in 
this capacity since they provide information relating to politics, elections and policy.  But 
once access is gained, the data show in order for their testimony to have influence, 
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interest groups will have much better success if they work with ideologically moderate, 
more bipartisan committees, chaired by a less tenured member of Congress.   The 
considerations of influence are shaped by characteristics of the committee rather than 
features of the group itself. 
 
Summary of Results 
Two statistical models, one looking at the access given to interest groups to serve 
as witnesses in committee hearings and the other examining the impact interest group 
testimony has on subsequent bill markups, test the Interest Group Impact Theory.  A 
unique data set was developed for each model.  The access data set consists of attempts 
by interest groups to testify before House committees during the 105th, 106th, 107th and 
108th sessions of Congress.  The influence data set was constructed from a stratified 
sampling of testimony made by interest groups, before six House committees during the 
103rd, 106th and 108th sessions of Congress.  Variables measuring party influence, 
partisan affinity, ideological extremism, chair influence, interest group resources, interest 
group visibility and political influence are tested in both models. 
 
The Access Model 
Testing the models, the data reveal access to hearings is a separate process with 
considerations distinct from the influence derived from interest group testimony.  Interest 
groups with reputations for having good information in a policy area have greater access 
to hearings than other groups, even those that have more resources.  Resource rich 
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groups, with the exception of lobbyists on staff, and groups that contribute money to 
members of Congress have no advantage in this process.  While the number of lobbyists 
on staff may in one sense be considered a resource, here it is signaling the reach of 
expertise an interest group has on a given issue.  Along the same lines, groups that are too 
busy lobbying a wide range of issues are less likely to be seen as an expert source on any 
one issue and therefore are less likely to be invited to testify.   
Committees are also more willing to give access to groups that have contact with 
some population of individuals whether it is their membership or their employees.  It is 
not the case that highly populated groups will have a significant advantage over lesser 
populated groups, but it is the case that committees value organized interests that have at 
a minimum some population of individuals with whom they have contact.  This in a way 
is another signal to legislators, one indicating the potential reach of influence a group has 
within the electorate. 
The access model also reveals prestige committees, along with the Agriculture 
and Science Committees, both policy committees, are more accessible to interest groups.  
Chapter five includes a discussion of how the Ways and Means Committee was 
considering a highly salient issue on which it held many hearings, Medicare Prescription 
Reform.  The large number of hearings on this issue increased the opportunities to testify.  
A similar story emerges for the Appropriations Committee where a high number of 
subcommittees create multiple opportunities for interest groups to be involved in 
hearings.   
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In part, the committee data support Theodore Lowi’s (1964) theory of 
differentiated policy arenas.  Lowi suggested policymaking on regulatory policy (handled 
by policy committees) differs from that on distributive policy (considered by 
constituency committees).  Regulatory policy debates occur in more open arenas and 
involve a number of political actors and interest groups.  Unlike distributive policy which 
stands to benefit a large number of interests, regulatory policy may positively affect some 
interests, but it also typically negatively impacts others.  From the view of organized 
interests, there is more at stake prompting wider activism, which in turn increases the 
level of competition.  The data show greater accessibility for interest groups attempting to 
testify before the Agriculture and Science committees, as would be expected given 
Lowi’s theory. 
Interest groups rank testifying in committee as one of their preferred lobbying 
activities (Schlozman & Tierney 1986; Nownes & Freeman 1998; Walker 1991; Berry 
1997).  If they want to be invited to testify, this research indicates they need to 
demonstrate to committee members they are experts in their policy area and have contact 
with a population of individuals interested in the outcome of the legislation.  The more 
visibility a group has on a particular policy issue, the more likely it will get to participate 
in the hearing as a witness. 
 
The Influence Model 
 Once granted access, the advantage gained by being a reputable source of 
information largely disappears.  One measure of visibility still remains influential – the 
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age of the group.  But other than a group’s age, the question of influence turns on 
characteristics related to the committee.  Partisan affinity and ideological extremism 
figure most prominently in whether an interest group’s testimony influences subsequent 
bill markups. 
 The more partisan a committee or subcommittee is the less likely an interest 
group will be able to influence a bill markup.  Interest groups will also have greater 
difficulty impacting legislation being considered by ideologically extreme committees.  
The only conditions in which an interest group is more likely to have its 
recommendations incorporated into the legislation, is when testifying before a committee 
with a larger ratio of majority to minority party seats and when testifying on regulatory 
policy.  These results however pertain to a broad definition of influence, one that includes 
testimony which solely affirms the committee position.   
 More interesting is what happens when the definition of influence is narrowed to 
include only recommended changes in the legislation; in other words, when the “window 
dressing” supportive testimony is excluded.  The fundamental difference is now interest 
groups find it more difficult to influence policy being considered by committees where 
seats are more skewed toward the majority party.  When the testimony included the 
“window dressing” supportive testimony, they were more likely to have influence.  Now 
the relationship is reversed.  Another difference is now interest groups have greater 
difficulty impacting legislation when the committee or subcommittee chair is more 
tenured; interest group expertise is not valued as much. 
  206  
    
 While the Interest Group Impact Theory was guided by congressional committee 
theory, the various theories could not be directly tested by the influence model.  Despite 
this, in comparing the 103rd, 106th and 108th sessions of Congress a particularly revealing 
result is found.  The data indicate more autonomy for committees under the 103rd 
Congress and little to no autonomy for the Republican controlled 106th and 108th 
Congress.  If the committees and their chairs are unable to control decisions, it is because 
the party leadership is.  This confirms what we do know about the successful efforts of 
the Republican House leadership to centralize power in its own hands.   
  
Contributions to the Interest Group Literature 
 The Interest Group Impact theory supports John Wright’s (1996) informational 
lobbying theory.  My research confirms the importance of information relating to a 
congressional member’s interests.  These interests are re-election, influence within the 
chamber and good public policy (Mayhew 1974).  Interest groups have created a role for 
themselves in the House of Representatives by being a source of information for 
members. 
 In addition, my research also finds limited evidence of PAC contributions buying 
access or influence in Congress.  This adds another finding of limited impact of PAC 
contributions that is common in the literature (Chappell 1981, 1982; Grenzke 1989; 
Kabashima and Sato 1986; Lothenberg 1992; Owens 1986; Vesenka 1989; Wright 1985).   
 But the largest contribution this research makes to the interest group literature is it 
fills a void.  As discussed in the literature review, very few scholars have examined 
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interest group testimony as a potential source of influence.  Some have already examined 
interest group access to committee hearings as witnesses (Leyden 1995; Holyoke 2003; 
Kollman 1997; Hansen & Mitchell 2000).  As Leyden (1995) this research finds interest 
group resources such as the number of lobbyists on staff positively influence the 
likelihood of gaining access.  Unlike his model only one of the PAC variables here 
(contributions made to the chair), neared statistical significance.  Leyden found the 
presence of PAC money positively impacted access.  The difference in the two studies is 
the sample size of interest groups.  The access model had a larger sample and was culled 
from the Lobbying Disclosure database rather than from the Encyclopedia of 
Associations.   
 Looking at interest group influence through testimony this research steps into new 
territory.  Richard Smith (1995) conducted a comprehensive literature review of interest 
group influence in Congress and found only three studies examining interest group 
influence in congressional committees.  Only one study was found by Baumgartner and 
Leech (1998) to use interest group testimony as a measure of lobbying (Segal, et. Al 
1992).  Most studies on congressional hearings, many using case studies as a method of 
analysis, found interest group testimony to be little more than a scripted show of support 
for the committed (Del Sesto 1980; Farnsworth 1961; Huitt 1954; Jones, Baumgartner 
and Talbert 1993; Lutzker 1969; Morrow 1969; Redman 1973).  This research is unique 
in providing a comprehensive analysis of congressional testimony to determine whether it 
impacted legislation.   
  208  
    
 This research indicates most testimony is real.  Over 70% of the recommendations 
made in hearing are real requests to change the legislation in the way the interest group 
sees fit, not merely cheerleading the committee position.  This either indicates a changed 
role for interest group testimony in the modern post-reform Congress or it reveals the 
shortcomings of the methods employed by previous studies.   
 
Contributions to the Congressional Committee Literature 
 While the congressional committee power theories guided the development of the 
Interest Group Impact Theory, as mentioned previously, the data disallowed direct testing 
of these theories.  Although there is variation in the time periods under examination they 
do not extend to a time before the onset of conditional party government.  Conditional 
party government in Congress is marked by party polarization, high levels of party unity 
in voting, and stark difference between the two parties.  All of the House sessions 
included in this analysis can be described as such.  Nevertheless this research reveals a 
process in which congressional committee power does not come into play at all.  The 
decision of which groups to include in committee hearings is not directly related to 
power; this process is about access.  And when it comes to access, the decision turns on 
which groups will best supply the information valued by committee holding the hearing. 
 Power within the committee enters into the equation once the testimony is 
delivered.  Whether or not the testimony will be adopted ultimately depends on 
characteristics related to the committee.  The levels of partisanship within the committee 
are important as is the ideology of the committee and how experienced is the chair.  
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Whether or not interest group testimony is influential depends on what is happening 
within the committee. 
 In Chapter Six, in testing the influence model, one of the analyses involved 
testing each session of Congress, the Democratic controlled 103rd, the Republican 106th 
and the Republican 108th, separately to allow for comparisons between the three.  What 
emerged from the results was an indication that House committees and subcommittees 
retained more autonomy under the Democratic majority than they did under Republican 
control.  The committees under Republican control had less autonomy as the party 
leadership was more centralized and more powerful.  This finding supports other studies 
which have described the strengthening of the party leadership under Republican control.   
 Underlying my research is the normative concern about how power is dispersed in 
our government.  I ultimately want to be able to answer bigger questions related to the 
quality of democracy.  In the next section I will go back to these normative concerns and 
will speak to the questions identified by Schattschneider  (1960) in the Semisovereign 
People. 
 
Pluralism and Plural Elitism 
Power is central to the study of politics.  The fundamental questions driving much 
of our research are how is power dispersed and how is it used to wield influence?  Arthur 
Bentley’s (1908) research did much to bring interest groups into the study of politics as 
key political actors, and since then many studies seeking to understand power in 
American politics have included, if not focused on, a discussion of interest groups.  
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While Bentley’s work brought interest groups to the forefront of political science 
research, pluralism as a theory of political power and democracy does not take hold as a 
dominant framework of American government until the 1950s and 1960s.  Bolstered by 
the research of David Truman, Robert Dahl, and Charles Lindblom, pluralism describes 
power as being de-centralized and dispersed among the many interests and actors 
involved in American policymaking.    
Leading the charge against pluralism in the 1960s is a group of scholars Andrew 
McFarland (1987) has labeled as the “plural elites.”  While the problems with pluralism 
are varied, McFarland (1987) summarizes their arguments in the following propositions: 
“1) many widely shared interests cannot be effectively organized within the political 
process; 2) politics tends to be fragmented into decision-making in various specific policy 
areas, which are normally controlled by special-interest coalitions; 3) there are a variety 
of specific processes whereby pluralist rule is maintained; 4) a widespread ideology 
conceals the truth about American politics” (pg. 133).  E.E. Schattschneider’s (1961) The 
Semi-Sovereign People helped to discredit pluralism as a framework for understanding 
American politics.  But the charges against pluralism did not just arise in response to the 
work of the pluralists in the 1950s and 1960s.  Critical studies date back to the early 
1900s following the work of Arthur Bentley. 
Schattschneider accuses interest group pluralism as being tilted heavily in favor of 
advantaged private interests.  Not only are businessmen (and women) more likely to write 
their members of Congress than are manual laborers, but political participation is skewed 
toward individuals occupying higher levels of socio-economic status.  It is not the 
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disadvantaged, under-resourced or even common middle class individual who is joining 
interest groups, it is the wealthier and better educated individual; it is not the laborers but 
the business owners.  Power is hardly dispersed evenly in such a biased interest group 
system, particularly as the “pressure system” at the time of Schattshneider’s observations 
was fairly small.  Powerful private interests prevailed over more universalistic public 
interest groups. 
But the advantage of private interests over public interests extends beyond 
representation.  Understanding the complex nature of power, Schattschneider recognized 
some of the most powerful corporations did not lobby government directly.  They did not 
need to engage in lobbying strategies like other interests because their alignment with the 
Republican Party makes it unnecessary.  So long as Republicans maintained their 
ideology which is pro-business in many respects, corporations did not need to directly 
lobby policy makers.  Today, some 30 years later, the Republican ideology although 
shifting to incorporate moral issues, still encompasses a pro-business attitude. 
The political issues raised by Schattschneider remain unsettled to this day.  Is the 
pluralist system today as “small” and “exclusive” as Schattschneider had characterized it?  
If not, is there greater competition among interest groups seeking to influence public 
policy?  Are business groups and trade association still the dominant actors in the 
pluralist system?  Do business groups and trade associations enjoy more “access” to 
Congress and “influence” over legislation than other types of interest groups?  Is access 
by business groups and trade associations and their influence over legislation facilitated 
by Republican control and frustrated by Democratic control of Congress?  Since 
  212  
    
“weaker” interests want to socialize conflict in the public domain, are they advantaged in 
congressional committee deliberations (being a public venue) relative to business groups 
or trade associations? 
 Interest group scholars have yet to answer the preceding questions definitively.  In 
part, this is because research in this field has evolved along two separate paths: 
organizational maintenance and influence.  Those studies pursuing interest group 
influence have been lacking in many regards.  For one, there has been too much focus on 
PAC contributions since the creation of the Federal Election Commission which provides 
readily available public data.  We are not any better able to link PAC contributions to 
interest group influence now than we were prior to passage of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act (Baumgartner and Leech 1998).  The research examining PAC 
contributions and voting records has resulted in confusing, disjointed and contradictory 
results. 
 Another problem with the interest group influence literature is the tendency for 
scholars to use narrow case studies examining only a group or a particular policy sector                    
rather than engaging in comprehensive examinations of interest group lobbying that 
extend over a period of time and encompass a wide range of interests and lobbying 
activities.  The notable exception is the recent comprehensive effort by Baumgartner, 
Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball and Leech to create the advocacy and public policymaking data 
base funded by the National Science Foundation. 
 But perhaps the biggest problem is the tendency of interest group scholars to 
avoid directly taking on the question of interest group influence; whether it’s because of 
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not wanting to reignite a battle  between pluralists and plural elites or because of having 
found no way to deal with the complex nature of power and influence.  Bachrach and 
Baratz (1962) first noted the intricacies of measuring power in their discussion of 
negative agenda control.  When once research spoke directly to the concepts of power 
and influence, recent scholarship has side-stepped the issue never fully addressing the 
questions raised by Schattschneider and others.  Scholars have been reluctant to ask 
difficult questions about influence and we still have not come to terms with how to be 
able to measure power in all its manifestations.   
 The combination of these varied troubles within the influence literature has led to 
what Baumgartner and Leech (1998) have termed, “A literature that grows but does not 
accumulate.”  After 30 years it is questionable as to whether we have a better 
understanding of interest group influence than Schattschneider had writing in 1960. 
 While this research certainly has not solved all of these problems, it does attempt 
to address the normative concerns raised by Schattschneider.  I have found a void in the 
interest group literature and my efforts do contribute to our understanding of influence as 
it works in congressional committee hearings.  Certainly, I am only looking at one of the 
many ways in which influence is exerted by interest groups, and recognize the limitations 
of being able to explain only some of the multifarious sources of that power.  Not only 
does this research contribute to interest group scholarship but it also reveals the forces at 
play in congressional committees.   
It is fitting perhaps, that this search for a better understanding of interest group 
influence led to congressional committee testimony - the very same place Schattschneider 
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began his intellectual pursuit of the very same questions.  But much has changed since 
the 1930s and even the 1960s.  Interest groups have proliferated beyond the extant people 
like David Truman and E.E. Schattschneider ever imagined.  The relatively small 
“pressure system” has been replaced with an interest group universe which is much 
larger, more diverse, and perhaps more representative of American interests than ever 
before.  Policymaking, too, has changed.  Reflecting the complex nature of the American 
economy, legislating requires far greater issue expertise and law makers must respond to 
ever more competing demands.  And the polarization between the two parties governing 
has never been greater.   
The population of interest groups in the American political system has 
proliferated greatly since the 1960s.  Over 20,000 interest groups operate in federal 
government.  Much of the growth in the interest group populations since the 1960s has 
been among membership groups, whether they be environmental, civil rights, women’s or 
gay rights groups.  But just as more membership groups entered the fray, even more 
businesses came to Washington D.C. to be represented as a countervailing force.  So 
while it is true more single issue membership groups organized, so too did more 
businesses and corporations seek representation. 
 The data from the access sample shows businesses and trade associations 
representing 71% of the interest group population.  This dwarfs membership groups 
which only occupy 11.3% of the same population.  Looking specifically at the 
participation of interest groups in hearings, the influence sample shows businesses and 
trade associations predominant at 51.3% as compared to membership groups at 15.3%.  
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Taken prima facie, this buttresses the plural elites’ allegations of a “pressure system” 
tilted toward business interests.   
 But Schattschneider contended many corporations did not even have to lobby 
since the Republican Party served effectively to represent them.  There is not one notable 
corporation of business that does not lobby our government today.  Microsoft used to 
pride itself on its Silicon Valley culture of not getting involved in politics in any way, but 
after their difficulties with the Justice Department they have not only maintained a 
lobbying presence in Washington, they are one of the most active corporate interests in 
D.C. (Hart 2002).  All the large business and corporate interests have representation in 
Washington.  If we are to follow Schattschneider’s reasoning, this indicates they do not 
believe the parties are adequately protecting their interests. 
Although a number of studies have explored business activity in policy making,38 
there is still much unknown about this population of organized interests.  Brady, 
Drutman, Schlozman and Lee have been working on this area of research recently and 
will have a book forthcoming.  Their comprehensive literature review on corporate 
lobbying demonstrates the business population is not monolithic.  There are different 
types of businesses – private businesses, firms, corporations – that represent a range of 
industries – medical, educational, retail, entertainment, hospitality, wholesale, 
manufacturing, agricultural, etc.  In addition, businesses have different motivations for 
having representation in government.  Some are concerned with improved infrastructure, 
others with tax structures, property rights, or market structures.  Furthermore they allege 
 
38 Brady, Drutman, Schlozman and Lee have identified 24 papers or articles.  See the paper they presented 
at the American Political Science Association’s meeting in 2007 entitled, “Corporate Lobbying Activity in 
Politics” for the list of works. 
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“there is quite of bit of bias within the bias of the pressure system” (Brady, et al. 2007, 
pg. 32).  Meaning there are certain types of businesses within certain industries that are 
better represented and more influential than others.  Yet it should be noted that even with 
such a large business presence in the interest group population this does not necessarily 
pose a barrier for membership groups.  Leech et al. (2007) note that although citizen 
groups may not lobby as much as businesses or expend as many resources, they are time 
and again recognized as “major players” within the policy making arena.  In The New 
Liberalism, Jeffrey Berry (1999) comes to a similar conclusion.   
 The variety of groups represented in both the access and influence sample suggest 
a range of types of groups participated in policymaking.  There are old groups, new 
groups; large groups and small groups; business groups and labor groups.  The access 
model shows membership groups have an advantage over business groups in receiving 
invitations to testify, but trade associations are slightly more advantaged than 
membership groups.  Trade associations, however are then slightly disadvantaged over 
other types of groups when it comes to influential testimony (based on the narrow 
definition of influence).  So while the evidence suggests membership groups are not left 
without any participation or influence within the policymaking process, there is also no 
definitive evidence to suggest businesses are properly balanced by countervailing forces.   
 There is also no evidence to suggest a close relationship between either 
Republicans and business interests or Democrats and labor unions.  This holds true when 
speaking both of access and of influence.  In fact, the influence model broken down by 
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session of Congress for comparison, show labor unions were less likely than other groups 
to influence bill markups when the Democrats controlled the House. 
 Political influence in the form of campaign contributions, whether given to chairs, 
committee members, one party of the other also fails to impact the likelihood of access or 
influence.  This means there is no direct link between an individual group and that 
group’s chances of gaining access or being influential.  But again, the Interest Group 
Impact Theory maintains a cooperative, if not symbiotic, relationship between interest 
groups and House members.  In exchange for information and campaign support (money 
and otherwise), House members will give interest groups access to the policymaking 
process and at times aid them in their policy pursuits.  But it does not operate in a “pay to 
play” manner where a single interest group must make a contribution before it gains 
access.  So long as House members are gaining something of value from interest groups, 
they will allow them a role in the policymaking process. 
 Probably the aspect of this research that best allays the concerns that private 
interests are too powerful in the policymaking process comes from the influence model.  
While it is true that interest groups prefer testifying as a lobbying technique, it is not so 
true their testimony is influential.  While the testimony is real, in that it is mostly seeking 
substantive changes in the legislation, very little testimony actually gets incorporated into 
the bill – at least at the markup stage.  Less than 5% of 13,000 real recommendations 
actually made it into the bill markup.  This is hardly an endorsement of interest group 
influence.   
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 This research allays some of the concerns of the elite pluralists regarding the 
undue influence of business interests.  There is no evidence to suggest they have an 
advantage over other types of organized interests.  Indeed their presence as participants in 
the hearing process may suggest they feel their interests are not being properly protected 
by our policy makers.  On the other hand, pluralists cannot claim evenly dispersed power 
in the policymaking process.  The fact that less than 5% of 13,000 interest group 
recommendations are heeded, along with the results of the influence model revealing a 
committee driven process, interest groups in this aspect of policymaking process have 
little to no influence.  Powerless interest groups are not any better than a pressure system 
dominated by business interests.  The very ideal of pluralism encourages as many 
interests involved in the policymaking process as want to be a part.  But it also must be 
recognized this is only one stage of a very intricate legislative process. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 The legislative process is complicated but so are the relationships between interest 
groups and congressional members.  Studying influence within the legislative process is 
difficult as quid pro quo exchanges which may be easier to detect, mostly do not exist; 
power is wielded is more subtle ways.  Influence can be direct or it may be indirect, 
positive or negative.  Interest group resources factor into the power of interest groups, but 
no singular asset or resource, bestows special advantages across all interest groups (Smith 
1990).  The legislative process is extensive, not one single stage, step or procedure can 
fully capture the flow of power and influence amongst political actors. 
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 While this study is ambitious in its attempt to understand how power is wielded 
within the legislative process, it is limited by only looking at two steps which take place 
publicly.  It cannot account for any interest group lobbying preceding the legislative 
hearing and markup, nor does it examine what occurs after the legislation leaves the 
committee and it does not consider lobbying behind closed doors.  In addition, there is no 
way to measure negative agenda control which is often the strategy employed by interest 
groups.  These are significant limitations, ones of which I was aware in deciding to 
undertake this research.  Although this research does not consider other avenues of 
influence, it was decided examining hearings and markups can help inform us of the 
nature of power at other stages and in other legislative venues.   
 Part of this shortcoming will be addressed in the next stage of the research which 
will be to add a qualitative component.  Surveys and interviews of interest group 
representatives, legislators and House committee and subcommittee chairs are planned in 
order to better understand interest group influence. 
 Another limitation of this study is it only considers two players involved in 
policymaking: House members and interest groups.  There are other contextual factors 
which can be added such as presidential support and the saliency of the issue under 
consideration; saliency from the perspective of legislators, the public and the interest 
group population alike.  While some of these contextual measures can be added to the 
quantitative models used in this research, speaking with individuals directly involved in 
the process will help identify which measures should be considered and even aid in 
measuring how salient the issue is. 
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 One of the greatest frustrations in understanding how interest groups operate 
stems from the wide range of organized interests actively involved in the process.  The 
plural elitist concern of a pro-business bias among the interest group population led me to 
incorporate a very broad definition of interest groups.  By including any organized 
interest attempting to influence American public policy in my definition, businesses were 
considered alongside membership groups and governmental entities enabling testing of 
whether any type of interest group has an advantage over others.  The difficulty is these 
organizations have different structures; measuring the budget of a group is challenging in 
that the budget of a membership group is very different from the budget of a business or 
government agency.  While ultimately this variable is dropped from the analysis, it raises 
the question whether all types of interest groups can be compared against one another.   
 Some scholars like Jeffrey Berry and Andrew McFarland have focused solely on 
membership groups.  But still others have specified interest groups as broadly as this 
research has.  Future research should perhaps follow the lead of Berry and McFarland 
and study only one type of interest group or at least test alternative models in which 
interest groups are pooled by type. 
 Lastly, future research should include in its analysis earlier sessions of Congress.  
While this is a time-series analysis and it covers sessions of Congress from the 103rd 
(1993-1994) through the 108th (2003-2004) all of these are categorized as periods of 
conditional party government.  In order to understand how strong parties impact 
congressional hearings and markups, it would be instructive to include at least one 
session that predates conditional party government.         
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Conclusion 
 Interest groups have an informational role in the policymaking process.  Groups 
with a sound reputation for good information serve Congress by presenting testimony in 
congressional hearings.  Interest groups enjoy this public opportunity to make their 
positions known.  Testifying also allows interest groups to show their members, 
employees and clients they are actively engaging in legislation.   
Testifying is not an effective means for influencing legislation directly.  Very few 
of the recommendations made by interest groups are actually incorporated into bill 
markups and it is only the moderate, bipartisan committees led by relatively 
inexperienced chairs that do incorporate the recommendations. 
The Interest Group Impact Theory was tested along the dimensions of both access 
and influence.  Two statistical models tested data collected from the committees, the 
interest groups and the testimony given.  While the work is sound, it lacks some of the 
deeper understanding of the process that comes from speaking directly with committee 
chairs, members and the interest groups themselves.  Future research will take this 
qualitative approach.   
 While none of the results can raise concerns about the undue influence of certain 
types of interests over others, other concerns remain.  For pluralists, the concern is the 
inability of interest groups to have little influence through congressional testimony at all.  
Future research should continue to directly confront the question of influence in the 
policymaking process as we can no longer avoid the concerns raised several decades ago 
by the plural elites. 
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Date   (Sub)Committee   Legislation          
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
6-9-94  Agriculture – Dept. Ops.  HR 8: Healthy Meals for Healthy Americans Act 
 
6-15-94 Agriculture – Dept. Ops.  HR 1627: Food Quality Protection Act 0f 1993 
 
4-1-93  Agriculture – Env & Credit  HR 1440: Site Specific Agricultural Resource Mgmt Act of 1993 (-) 
 
8-4-93  Agriculture – Farm Comm.  HR 2689: US Grain Standards Act Amendment 
 
7-13-93 Agriculture – Full   HR 3450: NAFTA Implementation Bill (+) 
 
10-26-93 Agriculture – Livestock  HR 2664: Dairy Budget Reconciliation and Self-Help (-) 
 
5-5-99  Agriculture – Livestock  HR 3428: Reform of Milk Marketing Orders (-) 
 
3/10/99 Agriculture – Risk Mgmt  HR 2559: Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 1990 (-) 
 
5-18-95 Agriculture – Spclty. Crops  HR 3905: Opal Creek Forest Preserve Act of 1994 
 
7-14-00 Banking & Finan – Full  HR 4585: The Medical Financial Privacy Act (+) 
 
6-15-99 Banking & Finan – Full  HR 1095: The Debt Relief for Poverty Act (+) 
 
6-20-00 Banking & Finan –Full  HR 4419: Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act (+) 
 
7-19-06 Banking & Finan – Full  HR 4541: Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (+) 
 
3-16-99 Banking & Finan – Housing  HR 1073: The Homeless Housing Programs Consolidation and Flex. Act 
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4-28-99 Banking & Finan – Housing  HR 21: Homeowners Insurance Availability Act of 1999 
 
9-15-99 Banking & Finan – Housing  HR 1776: American Homeownership & Economic Opportunities Act of 
      2000 
 
2-24-94 Banking & Urban – Housing  HR 3838: Housing & Communities Development Act 
 
7-15-99 Commerce – Energy & Power HR 2944: Electricity Competition & Reliability Act of 1999 
 
3-22-00 Commerce – Energy & Power HR 3383: Amend Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to Exempt Non-Profit Inst. 
 
3-30-00 Commerce – Energy & Power HR 2335: Hydroelectric Licensing Process Improvement Act 
 
4-5-00  Commerce – Energy & Power HR 2461: Amend Energy Policy Act to extend the Uranium Mill  
        Tailings 
 
5-13-99 Commerce – Energy & Power HR 2944: Electricity Competition & Reliability Act of 1999 
 
3-11-03 Ed & Work – 21st Century  HR 1261: Strengthening One-Stop Career Centers (+) 
 
5-20-03 Ed & Work – 21st Century  HR 2211: Ready to Teach Act of 2003   
 
3-6-03  Ed & Work – Ed Reform  HR 2210: Head Start Reauthorization (+) 
 
6-19-03 Ed & Work – Select Ed  HR 3077: Amend Title VI of the Higher Ed Act to Enhance Intl Programs 
 
2-24-93 Energy & Commerce – Commerce HR 965: Child Safety Protection Act 
 
6-23-94 Energy & Commerce – Energy HR 4394: Comprehensive One Call Notification Act 
 
4-21-93 Energy & Commerce – Haz Mat HR 3800: Superfund Reform Act of 1994 
      225  
 
 
 
6-23-93 Energy & Commerce – Haz Mat HR 3800: Superfund Reform Act of 1994 
 
3-10-04 Energy & Commerce – Telecomm. HR 4501: Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act 
 
3-11-93 Public Works  - Pub. Bldgs.  HR 881: Ban on Smoking in Public Buildings Act (-) 
 
10-28-93 Public Works – Pub. Bldgs.  HR 2680: Public Buildings Ac of 1959 Amendment (-) 
 
8-10-94 Public Works – Pub. Bldgs.  HR 4704: Hopewell Township Investment Act of 1994 (-) 
 
6-15-93 Pub Works – Surf. Transp.  HR 2121: Negotiated Rates Act of 1993 
 
6-22-94 Pub Works – Water Res.  HR 4460: Water Resources Development Act of 1994 
 
6-9-94  Pub Works – Water Res.  HR 3800: Superfund Reform Act of 1994 
 
6-26-03 Resources – Fisheries   HR 1204: A Bill to Amend the Natl Wildlife Refuge System 
 
4-28-04 Resources – Full   HR 2933: To Amend the Endangered Species Act of 1993 
 
6-18-03 Resources – Full   HR 884: Western Shoshone Claims Distribution Act 
 
9-30-99 Resources – Natl Parks  HR 2541: A Bill to Adjust the Boundaries of the Gulf Islands Natl Park 
 
6-9-99  Transp & Infra – Aviation   HR 1000: W.H. Ford Aviation Investment & Reform Act (-) 
 
3-17-03 Transp & Infra – Aviation  HR 2115: Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (-) 
 
3-4-04  Transp & Infra – C Guard  HR 2443: Coast Guard & Maritime Transportation Act of 2004 
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5-22-03 Transp & Infra – C Guard  HR 2443: Coast Guard & Maritime Transportation Act of 2004 
 
7-13-99 Transp & Infra – Water Res  HR 1237: National Estuary Program 
 
7-8-04  Transp & Infra – Water Res  HR 784: Water Quality Investment Act of 2003 
 
7-8-04  Transp & Infra – Water Res  HR 4470: Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
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Interest Groups that Succeeded in Getting One Recommendation Changed 
A Duda & Sons        Business 
AARP          Membership 
Agribusiness Council        Membership 
Albina Head Start Program       Government 
Alliance of Western Milk Producers      Trade Assn 
American Assn of Community Colleges     Trade Assn 
American Assn of Crop Insurers      Trade Assn 
American Assn of Grain Inspection & Weighing Agencies   Trade Assn 
American Assn of Port Authorities      Trade Assn 
American Assn on Mental Retardation     Trade Assn 
American Commodity Distribution Center     Trade Assn 
American Congress of Community Supports & Employment Services Trade Assn 
American Council of the Blind      Membership 
American Farm Bureau Federation      Trade Assn 
American Network of Community Options & Resources   Trade Assn 
American Public Power Assn       Trade Assn 
American Sod Producers Assn      Trade Assn 
American Soybean Assn       Trade Assn 
American Subcontractors Assn      Trade Assn 
Assn for Educators of Community-Based Rehabilitation Personnel  Trade Assn 
Assn for Persons in Supported Employment     Membership 
Assn for Service Disabled Veterans      Membership 
Assn of General Contractors of America     Trade Assn 
Assn of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies     Trade Assn 
Assn of Oregon Counties Public Lands Committee    Trade Assn 
Assn of State & Territorial Solid Waste Mgmt Officials   Trade Assn 
Assn of University Centers on Disabilities     Trade Assn 
Blakely Crop Hail, Inc       Business 
Bureau of Indian Affairs       Fed Govt 
C.J. Neitzke, Inc        Business 
California State University, Northridge     College/Univ 
Chemical Producers & Distributors Assn     Trade Assn 
Citizens for Florida’s Waterways      Membership 
City of Chicago        Govt 
Coastal States Organization, Inc      Trade Assn 
Commercial Energy of Montana      Business 
Commodity Distribution Coalition      Coalition 
Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities     Coalition 
Corporation for Supportive Housing      Membership 
Council of State Administrators of Vocational Rehabilitation  Trade Assn 
Crop Insurance Services       Business 
Denver, CO         Govt 
Distributed Power Coalition of America     Coalition 
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District 22 of Texas State Senate      Govt 
Dredging Contractors of America      Trade Assn 
Echostar Communications Corp      Business 
Education Leaders Council       Membership 
Electronics Industry Assn       Trade Assn 
Elkhart, IN         Govt 
Farmers & Merchants State Bank of Clarkfield    Business 
Farmers’ Legal Action Group, Inc      Membership 
Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc      Membership 
Federal Maritime Commission      Fed Govt 
Federal Trade Commission       Fed Govt 
Financial Services Roundtable      Trade Assn 
First Command Financial Planning, Inc     Business 
Florida Dept of Agriculture       Govt 
Florida Marine Contractors Associates     Business 
Friends of Blackwater Natl Wildlife Refuge     Membership 
Friends of the Earth        Membership 
Gifts in Kind America       Membership 
Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce     Trade Assn 
Gulf Citrus Growers Assn       Trade Assn 
Helen Keller Natl Center       Membership 
Hoover Institution        Think Tank 
Hydropower Programs for American Rivers     Membership 
Hydropower Reform Coalition      Coalition 
Intel Corp         Business 
Intl Assn of Business, Industry & Rehabilitation    Trade Assn 
Intl Brotherhood of Teamsters      Union 
Intl Dairy Foods Assn        Trade Assn 
Intl Foodservice Distributors Assn      Trade Assn 
Intl Swaps Derivative Assn       Trade Assn 
Investment Company Institute      Business 
Landfill Solutions Group       Coalition 
Latin American Mgmt Assn       Trade Assn 
Latter & Blum         Business 
Life & Health Insurance Foundation      Trade Assn 
Local 175 (Teamsters)       Union 
Local Govts for Superfund Reform      Coalition 
MBNA America Bank       Business 
Marine Contracting Corp       Business 
McLaughlin Gormley King Company     Business 
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City, UT    Govt 
Minnesota Dept of Administration      Govt 
Mobile Home Federation of Massachusetts     Trade Assn 
NISH          Membership 
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NJ Dept of Environmental Protection & Energy    Govt 
NY Bureau of Government Donated Foods     Govt 
Narragansett Bay Commission      Govt 
Natl Agricultural Aviation Assn      Trade Assn 
Natl Agricultural Chemicals Assn      Trade Assn 
Natl Assn of Counties        Trade Assn 
Natl Assn of County & City Health Officials     Trade Assn 
Natl Assn of Insurance & Financial Advisors    Trade Assn 
Natl Assn of Pipeline Safety Representatives    Trade Assn 
Natl Assn of Protection & Advocacy Systems    Trade Assn 
Natl Assn of Realtors        Trade Assn 
Natl Assn of Rehabilitation & Resource Training Centers   Trade Assn 
Natl Assn of State Foresters       Trade Assn 
Natl Assn of Wheat Growers       Trade Assn 
Natl Cattleman’s Assn       Trade Assn 
Natl Corn Growers Assn       Trade Assn 
Natl Cotton Council of America      Trade Assn 
Natl Family Farm Coalition       Coalition 
Natl Governors’ Assn        Trade Assn 
Natl Head Start Assn        Trade Assn 
Natl Industries for the Blind       Trade Assn 
Natl Pork Producers Council       Trade Assn 
Natl Review Online        Business 
New York Racing Assn       Trade Assn 
New York University        College/Univ 
Non-Commissioned Officers Assn of the USA    Trade Assn 
North American Electric Reliability Council     Trade Assn 
North-South Center at the University of Miami    College/Univ 
Oxfam America        Membership 
PacificCorp         Business 
Paragould Light & Water Commission     Business 
Paralyzed Veterans of America      Membership 
Pennsylvania Pubic Utility Commission     Govt 
Port Authority of NY & NJ       Govt 
Port of Richmond, CA       Govt 
Richmond, VA        Govt 
Ruth, Young, Pignatelli & Over      Business 
Small Business Working Group on Procurement Reform   Coalition 
Somersworth, NH        Govt 
Southwest Virginia Vegetable Growers Assn    Trade Assn 
New York State        Govt 
Pennsylvania State        Govt 
Stuntz, Davis & Staffner PC       Business 
TASH          Trade Assn 
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Transportation Claims & Prevention Council, Inc    Trade Assn 
US Conference of Mayors       Trade Assn 
US Rice Producers Group       Trade Assn 
US Trade Representative       Fed Govt 
United Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Assn     Trade Assn 
University of the District of Columbia     College/Univ 
Water Policy Center of Albany State University    College/Univ 
Williams Distributed Power Services      Business 
Women Involved in Farm Economics (WIFE)    Membership 
 
Interest Groups that Succeeded in Getting 2 Recommendations Changed 
65th State Legislative District of Florida     Govt 
Albany Law School        College/Univ 
American Trucking Assns       Trade Assn 
Assn for the Development of Inland Navigation…    Coalition 
Charles E. Smith Mgmt       Business 
Chase Manhattan Bank       Business 
Citigroup, Inc         Business 
Consumer Federation of America      Membership 
Consumers Union        Membership 
Credit Suisse First Boston, Inc      Business 
DuPont Company        Business 
Education Trust        Membership 
Enlisted Assn of the Natl Guard of the US     Trade Assn 
Environmental Protection Division of Minnesota    Govt 
Eugene Area Chamber of Commerce      Trade Assn 
Federal Aviation Assn       Fed Govt 
First Energy Corp        Business 
Florida Fruit and Vegetable Assn      Trade Assn 
Goldman Sachs & Co        Business 
Harker Firm         Business 
Harvard Institute for Intl Development     College/Univ 
Intl Assn of Fish & Wildlife Agencies     Trade Assn 
Jones-Blair Co        Business 
Kerr McGee Chemical Co       Business 
Maine Public Utilities Commission      Govt 
Merrill Lynch & Co        Business 
Michigan Dept of Natural Resources      Govt 
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Co      Business 
Natl Alliance to End Homelessness      Membership 
Natl Assn of Attorneys General      Trade Assn 
Natl Assn of Counties        Trade Assn 
Natl Assn of Manufacturers       Trade Assn 
Natl Assn of Towns & Townships      Trade Assn 
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Natl Coal Assn        Trade Assn 
Natl Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty    Membership 
Natl Motor Freight Traffic Assn      Trade Assn 
Natl League of Cities        Trade Assn 
Natl Safe Kids Campaign       Coalition 
Natl Wildlife Refuge Assn       Membership 
New Castle, DE        Govt 
North Baton Rouge Environmental Assn     Membership 
Oregon Airport Mgmt Assn       Govt 
Public Citizen         Membership 
Responsible Industry for a Sound Environment    Trade Assn 
Securities Exchange Commission      Fed Govt 
US Coast Guard        Fed Govt 
US Conference of Mayors       Trade Assn 
US Public Interest Research Group      Membership 
University of Waterloo       College/Univ 
Volunteers of America       Membership 
 
Interest Groups that Succeeded in Getting 3 Recommendations Changed 
Alcoma Packing Company       Business 
American Automobile Manufacturers Assn     Trade Assn 
Atlantic Richfield Co (ARCO)      Business 
California Citrus Mutual       Trade Assn 
Child Welfare League of America      Membership 
Chrysler Crop         Business 
Citrus Growers Assn        Trade Assn 
Dept of Interior        Fed Govt 
Economic Council of Okeechobee      Membership 
Environmental Defense Fund       Membership 
Environmental Law Institute       Think Tank 
EPA          Fed Govt 
Federation of Manufactured Home Owners of Florida   Trade Assn 
Florida Citrus Mutual        Trade Assn 
Florida Citrus Packers       Trade Assn 
Florida Citrus Processors Assn      Trade Assn 
Florida Dept of Citrus        Trade Assn 
Florida Farm Bureau Federation      Trade Assn 
General Services Administration      Fed Govt 
Golden State Mobilehome Owners League Inc    Trade Assn 
Indian River Citrus League       Trade Assn 
W.R. Grace & Co        Business 
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Interest Groups that Succeeded in Getting 4 Recommendations Changed 
Concerned Neighbors in Action      Membership 
Dept. of Army         Fed Govt 
Dept of Commerce        Fed Govt 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission     Fed Govt 
Federal Reserve Board       Fed Govt 
Littleton, CO         Govt 
Natl Commission on Superfund      Coalition 
Natl Paint & Coatings Assn       Trade Assn 
Western Shoshone Claims Distribution Steering Committee   Govt 
 
Interest Groups that Succeeded in Getting 5-9 Recommendations Changed 
American Movers Conference      Trade Assn 
Clean Sites, Inc        Business  
Dept of Energy        Fed Govt 
Dept of Treasury        Fed Govt 
Florida Dept of Agricultural & Consumer Services    Govt 
Household Goods Carriers’ Bureau      Trade Assn  
Housing Assistance Council       Membership 
USDA          Fed Govt 
 
Interest Groups that Succeeded in Getting 20+ Recommendations Changed 
Army Corps of Engineers       Fed Govt 
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